Board Independence and Corporate Spending

Erik Lie; Keyang (Daniel) Yang

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3167493

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Board Independence and Corporate Spending

Working paper

Open access

Board Independence and Corporate Spending

Erik Lie and Keyang (Daniel) Yang

SSRN

05/09/2018

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3167493

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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3167493View

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Abstract

We examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Non-compliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates over-investment

Details

Title: Subtitle: Board Independence and Corporate Spending
Creators: Erik Lie - University of Iowa
Keyang (Daniel) Yang - Washington State University
Resource Type: Working paper
Publisher: SSRN
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3167493
Number of pages: 38 pages
Language: English
Date posted: 05/09/2018
Academic Unit: Finance
Record Identifier: 9984380593802771

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