Thesis
Non-Rational Persons and the Original Position: A Rawlsian Defense of Animal Citizenship
University of Iowa
Bachelor of Arts (BA), University of Iowa
Spring 2018
Abstract
<p>John Rawls’s approach to political philosophy, like other contractarian theories, is non-sympathetic to those who don’t qualify as moral persons.<a title=""><strong>[1]</strong></a> Mark Rowlands challenges this position in “Contractarianism and Animal Rights” by arguing that species, as well as strength, class, intelligence et al. is a natural asset that ought to be hidden behind the veil of ignorance. As such, parties in the original position must extend the principles of justice to non-human animals as a matter of personal interest. I argue that criticisms of Rowlands’ claim are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of personhood, and so what it means to be a proper recipient of justice. The aims of this paper are threefold: first, to discuss various criticisms of Rowlands’ essay; second, to establish an alternative definition of personhood; and lastly, to explore the implications of what an expanded account of rights might entail. <br /> <a title="">[1]</a> Moral personhood in the Rawlsian sense will be discussed at greater length later on</p>
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Non-Rational Persons and the Original Position: A Rawlsian Defense of Animal Citizenship
- Creators
- Michael Corazza - University of Iowa
- Contributors
- Carrie Figdor (Advisor)Diane Jeske (Mentor)
- Resource Type
- Thesis
- Project Type
- Honors Thesis
- Degree Awarded
- Bachelor of Arts (BA), University of Iowa
- Degree in
- Philosophy
- Date degree season
- Spring 2018
- Publisher
- University of Iowa
- Number of pages
- 31 pages
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2018 Michael Corazza
- Language
- English
- Academic Unit
- Honors Program; CLAS Honors Theses
- Record Identifier
- 9984111214702771
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