Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? A Model of Venue Choice

Frederick J Boehmke; Sean Gailmard; John W Patty

doi:10.2139/ssrn.529402

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Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? A Model of Venue Choice

Working paper

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Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? A Model of Venue Choice

Frederick J Boehmke, Sean Gailmard and John W Patty

SSRN

04/14/2004

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.529402

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Abstract

In this paper we consider a model of lobbying in which an interest group can lobby either the bureaucracy or the Congress for their preferred policy. The implications of the choice by a lobbyist of whom to lobby (the agency or the legislature) are explored. The main findings of the paper are that self-selection of venues by lobbyists can lead to a failure of the "ally principle" and that delegation but not abdication of authority can lead to an increase in Congressional hearings. Changes within the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s are reinterpreted in the context of our model.

Details

Title: Subtitle: Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? A Model of Venue Choice
Creators: Frederick J Boehmke
Sean Gailmard
John W Patty
Resource Type: Working paper
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.529402
Publisher: SSRN
Number of pages: 36 pages
Language: English
Date posted: 04/14/2004
Academic Unit: Public Policy Center (Archive); Political Science
Record Identifier: 9983982926702771

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