Working paper
Delegation and CFO Retention: Evidence from Chief Accounting Officers on the Executive Team
SSRN
06/30/2025
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5328061
Abstract
In recent years, chief financial officer (CFO) responsibilities and resignations have increased. Given these trends, we examine whether delegating accounting is associated with CFO retention. We develop a methodology to identify voluntary CFO departures using the firm's public messaging around the CFO's exit. Our results suggest that CFOs are less likely to voluntarily depart when accounting is delegated. Further, we find evidence that the negative association between delegating accounting and voluntary CFO departures is stronger when accounting demands are higher. Moreover, we find evidence that delegating accounting increases the CFO's human capital. When CFOs do leave, they are more likely to become a CEO and less likely to make a lateral move to another CFO position. Taken together, this study finds evidence consistent with the delegation of accounting increasing CFO retention and human capital.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Delegation and CFO Retention: Evidence from Chief Accounting Officers on the Executive Team
- Creators
- Leah Muriel - University of North FloridaAdrienne Rhodes - University of IowaDan Russomanno - University of Arizona
- Resource Type
- Working paper
- DOI
- 10.2139/ssrn.5328061
- Publisher
- SSRN
- Number of pages
- 66 pages
- Language
- English
- Date posted
- 06/30/2025
- Academic Unit
- Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984843590802771
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