Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence

Rabah Amir; David Rietzke

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4542103

Back

Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence

Working paper

Open access

Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence

Rabah Amir and David Rietzke

SSRN

09/06/2023

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4542103

Files and links (1)

url

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4542103View

Open Access

Abstract

We employ lattice-theoretic techniques to provide sufficient conditions under which sets of pure-strategy Nash equilibria across games are comparable. Differentiating our approach from previous literature, our conditions do not require any notion of complementarity between players' actions or within the components of an individual player's action. Instead, our conditions imply a bound on the magnitude of behavioral changes that stem from the interactions between actions. Our results have broad applications throughout economics, particularly in industrial organization

Monotone comparative statics

supermodularity

non-monotonic best-replies

Cournot Oligopoly

Bertrand oligopoly

Pareto efficiency

Details

Title: Subtitle: Monotone Comparative Statics and Bounds on Strategic Influence
Creators: Rabah Amir - University of Iowa
David Rietzke - Lancaster University
Resource Type: Working paper
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4542103
Publisher: SSRN
Number of pages: 31 pages
Language: English
Date posted: 09/06/2023
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984465558902771

Metrics

11 Record Views