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WOMEN UNITED AGAINST WAR: AMERICAN FEMALE PEACE ACTIVISTS' WORK
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1917

by

Alison Rebecca Steigerwald

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy
degree in History in the
Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

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To my family, without whose support I could not have finished such a monumental achievement.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the work of the women's peace movement from 1914 through 1917. Focused on American women I traced the actions of three actors within the peace movement: Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Fannie Fern Andrews. Though all three women joined the movement around the same time they followed different trajectories as international and national events forced them to react. What I found was that the women's peace movement, despite seemingly united to the contemporary public, was in fact fractured.

Using these three women as representatives of larger factions within the peace movement I traced the creation of the American and international women's peace movement through its failure in April 1917. I argue that the lack of a unified argument prevent the women's peace movement from preventing the United States from entering World War I in April 1917. The factions within the overall women's peace movement were all motivated by different goals, despite having similar long-term hopes of world peace. Despite their differences all women combined ideas of internationalism, Kantian ideals for peace, and American exceptionalism in creating their own resolutions for an end to all wars.

At the center of my story sits Jane Addams, the moderate, who hoped for a negotiated settlement where no country could claim victory. To her right was the conservative Fannie Fern Andrews who, over the course of the war, came to believe that only through Germany's defeat could the world be at peace. Fighting to end the war through any means necessary radical Emily Greene Balch willingly faced the stigma that awaited many pacifists and believed that the world had to address the key components of why wars began, namely large standing armies and imperialism. Understanding these factions allows us to better understand the women's peace movement and its failure to prevent American entry into World War I.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the women's peace movement from 1914 through 1917. I traced the actions of three American actors within the peace movement: Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Fannie Fern Andrews. Though all three women joined the movement around the same time they followed different trajectories as international and national events forced them to react.

Using these three women as representatives of larger factions that formed within the peace movement I traced the creation of the American and international women's peace movement through its failure in April 1917. I argue that the lack of a unified argument prevented the women's peace movement from stopping the United States from entering World War I. The factions within the overall women's peace movement were all motivated differently, despite having similar hopes of world peace. Despite their differences all women combined ideas of internationalism, Kantian ideals for peace, and American exceptionalism in creating their work.

At the center of my story sits Addams, the moderate, who hoped for a negotiated settlement where no country could claim victory. To her right was the conservative Andrews who, over the course of the war, came to believe that only through Germany's defeat could the world be at peace. Fighting to end the war through any means necessary radical Balch believed that the world had to address the key components of why wars began. Understanding these factions allows us to better understand the women's peace movement and its failure to prevent American entry into World War I.

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THE QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE

*“Our Congress is an alternative to the traditional conventions of state-centric and male dominated international relations playing out in Paris. I honour you women from both sides of the conflict who, because of your opposition to the war, have faced harassment and approbation from your governments and fellow citizens. The war methods of government espionage against pacifists are identical in all nations. You will share with one another your wartime experiences, hopes for the future, and how you will advocate for post-war social reform in your home countries.”*¹ –Jane Addams, 1919

Speaking in 1919 at the second Women’s Congress in Zurich, Switzerland, Jane Addams looked back on the hardships that the women meeting there had faced throughout the war, and the unity of purpose they still represented. Indeed, Addams was so focused on demonstrating unity at the Zurich conference that she, along with fellow peace activist Emily Greene Balch, attempted to censor a fellow American delegate’s speech to prevent any form of controversy. Addams and Balch told Mary Church Terrell, the only nonwhite peace delegate, and one of the few African Americans to remain in the peace movement after the American declaration of war, not speak about racial equality when addressing the delegation. Terrell ignored Addams and Balch and spoke about discrimination around the world, but was careful to not mention the United States specifically, thus protecting American’s projected image.²

It is this image of unity that Addams and Balch strove to protect in Switzerland in 1919. Addams, Balch, and others had worked throughout the American neutral period, 1914–1917, to cultivate the American women’s peace movement. They stressed ideas of American-led progressive internationalism, eighteenth-century Kantian ideals of perpetual peace, and the

¹ Jane Addams, Zurich Congress Report, 1919, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

² This particular incident is well documented in Joyce Blackwell-Johnson, “Peace Without Freedom Is Not an Option: Race and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 1914–1945,” *Living War, Thinking Peace (1914–1924): Women’s Experiences, Feminist Thought, and International Relations*, ed. Bruna Bianchi and Geraldine Ludbrook (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016) 239–64.

notion of cosmopolitan patriotism. These ideals supported the women's resolutions which called for a negotiated peace settlement instead of a military-enforced dictated peace, an international organization that could enforce its decisions through economic means and courts, and the spread of American-style democracy.³

When war broke out in July and August 1914, Addams and Balch were joined by many other American women who were all united in their hope for an early peace.⁴ One of these women was Fannie Fern Andrews. An educator and founder of the American School Peace League (ASPL), Andrews worked alongside Balch and Addams from 1914 through 1917. After the American declaration of war, she chose to support President Woodrow Wilson and Congress in the decision to enter the war—and left Addams and Balch's circles. In 1919, when asked about the Zurich Conference, she wrote, "I did not go to the Zurich Congress. I was not in sympathy with the meeting, as I told Miss Addams ... I must confess that I was greatly shocked to read the resolutions of the Congress."⁵

While the women's peace movement disintegrated after the 1917 declaration of war, disunity appeared as early as winter 1915. Conservative and radical factions began to form within the moderate women's peace organizations, which created cracks in the overall women's peace movement. The three factions, conservative, moderate, and radical, had similar long-term goals to end all war; however, their short-term goals, methods, and strategies differed in ways that created controversy. In 1919, desperate to prevent any more fracturing and still hoping to prevent the harsh peace proscribed by many in Paris at the time, Addams sacrificed her

³ This last resolution would only be applied to the women's resolutions selectively, as I will discuss later.

⁴ Countries declared war on each other over a period of time, with Austria-Hungary being first on July 28, 1914, and Great Britain being the last, on August 4, 1914. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, *Decisions for War, 1914–1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1–47.

⁵ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941: letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Miss Nichols, June 25, 1919, A-95, box 20 folder 272, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

friendship with Terrell and her own civil rights beliefs in an attempt to silence Terrell on the need for racial equality.⁶

My dissertation examines Addams, Balch, and Andrews during the American neutral period from 1914 through 1917. These three women each represent a different faction of the women's peace movement. Addams, the moderate, helped establish the first women's peace organization in the United States, and then spent the rest of her time attempting to maintain unity within it. Believing in worldwide disarmament, women's suffrage, self-determination for the European continent, and a negotiated peace settlement that favored neither side, moderate women peace advocates tried to convince American leaders to lead the world to peace.⁷ Conservative female peace advocates focused on the creation of an international government that would ensure world peace into the future, sacrificing all other issues. Conservatives did not believe that a true neutral settlement would benefit the world, as they felt Imperial Germany posed a threat to their goal of world peace.⁸ Radical peace advocates—while in favor of all the moderates' goals—stressed the need to end the war quickly through any means necessary, and focused more on the economic causes of war, including imperialism.⁹ At the onset of war, these three factions worked together through moderate women's peace organizations, such as the American Women's Peace Party (WPP) and the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP); however, as the war dragged on and other international

⁶ Addams was a member of the NAACP and friend of W. E. B. DuBois. She believed in equal rights for all people, but her priority to end all war led her to sacrifice her belief in equality in order to build alliances and maintain unity. Marilyn Fischer, *On Addams* (Australia: Thomson & Wadsworth, 2004). 74–91

⁷ These ideas are very similar to President Woodrow Wilson's plans for peace in 1917 and onward. Wilson learned and was persuaded by women peace advocates and took up these ideas, making them seem like his. Wilson will be discussed in detail below.

⁸ These ideas are more in line with conservative internationalists, who will be discussed below.

⁹ This faction overlapped with socialist thinkers at the time and many members were also Socialists themselves.

organizations developed, the radical and conservative factions began to pull away from the moderate center. While certain international events allowed these cracks in the coalition to remain hidden, the reality was that by mid-1916 the women's peace organization was fractured beyond repair. This disunity prevented the women's peace movement from presenting a united front during the crucial period from February to April 1917 as the United States debated entering the First World War.

Despite this disunity, the work of these three women in founding the American and international women's peace movements, such as the previously mentioned WPP and ICWPP along with the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) and the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, has had lasting effects on peace organizations, as well as peace policy, through present day. This study joins the historiography on dissent in war, American foreign policy, women's history, and American international relations.¹⁰ One area of study that I wish to highlight has been growing in popularity in recent years, as historians work to shine a light into parts of history that have been left out of the more mainstream histories of "winners."

While some scholars have focused on movements that failed and why others have examined peace movements that were not able to prevent wars but still had a significant impact on society.¹¹ Michael Kazin's study of dissent during World War I is one of these books. In *War*

¹⁰ David S. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women's Activism and Citizen Diplomacy in World War I* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Justus D. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2011); Michael Kazin, *War against War: The American Fight for Peace 1914–1918* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017); Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Marie Louise Degen, *The History of the Woman's Peace Party* (New York: Burt Franklin Reprints, 1974); Elizabeth Cobbs, *The Hello Girls: America's First Women Soldiers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017); and Barbara S. Kraft, *The Peace Ship: Henry Ford's Pacifist Adventure in the First World War* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978).

¹¹ To examples are these kinds of works are: Keisha Blain's book *Set the World On Fire*, examining black women who supported the Marcus Garvey movement, which also covers the effects of World War I on her protagonists. Like Kazin's "anti-warriors," Blain's women were unsuccessful in passing the legislation that would have helped millions of black Americans to resettle in Liberia. Keisha N. Blain, *Set the World On Fire: Black Nationalist Women and the Global Struggle for Freedom* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). Even more

against War Kazin argues that the peace activists, whom he terms “anti-warriors,” fought against the United State’s entry into World War I because of a shared revulsion at the conflict that was destroying men and, as they saw it, civilization. Kazin acknowledges that his protagonists did not achieve their goals, but deserve to be studied nonetheless.¹² A recent study of the peace movement during the Cold War, Petra Goedde’s *The Politics of Peace* argues that the peace movement was central to the Cold War and was multifaceted instead of simply focused on one piece of Cold War politics.¹³ Goedde’s work, through examining a different time period than my dissertation, makes a similar point. Because peace movements involved a range of people with a multitude of beliefs, they cannot be studied as a single movement. By examining the factions and differences within the peace movement, historians can better understand why these organizations formed and, unfortunately, failed.

Like these authors I am studying a group that did not meet its immediate objective. Addams, Balch, and Andrews tried to prevent America from entering the First World War, while also working to end the war through a negotiated peace settlement.¹⁴ Yet they accomplished neither goal: America entered the war in 1917, and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was far from a negotiated settlement.¹⁵ These failures, however, do not mean that the work of Addams, Balch, and Andrews during this period is not worth examining.

recently, Chad Fulwider’s book *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I* examines the Imperial German government’s attempts at propaganda in the United States. Fulwider specifically attempts to answer the question “why did the German government fail?” Chad R. Fulwider, *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2016).

¹² Kazin, *War against War*, 1–17.

¹³ Petra Goedde, *The Politics of Peace: A Global Cold War History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019).

¹⁴ Andrews’s goals shifted over time as she became the leader of the conservative peace faction. At the start of the war, however, she agreed with both Addams and Balch.

¹⁵ For more on the Treaty of Versailles, see Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003).

While I am not the first historian to examine Addams, Balch, or Andrews during the First World War, the three of them have not previously been compared and contrasted in a single work. In fact very little has been written on Andrews's work as a peace activist. She is better known for her work in education reform, and though many historians have written about her and her organization, the American School Peace League (ASPL), there is no biography of her.¹⁶ Addams and Balch, on the other hand, have more than a few biographies and articles about them. Most of these, however, focus on the work that led to the two women winning their respective Nobel Peace Prizes.¹⁷ Other works attempt to analyze the women's childhoods, or progressive era work.¹⁸ Biographies are also limited because they attempt to tell the whole story of one person's life, which limits the amount of time an author can spend on a few short, albeit crucial, war years.

Another reason that scholars have not focused on this period of time relates directly to the fact that these women failed to meet their stated objectives. I, however, chose to examine the three women's actions in regard to their peace work during this time in order to understand the ideologies behind their choices, and the actual impact of their work despite their failure. Addams, Balch's, and Andrews' work for peace helped create and publicize ideas such as the spread of democracy, an international government, plebiscites to ensure territorial transfers do not cause future wars, and the hope that the "Great War" would truly be the war to end all wars. Many of these ideals were made even more popular thanks to their adoption by President Wilson

¹⁶ Susan Zeiger, "The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory: U. S. Teachers and the Campaign against Militarism in the Schools, 1914–1918." *Journal of Women's History* 15, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 150–79, Johns Hopkins University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jowh.2003.0058>; Megan Threlkeld, "Education for *Pax Americana*: The Limits of Internationalism in Progressive Era Peace Education," *History of Education Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (November 2017): 515–41, <https://www.cambridge.org/core>.

¹⁷ Judith Hicks Steihm, *Champions for Peace: Women Winners of the Nobel Peace Prize* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006), 21–60.

¹⁸ These include books such as Kristen E. Gwinn, *Emily Greene Balch: The Long Road to Internationalism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010); and Marilyn Fischer, *On Addams* (Australia: Thomson & Wadsworth, 2004).

in his 1918 Fourteen Points speech. Thomas Knock's book *To End All Wars* argues that Wilson got many of his later ideas concerning peace from progressive peace activists such as Addams, Balch, and Andrews.¹⁹

Addams, Balch, and Andrews also founded the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP) in 1915, which became the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1919. This international women's peace organization still exists today and is considered one of the first ever nongovernment organizations (NGOs). All three women also helped found the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), which developed into the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) by 1918. These organizations continue to have an impact on the United States and the world—and would not exist without the actions of these three women during the first years of the war.

My dissertation argues that Addams, Balch, and Andrews, merged the ideas of internationalism with American exceptionalism, cosmopolitan patriotism, and the eighteenth-century philosophy of Immanuel Kant on perpetual peace. From these ideas they crafted a message that they thought would help end the First World War so it would be the last. While they maintained the same long-term goals, their individual trajectories differed. While Addams maintained a moderate position, Andrews became more and more conservative, eventually separating from the peace movement altogether. Balch became a part of the radical peace movement in 1916 and remained with it, despite suffering personal and professional consequences. These women represent these three factions, however, many other women were involved in the movement as well. Their actions, however, demonstrate the different opinions and goals of the different threads of the women's peace movement and how the threads

¹⁹ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 34–36.

unraveled as the war progressed. The resulting breakdown of the women's peace movement made it impossible to prevent American entry into the First World War. Yet despite this lack of success in their ultimate goals, their work for peace had profound and lasting impact on the country and world.²⁰

Jane Addams

Born in 1860 in Cedarville, Illinois, Jane Addams was by 1914 one of the most popular progressive activists in America. While she was best known for her Chicago settlement house, Hull House, she also lectured around the country and taught independent classes to unaffiliated students at the University of Chicago. Addams's life revolved around helping others, and educating people to help themselves and others. A believer in the American pragmatism school of philosophy, Addams studied and adopted and made use of many different social and political theories throughout her lifetime. Avoiding labels—such as socialist, and feminist—Addams saw the benefits of multiple movements and strands of thought in her fight for humanity.

Hull House was inspired by the British Toynbee Hall, which Addams visited in 1888. Founding Hull House with a friend in 1889, Addams quickly became known as an independent thinker and actor in America. At its peak Hull House had 25 women residents, with over 2,000 visitors each week. The home also funded research into progressive issues such as housing,

²⁰ My work relies on the archives of the three women primarily, but one of my main interventions is examining these three women together along with using the Fannie Fern Andrews Papers in an examination of the peace movement. While Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch have been scrutinized by historians studying their peace work, Andrews's papers have not been as examined. Because she is seen as an education activists her peace work has been overlooked. Her papers, however, are a treasure trove for the history of the women's peace movement. Those who organized her papers kept everything, including attachments, duplicates, and other repetitive copies of letters, pamphlets, etc. These papers are lacking in the Addams and Balch papers because they have been completely microfilmed by archivists. The degradation of the Addams and Balch's papers means that no one is allowed to view the original papers which prevents historians from seeing all the different aspects of their papers. Andrews's papers demonstrate the different strands within the women's peace movement because she kept letters and publications from all three main factions of the movement. Her friendship with both Addams and Balch, as well as her leadership of the conservative women's peace movement starting in 1916 left a paper trail for historians to examine. Some of my most valuable letters and documents come from her archive.

sanitation, diseases, and women's issues such as midwifery. Hull House epitomized Addams's ethical philosophies: teach by example, practice cooperation, and practice social democracy. The settlement house taught by example by proving that just because a person was impoverished did not mean they were not worth helping, or could not be educated to benefit society. The home also demonstrated that people of different ethnicities, economic status, and backgrounds could get along and work together despite their differences. This last point was the most important for Addams, who was a community internationalist, as well as a humanitarian internationalist. Addams did not care who a person was or where they were from; she believed that they should all be allowed the same opportunities, access to education, enfranchisement, etc., in order to make the world a better place.²¹

Addams's love for all people conformed to the Christian faith that she was raised in, and which she continued to educate herself in throughout her life. Though her father was an unaffiliated Quaker, Addams herself attended a more strict Christian girls' school and got baptized into the Presbyterian Church in 1886. Throughout her life she would attend Presbyterian church services, but also went to a Unitarian church regularly and later attended and even spoke at an Ethical Society in Chicago. Despite her keen sense of faith, she did not adhere to any organized religious practice or doctrine. Guided by practices of early Christians, and by Tolstoy's book *My Religion*, Addams focused on the love of Christ as her inspiration to love others. This brand of love, also known as agape, is given to all equally, no matter what. Addams took this to heart and throughout her life would attempt to help others see all people in this same way.²²

²¹ Fischer, *On Addams*, 74–91.

²² Fischer, *On Addams*, 74–91.

Her belief in agape and humanitarian internationalism were the foundations of her peace work. Addams believed that all people deserved peace. She did not discriminate between a German soldier and a British housewife: both deserved a world built on peace. As the war broke out in 1914, Addams was working at Hull House and completing her tenure as the vice-president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, a post she had held since 1911. Addams went on many speaking tours around the country, fighting for the vote. Her work as a women's suffrage advocate created more connections around the U.S. and the world for her—one of the most important of which would be with Carrie Chapman Catt, a fellow women's suffrage advocate and close friend.

Carrie Chapman Catt was born in 1859 in Wisconsin and had a career as a teacher in Iowa. She paid her own way through Iowa State College and, after working in education for many years, joined the suffrage movement in 1887 and became the leader of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1900. She was a prominent mind behind the wording of the Nineteenth Amendment, which passed in 1920. Catt founded the League of Women Voters and supported pacifism openly later in her life. While she and Addams disagreed on the importance of pacifism versus the importance of women's suffrage, they remained friends and supported each other in almost all of their organizations. Their correspondence demonstrates their friendship, even in times of disagreement.²³ While Catt attempted to remain outside the public peace movement during the war she worked behind the scenes to maintain a moderate peace movement within the United States. As a close friend of Addams correspondence between the two women offers insights into their opinions about the peace movement as well as its goals.

²³ The First World War would prove to be an exception to this, as Catt ended up working with the United States government in support of the war after April 1917, and Addams did not. Catt was very careful to not make peace more important than suffrage and never formally aligned her suffrage groups with the peace groups she supported through Addams. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 37.

Fannie Fern Andrews

Born in 1867, and married in 1890 to Edwin G. Andrews, Fannie Fern Andrews was a teacher, education activist, and international education worker. A native of the Boston area, Andrews attended the Salem Normal School for training in teaching. After six years of teaching public school in Boston, she returned to school and earned her degree in psychology and education from Radcliffe College in 1902.²⁴

A progressive activist, Andrews helped found the American School Peace League in 1908, and was also a member of the American Peace Society, where she was the only female to serve on the executive committee. Throughout her lifetime, Andrews worked with both men and women to establish civics education in public schools. Andrews believed that conflicts between people could be traced back to differences in ethnic and economic backgrounds—and that these differences could be reduced through education. Andrews applied this idea to nations as well. As a community internationalist, Andrews thought that if a local community could be taught to get along despite differences, then countries of educated people could understand how they were connected despite their differences. Therefore, an internationally focused education could achieve world peace. To achieve her goal, Andrews pushed for a form of internationalism to be taught in public schools, and dreamed of an international curriculum, which would eventually lead to permanent peace.²⁵

Andrews's form of internationalism, however, was not free from nationalist bias. Despite her encouragement of cooperation between all people, Andrews was entrenched in the idea of American exceptionalism, and believed that America and western societies would be the ones to

²⁴ Susan Zeiger, "The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory," 150–79.

²⁵ Susan Zeiger, "The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory," 150–79.

“lead the way” in the creation of a world community.²⁶ Her curriculum, published early in 1914, focuses on an American-led education system. It implies —though it never explicitly states— American and even white superiority over other races and other cultures. This belief in American exceptionalism would influence her ideas on peace during World War I.²⁷

Andrews’s American focused internationalism connects her with other activists, such as Jane Addams, during this time. Addams, however, focused more on humanitarian internationalism, and did not share the belief in the differences between the races. Like Andrews, though, Addams did believe that the United States would lead the way in creating a world community and world peace. Yet Addams put peace work before all other causes. Andrews was a peace activist and suffrage activist, but believed her education work to be the most important, and was willing to put it above all other causes, including peace.²⁸

Emily Greene Balch

Emily Greene Balch, born January 9, 1867, to a prominent Boston family, lived a decidedly more international life than either Addams or Andrews, though she published less and remained less known than Addams among the general United States public.²⁹ Balch’s life

²⁶ American exceptionalism is the nationalist belief that the United States and the American people are somehow extraordinary when compared to the rest of the world. This idea can be seen as far back as the founding of America with the idea that the country would be a “city on a hill” or a beacon to all others. For more information on American exceptionalism and specifically Wilson’s interpretation of it, see Cara Lea Burnidge, *A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).

²⁷ Threlkeld, “Education for *Pax Americana*,” 515–41.

²⁸ Unfortunately, there is no biography of Fannie Fern Andrews. All of the above has been pulled from articles and mentions in books. Unlike Balch and Addams, Andrews has not gotten the attention she deserves, despite a lengthy correspondence record and complete archive collection at Harvard University through the Radcliffe Library.

²⁹ Though both women won Nobel Peace Prizes for their work for international peace, an article in 1995 acknowledged that Addams was much better known than Balch. While authors disagree on the reasons, some argue that her socialism diminished her popularity in America, and some point to the attitudes of the world at the time she was awarded the prize. Authors agree, though, that she avoided the limelight more than Addams, and never founded an establishment, like Adams’s settlement house, that would have cemented her legacy. See Harriet Hyman Alonso, “Nobel Peace Laureates, Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch: Two Women of the Women’s Internationalism League for Peace and Freedom,” *Journal of Women’s History*, 7 (Summer 1995): 6–25; and Mary Jo Deegan, “A Very Different Vision of Jane Addams And Emily Greene Balch: A Comment on ‘Nobel Peace Laureates, Jane

focused on improving relations between human beings. She believed that nationalism and patriotism inhibited people from understanding each other—and needed to be unlearned in order for international education to be successful. Yet Balch too believed in an American-centered internationalism and wrote in her diary, “Americanism which holds the future of our people as its pledge. This Americanism breathes a spirit of universal and disinterested good-will; it is based on individual liberty, enriched by a sense of social duty.”³⁰ For Balch, America offered the path that she hoped people would follow into the future. Balch’s beliefs aligned with those of fellow progressive activist Randolph Bourne, who argued that the United States needed to accept immigrant cultures creating a more diverse America instead of forcing all immigrants to conform to Anglo-Saxon beliefs. Balch’s study of Eastern European immigrants proved that those who lived in the United States lost connections with their homes and their traditions, which weakened their communities. She believed that they deserved to keep these connections instead of sacrificing them to Americanism.³¹

Though Balch was born and raised in a sheltered, wealthy environment, she sought out those from different economic and cultural backgrounds as she pursued her career as an academic and progressive activist. Attending private schools and Bryn Mawr College before traveling to France to study economics, Balch completed her degrees at Harvard, the University of Chicago, and Berlin by 1896. That same year she became a professor at Wellesley College, where she taught economics and sociology. Starting in 1904 until 1906, Balch took a sabbatical from Wellesley and travelled around the United States and Eastern Europe to research and write

Addams and Emily Greene Balch, *Journal of Women’s History* 7 (Summer 1995): 6-26, by Harriet Hyman Alonso,” *Journal of Women’s History* 8 (Summer 1996): 121–25.

³⁰ Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5 and 6.

³¹ Mercedes M. Randall, *Improper Bostonian: Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Peace Laureate, 1946* (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1964), 100-24.

her book *Our Slavic Fellow Citizen*. Balch lived in mining villages, tenement housing, and settlement houses in New York, Illinois, Texas, Nebraska, and Connecticut; she also travelled to Austria-Hungary to visit with the country's different ethnic groups.³² Her book argued that immigrants could not be understood without learning where they came from and what they had left behind. In Austria-Hungary she found each individual ethnic group maintained its own culture and values—which could not be found in their diasporic settlements in the United States. She contended that this loss of culture created tension between generations, all of which needed to be understood in order for Americans to accept immigrant families as Americans, which was the ultimate goal.

Balch's research led her to support open immigration policies, at a time when anti-immigration advocates were using scientific racism to push for restrictions on Asian and other immigrants. Balch's book—and her teaching when she returned to Wellesley in 1907—argued that these restrictions were un-American and based on unscientific theories. At the same time, Balch also became a critic of capitalism because of her time living in the conditions of those who were not benefiting from it. Proclaiming herself a socialist in her journal in December 1906, she would fight for the rights of workers and unions up until the beginning of the war in 1914. Though Balch declared herself a socialist, she was not a Marxist and thought his economic interpretation of history to be overly simplistic: "I never accepted the theory or practice of the class struggle, which I rejected both on scientific and on ethical grounds."³³ Despite this, her biographer argues that she believed the contemporary competitive system of capitalism was so bad that she could not consciously support it.³⁴

³² These included the Bohemians or Czechs, Slovaks, Moravians, Ukrainians, several Russian immigrants, and Jewish citizens, whom she separated from the other groups.

³³ Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5 and 6.

³⁴ Randall, *Improper Bostonian*, 124.

Internationally, socialists seemed the most likely group to oppose war and encourage international relations between workers. In 1907 the second Socialist International meeting in Stuttgart, Germany, called for gradual disarmament through arbitration, and for standing armies to be replaced by small militias. Despite these international resolutions, American Socialists did not talk much about war and peace before 1914. Several different organizations claimed to speak for American workers, such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the American Socialist Party (ASP), and the radical International Workers of the World (IWW). While these organizations were not all socialist, they did all seek to even out the power structures in American workplaces. When the war broke out in 1914, however, European socialist leaders were surprised and disappointed at the nationalist rhetoric of their members, and many Socialists ended up supporting and fighting in the war.³⁵ In the United States, the APS opposed the war, much to the detriment of its political leader, Eugene V. Debs, who would later be arrested. Balch declared herself a Socialist with ideas similar to Debs on workers' rights and economic structures; and, like Debs, Balch supported a non-Marxist version of socialism, with no revolution threatening the democracy she supported.³⁶

Balch remained good friends with Jane Addams and Fannie Fern Andrews. Staying several times at Hull House during her travels, Balch was one of Addams's supporters during the creation of the Women's Peace Party in January 1915; she travelled with Addams to The Hague in April 1915. In 1917, Balch's devotion to understanding others and to American-led world peace would alienate her from Wellesley College, when the Board of Trustees chose not to renew her contract in 1918. Though like Addams she was redeemed a decade after the war,

³⁵ For more information on British socialists, see Adam Hochschild, *To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion 1914–1918* (New York: Mariner Books, 2001); for more on American socialists, see Kazin, *War against War*, 11–13.

³⁶ Kazin, *War against War*, 11–13.

Balch chose to work internationally instead of domestically, and did not return to teaching or economic work after 1919.

All three women subscribed to three ideologies that overlapped significantly during the First World War. The first was internationalism, the second cosmopolitan patriotism, and the third the 1795 Kantian ideals of perpetual peace. Among the internationalists were two types: progressive and conservative. While all three women began their peace work as progressive internationalists, Andrews became more and more conservative as the war progressed.

The three ideologies that the women subscribed to demonstrate that the women's peace movement was not operating in vacuum and that they were within a movement that had a long history and deep roots. Immanuel Kant's ideas in particular unite the three women as all three cite his work at some point during the First World War. His ideas also appear in the resolutions adopted by the different organizations created and joined by these three women.

Progressive internationalists believed that domestic politics and foreign policy were tied together and that peace was essential to change. They thought that the war in Europe would eventually draw in the United States, which would destroy the morality of the nation. Therefore the United States had a mission to bring about a negotiated settlement, in which one side would not benefit from the war over another.³⁷ Added to the idea of progressive internationalism, by most American peace activists, was American exceptionalism, which created the idea that I have termed American-led progressive internationalism.

While conservative internationalists also believed in an eventual world peace, their focus was not on the current war but rather on the world that would be created after the war ended.

³⁷ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 50–51.

Conservative internationalists planned for a strong international government and judiciary that would help maintain postwar peace. Pro-Entente, and more specifically pro-British, most conservative internationalists did not attempt to hide the fact that they supported Britain, Russia, and France winning over Germany and Austria-Hungary. Most conservative activists believed that German militarism had caused the war, and only through its defeat could the world achieve peace. Organizations such as the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), founded in 1915 and led by former president Theodore Roosevelt and future president William Howard Taft, the LEP put forth plans such as collective security and arbitration to prevent future wars. Conservative internationalists, however, did not work with pacifists, as they had no quarrel with the current war. The LEP was also a male-led organization, which did not provide roles for its female supporters.³⁸

Both progressive and conservative internationalists applied the idea of American exceptionalism to their movements. Both argued that all other countries should adopt the American model of democracy and foreign policy. Progressives frequently used the example of the relationship between the United States and Canada. A British Commonwealth country, Canada had been the site of many battles between the Americans and the British, but by the 1900s had settled into a peaceful coexistence with the United States. American peace advocates cited this relationship as proof that America was leading the rest of the world in creating peaceful borders. Progressive peace activists wanted the world to follow America's lead, and pressed this idea throughout the war.³⁹ Conservative internationalists also wanted the world to follow America's lead in the spread of democracy; most of their ideas for international governments

³⁸ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 45–51.

³⁹ The idea of America's relationship with Canada as an example for peaceful borders is expressed by Jane Addams and others at The Women's Congress at The Hague in 1915, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 2.

were based on the foundations of the American government. Yet conservatives were concerned with peace only as it related to maintaining world peace after the current war had ended, unlike progressive peace activists, who wanted America to lead in ending the European conflict.⁴⁰

Cosmopolitan patriots believed that one could actively dissent and oppose a nation's policies—even its ideals—and still love their country as patriots. Their argument—that the act of debating for change actually proved their patriotism—emerged from the second industrial revolution in America, the rise of immigration, and the growing wealth disparity that drove the progressive movement. Cosmopolitan patriots also believed in international solidarity among all people—that everyone had shared interests in peace, no matter who they were or what nationality they claimed. This conforms to Addams and Balch's ideas on humanitarianism, which was more important to them than the national interests that drove most wars.⁴¹ Andrews, on the other hand, was not a cosmopolitan patriot and did not have the same humanitarian focus. Andrews in particular believed in the supremacy of certain people over others and brought that argument into her peace work.⁴²

The final ideology that many in the peace movement subscribed to was their interpretation of German philosopher Immanuel Kant's essay *Perpetual Peace*. First published in English in 1796, it was adopted by the 1914 peace movement as the ideal way to create permanent peace. Kant's essay had two sections; the first listed the six resolutions that he believed would create permanent peace, and the second included three ideas that every state should adopt in order for perpetual peace to actually exist. Kant's resolutions were that 1) treaties could not contain any articles that would lead to future wars, 2) no state should ever control

⁴⁰ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 45–51.

⁴¹ Jonathan Hansen, *The Lost Promise of Patriotism: Debating American Identity, 1890–1920* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), xiii–xxii.

⁴² The issues of race, civil rights, and peace work during the war will be discussed in detail below.

another, 3) standing armies needed to be abolished over time, 4) no country should ever borrow money to fight a war of aggression, 5) no one should ever interfere with another states' government or constitution, and, finally, 6) states should abstain from allowing their soldiers to commit any atrocities that could lead to another conflict. For these resolutions to actually create permanent peace, Kant believed that all states needed a republican civil constitution and representative governments that allowed for democratic control of foreign policy. He also called on states to come together in a pacific union with a commitment to not perpetrating any atrocities on any peoples within any states.⁴³ Kant's philosophical argument aligns with the beliefs of cosmopolitan patriotism discussed above; like cosmopolitan patriots Addams and Balch he believed in putting humans over nations.

While Kant's book is referenced many times by the women of the peace movement, it needs to be noted that his writing is vague, open to varying interpretations.⁴⁴ For example, he called for states to come together in a pacific union, which many progressive peace activists believed meant an international government of some kind, though Kant never used that term. Kant also wrote that constitutional monarchies were perfectly acceptable representative governments for perpetual peace, while American peace activists called for American-type democracies to be formed, and frequently asked for plebiscites to be put in place for the transfer of territory. One piece of Kant's theory that was also completely ignored by the women of the American peace movement was his assertion that atrocities lead to future wars. The American women, and the international peace movement in general, knew what the German soldiers were

⁴³ This final idea referred more to governments harming minorities within their own states than others interfering. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1796), intro. Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia University Press, 1939).

⁴⁴ This is especially true because Kant was a philosopher writing at a time when monarchies still constituted most countries' governments, and debates on the rights of citizens versus subjects still caused great controversy.

accused of doing in Belgium as they conquered and held the country.⁴⁵ Some women actually travelled there during the war and saw it for themselves. However, no one ever brought up the German atrocities in reference to Kant. While the American women did not ignore what happened in Belgium, they purposefully ignored this part of Kant's essay when discussing it in public. By not acknowledging this part of the essay, the three women avoided acknowledging that, in Kant's formulation, the current "Great War" might not be the last.

One event that no international peace worker, American or otherwise, chose to debate was how the war started. Peace workers believed that the war would simply be prolonged by debating whose fault it was. While individuals had their own beliefs, as a movement, most peace workers choose to focus on how to *end* the war. The rest of the world, however, was more than eager to debate the start of the war. In fact, historians today are still in disagreement over why the war erupted—although everyone agrees on the immediate catalyst. On June 28, 1914, while inspecting the city of Sarajevo, the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were shot by a Serbian nationalist named Gavrilo Princip. This event sparked the international crisis that developed into World War I.⁴⁶

As scholars have written many different accounts of the beginnings of World War I, the purpose of this dissertation is not to attempt to answer why the war occurred.⁴⁷ I intend to

⁴⁵ The reports of German atrocities and the truth, exaggeration, and propaganda about them are well covered in John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

⁴⁶ Hamilton and Herwig, *Decisions for War*, 1–22.

⁴⁷ A comprehensive list of the works that study the beginnings of World War I is impossible to produce here. Some classic studies are Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928), and Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), while more modern monographs include Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012), and Margaret Macmillan, *The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914* (New York: Random House, 2014). While certain monographs take a side, others attempt to explain the war by examining international issues, such as colonialism, or the concepts of militarism and social Darwinism. During the war itself, every country involved in the war worked to shape the narrative of the war's beginnings to its own liking. The different colored books that each country produced supposedly told the "true" story of why the war began. These included the German White Book, Austro-Hungarian Red Book, English Blue Book, French Yellow Book, Russian Orange Book, Serbian Blue Book, and Belgian Gray Book. Once the war ended and the Entente powers, Britain,

examine what the contemporaries argued caused the war and what they believed needed to change in order to prevent future wars from occurring. What I have found is that many of the arguments for why the war began, posed after the war ended and well into the 1920s, were actually argued by people during the war itself. Ideas about militarism and colonialism became topics of debate by those in the anti-war movement as they worked to end the current war and prevent future ones. There was also plenty of blame placed on Germany. Britain, too, faced blame from American anti-war activists and government officials because of their naval policies during the war.⁴⁸

American entry into World War I also has a disputed history, but a recent monograph by Justus Doenecke provides a detailed look. Doenecke's *Nothing Less Than War* covers America's step-by-step entry into the war against Germany, with detailed coverage of the sinking of ships by German U-boats and the question of who America would go to war with, Germany or Britain. Rather than arguing for a single cause, Doenecke walks the reader through the multitude of events that brought America to declare war against Germany on April 6, 1917.⁴⁹

France, Italy, and the United States had won, a much simpler story was put in place. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles made the war Germany's fault and the consequences of that document are well known. Macmillan, *1919*, xxv–xxxi. Recently scholars have attempted to find compromise among the many theories for why the war began. Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig's book *Decisions for War* examines each individual country that entered World War I, smaller or colonized countries excluded, and argued that each country's leadership had independent reasons for entering the war. Hamilton and Herwig contend that no single argument or reason can ever be posited that would satisfy all the different powers that helped create the First World War. I personally find that Hamilton and Herwig's book provides the most logical reasons for the war beginning. Hamilton and Herwig, *Decisions for War*, 1–22.

⁴⁸ Sondra R. Herman, *Eleven against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898–1921* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), and Christopher McKnight Nichols, *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

⁴⁹ Doenecke argues that it was very possible early in the war for America to enter the war against Britain because of the royal government's confiscation of American cargo. This had led to a war between the two countries in 1812. Doenecke contends that many in the United States were angered by the British treatment of American goods and believed that as a neutral nation they should be allowed to trade with whomever they wished. Anti-British sentiment, however, was overtaken by anger at the Germans as passenger ships were sunk throughout the war. Though the Sussex Pledge of 1916 helped ease tensions between Germans and Americans, the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and the sinking of American ships in 1917 would lead America into the war.⁴⁹ Doenecke also examines the economic incentives of fighting Germany, which grew exponentially from 1914 through 1917. American businessmen had invested heavily in the British side of the war, and if Germany were to win, these investments would potentially be forfeited. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*.

One person whose role in the American declaration of war cannot be overlooked is President Woodrow Wilson. First elected in 1912 and then reelected in 1916 while the war in Europe raged on, Wilson became one of the main targets of peace advocates. Thomas Knock's *To End All Wars* covers Wilson's rise to the presidency and his actions during and after the war. Knock argues that Wilson's decision to not support his progressive backers during American belligerency cost him his political legacy. When the war first broke out in Europe in 1914 Wilson declared neutrality, but as the Germans continued to sink ships and the American economy became more and more mired in the British war, Wilson began seeing war as inevitable. Wilson himself, along with his advisors, were anglophiles as well. This sympathy for Britain led to Wilson ignoring British violations of American neutrality while severely protesting German ones. Knock contends, however, that Wilson needed the progressive peace activists to support him, especially during his reelection campaign. After the Imperial German government chose to resume unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram came to light in 1917, Wilson felt betrayed by the German government and refused to listen or communicate with progressive peace activists, to his own detriment. Knock's final argument is that while Wilson got many of his peace ideas from progressive peace activists, like Addams, he abandoned them during the year America was at war. Censorship laws and the Espionage and Sedition Acts led to many progressive peace publications being stopped or censored. The writers and editors of these papers persuaded Wilson to help stop this from happening; yet when Wilson's subordinates defied his orders, he did nothing.⁵⁰ With Wilson seemingly not helping progressives, they stopped supporting him. Knock contends that when Wilson came home with the Treaty of

⁵⁰ An example of this can be seen with Albert Sidney Burleson, the American Postmaster General, who was frequently told by Wilson from 1917 onward to reconsider his enforcement of censorship laws. Burleson ignored Wilson's requests, but he was not fired. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 134–37.

Versailles and its League of Nations, the progressive peace advocates, who had pushed for an international governmental body, did not campaign for him. Addams and others worked against the treaty's passage because of the articles in it.⁵¹ Without support and facing insurmountable health issues, Wilson failed to get the League of Nations through the Senate. Knock asserts that Wilson's decisions during the war alienated his best supporters, which led to his political downfall in 1919.⁵²

The Progressive and Suffrage Movements

When World War I began in 1914, there were many ongoing reform movements in the United States. One of the main reforms American pacifists were associated with before the war was women's suffrage.⁵³ Some women saw enfranchisement as the key to gaining their rights to participate in politics on the same level as men. The perception that femininity and pacifism went together helped gain women the support of pacifist men who believed that by getting women the

⁵¹ For more information about the articles protested by progressive activists and Wilson's fight to get the Treaty of Versailles through Congress, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 180–87.

⁵² Knock, *To End All Wars*, 260–71.

⁵³ The fight for women's suffrage in America dates back to 1848 when antebellum reformers wished to participate in reform movements such as temperance and antislavery. While two suffrage organizations formed after the Civil War in 1869, they merged in 1890 into the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, and Susan B. Anthony. NAWSA continued to be the mainstream suffrage organization and many female progressive reformers were members. By the start of World War I, some countries had already given women the right to vote nationally, and many U.S. western states had passed partial or full voting rights laws. New Zealand gave women the same voting rights as men in 1893; in 1902, 1906, and 1913 respectively, Australia, Finland, and Norway also gave women the right to vote. In the United States some western and Midwestern states began giving women the right to vote even earlier than New Zealand. Wyoming passed a women's suffrage bill in 1869, twenty-one years before it became a state. Women's suffrage in Wyoming almost cost them state ratification as lawmakers in Washington, DC, wanted the provision removed. Wyoming's state legislature, however, fought for women's suffrage to remain, and statehood was ratified with women's suffrage included. Though women in Wyoming gained suffrage in 1869, many other women would continue to wait until the 1890s and early 1900s before their states passed suffrage legislation. Colorado, Utah, and Idaho all passed women's suffrage bills in the 1890s, while Washington state, California, Oregon, Arizona, Kansas, and the territory of Alaska all passed similar bills from 1910 to 1913. While some states passed women's suffrage bills that allowed women to vote in all elections, many other states passed laws that allowed limited suffrage for women. In these states, women could vote only in presidential elections.⁵³ Most of these limited suffrage bills were passed by states from 1917 to 1919. The majority of these limited suffrage states were again in the Midwest and West with the exceptions of Rhode Island, Michigan, Tennessee, New York, and Maine. For the most part, New England and the South did not allow women's suffrage before the passing of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.

vote nationally they would be able to out vote more military minded men. This idea became more important after the start of World War I in Europe because pacifists saw women voters as a way to prevent America from entering or supporting the European war.⁵⁴

The women's suffrage movement, however, faced opposition from other women— from outside the movement as well as from radical activists within their own ranks. Though women had gained more direct political power throughout the world and in the United States by 1914, many special interest groups, politicians, and even other progressive women attempted to halt and reverse these gains. Known as the anti-suffragists, or just the antis, these activists worked to prevent women's suffrage from passing in the states and helped keep a national law from being passed in Congress. While many male activists did not think that women should be in politics or out of the home for any reason, female antis attempted a different tactic. Women organized against enfranchisement argued that gaining direct political power would corrupt the political and social power women already had. They argued that by gaining the vote women would no longer be above politics and would be forced into partisan fights that would prevent them from advocating and achieving real change.⁵⁵

While suffrage organizations were united behind the idea that women needed enfranchisement on the national level, two main factions formed, with very different views on how to achieve this. The more moderate NAWSA focused on public speakers, parades, and other forms of campaigning, such as letter writing, in order to keep politicians' focus on the plight of women and how many women actually wanted the vote. In states where women did not have the

⁵⁴ Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, "A Short History of the Woman Suffrage Movement in America," in *One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement*, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Oregon: NewSage Press, 1995) 9–20.

⁵⁵ Manuela Thurner, "Better Citizens Without the Ballot: American Anti-suffrage Women and Their Rationale during the Progressive Era," in *One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement*, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Oregon: NewSage Press, 1995), 203–20.

vote, the NAWSA staged fake elections during the 1916 presidential to convey that reasonable, fashionable women wanted the vote.⁵⁶ The other faction in the suffrage movement was Alice Paul's Congressional Union. Formed from a committee that was originally part of the NAWSA, the Congressional Union took a radically different approach to displaying the need of women's suffrage.⁵⁷ Seen as unladylike and aggressive, Paul's Congressional Union caused controversy among suffrage activists and organizations; however, Paul never gave up on her protests. She suffered imprisonment and forced feeding for her tactics.⁵⁸ The divisions in the suffrage movement between moderates and radicals mirrors the splits that would develop within the women's peace movement.

While tactics remained the most divisive factor among suffrage organizations before the war, once President Wilson declared war on Germany in April of 1917, a much larger split occurred. Many women were both pacifist activists and suffrage activists. Some organizations, such as the Women's Peace Party (WPP) had women's suffrage in its constitution, and many female activists were very active in both suffrage and peace organizations both national and international. Once war was declared, however, one could no longer be both a pacifist and a

⁵⁶ For more information about the wealthy and notable woman involved with NAWSA, see Johanna Neuman, *Gilded Suffragists: The New York Socialites Who Fought for Women's Right to Vote* (New York: Washington Mews Books, 2017).

⁵⁷ Paul, an activist, had returned in 1910 from England having worked with England's most prominent suffragettes, including Emmeline Pankhurst and the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). The WSPU, led by Pankhurst, was responsible for bombing the London home of David Lloyd George, an MP and future Prime Minister, as well as other violent acts. Their use of hunger strikes while in prison had led Parliament to pass the so-called Cat and Mouse Act, which allowed prisoners to be released for health reasons and then rearrested upon recovery. This legislation was passed in 1913 as the Temporary Discharge for Ill-Health Act; more information can be found at <http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/case-study-the-right-to-vote/the-right-to-vote/winson-green-forcefeeding/cat-and-mouse-act/> while never arrested in England, Paul was heavily influenced by Pankhurst's actions and slogan "Actions not Words" and brought the militant suffragette tactics back to the United States. The women of the NAWSA, however, disapproved of Paul's tactics because they believed that strategies, such as picketing the White House in 1917, which had never been done before especially by women, would alienate President Wilson from their cause.

⁵⁸ Linda G. Ford, "Alice Paul and the Triumph of Militancy," in *One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement*, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Oregon: NewSage Press, 1995) 277-94.

suffragist: extreme patriotism demanded all Americans choose one or the other. Many suffragists chose to support the United States government, mainly President Wilson, and work to support the war effort through relief work and fundraising. Other activists chose to work for peace and became alienated from the suffrage groups that supported the war as well as by the majority of American citizens. Carrie Chapman Catt and Jane Addams best represent this split. Catt, a prominent suffragist, pacifist, and president of the NAWSA, worked with Addams to organize a Women's Peace Meeting in January of 1915 and helped push against preparedness and American entry to the war. Once war seemed a sure thing, however, Catt sided with the American government and declared the NAWSA in support of the war—before Congress had formally declared war and before NAWSA members were polled. This act shocked members of the NAWSA, including Addams, who left the organization and continued fighting for peace.⁵⁹ While many women felt betrayed by Catt, historians credit Catt's decision with helping win women's suffrage at the end of the war, as President Wilson eventually became a leading advocate for women's suffrage. Even with the president's support it would take almost two years to get the nineteenth amendment ratified.⁶⁰

The second ongoing movement in the United States at this time was the progressive movement. While there were multiple goals for reform in the American progressive movement, prohibition being one example, its members frequently believed in internationalism and pacifism. By 1914, the progressive movement reached its peak in the United States. Though members of the movement worked throughout the 1920s and 1930s, most of their accomplishments occurred before World War I. During the war itself, the peace movement and

⁵⁹ Neuman, *Gilded Suffragists*, 105–40.

⁶⁰ Wheeler, "A Short History of the Woman Suffrage Movement in America," 9–20.

the preparedness movement occupied much of the nation's attention, which impacted the abilities of the progressives to pass reforms.

Many of these progressive reforms revolved around safety and education. Progressives wanted to reform the food industry, industrial safety, children's education and work, along with public safety and moral well-being. Michael McGerr's book *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America* documents these movements along with the challenges that progressives faced. McGerr notes that progressive movements were often led by middle-class white women who worked to improve society as well as their own place within it. Women such as Addams, Balch, and Andrews founded and led progressive organizations that attempted to reform society and politics; American progressive women also developed ties to similar organizations overseas.

At the same time, African American women, such as Mary Church Terrell, worked within the African American community for civil rights as well as many of the progressive reforms advocated by her white counterparts. African American progressives had a much harder time getting their voices heard within the progressive movement, however, and issues such as women's rights, beyond suffrage, and the peace movement during the war divided many women's movements and organizations.⁶¹

Race and the Women's Peace Movement

Within the women's peace movement race and equality were rarely discussed. While individual members such as Addams were believers in civil rights and equality for all people, white peace activists chose to ignore the issues of race in order to maintain political connections

⁶¹ Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870–1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 201–15.

with the Jim Crow South. Southern politicians, including President Wilson, actively supported the discriminatory policies of Jim Crow. Many southern politicians were also anti-war, which created an opportunity for female peace activists.⁶² Choosing to sacrifice any idea of equality in order to gain access to power, peace organization leaders like Addams made the decision to leave civil rights and equality behind. While Addams was a humanitarian and supporter of equal rights, as an upper-class white woman she had the luxury of leaving race behind. Other activists, such as Terrell, were forced to face this inequality every day.⁶³

Internationally, ideas about self-determination and imperial reform were part of the women's peace movement. However, the right to self-determination was in the WASP mind only associated with white European nations; reforms to the imperialist system were advocated only by American radical activists such as Balch. Most international women's peace organizations perceived the world in two camps, civilized and uncivilized. In reality this broke the world down to white and nonwhite nations, with the white nations having a responsibility to educate and help the nonwhite ones progress.⁶⁴ Andrews made this argument frequently while discussing the formation of an international government. Andrews, who viewed white and nonwhite people as different species, believed that a world government only should be made up of "civilized" or white nations and did not support self-determination for nonwhite colonies.⁶⁵ Although radicals

⁶² This was similar to how the suffrage movement approached race. White women used the fact that African American men had the right to vote (if not the opportunity) but white women did not. Especially in the South, women's suffrage was spun as a way to increase the white voting population. One of the most important southern politicians was Claude Kitchin, the Speaker of the House from North Carolina, who was expressly against the war, but was also a fervent racist. President Wilson screened the Ku Klux Klan film *Birth of a Nation* in the White House and complimented its "historical accuracy." Yet these are the men that Addams and others needed to persuade in order to prevent America from entering the war.

⁶³ For more information on Mary Church Terrell, see Callahan, Noaquia. "Heat of the Day: Mary Church Terrell and African American Feminist Transnational Activism" (PhD thesis, University of Iowa, 2018). <https://doi.org/10.17077/etd.wvdj-heak>.

⁶⁴ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20 folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁶⁵ Threlkeld, "Education for *Pax Americana*," 515-41.

such as Balch believed that imperial reform was necessary, the idea that people of all races were equal was not included among any peace organizations' resolutions. Radicals viewed imperialism as a reason the war began, and its reform as a necessary part of preventing future wars, but they never denounced the existence of colonies.⁶⁶

Race was simply not discussed within the women's peace movement—which demonstrates the racial dynamics of the movement itself. Consisting of almost all white upper-class women, the women's peace movement denied membership to most nonwhite women, and therefore denied them a platform from which to speak. Deciding that America needed to focus on peace not equality, white American peace activists actively ignored the plight of nonwhite Americans while also verbally discriminating against nonwhite people around the world.⁶⁷

The American Peace Movement

The American peace movement grew out of the progressive and socialist movements, making significant progress before 1914. Socialist groups created class-based connections throughout America and the world and worked to establish non-national ties between peoples. Progressives viewed war as a primitive way of working through international problems, and believed that international connections, and even an international body to help governments communicate, would enable countries to solve their conflicts without fighting. Part of this movement also involved the reduction of armaments and standing armies around the world.

Founded in 1828, the American Peace Society (APS) was the oldest American peace society. First organized in Boston, the APS had an inherently Christian nature, and was one of the more conservative peace groups by the start of the First World War. Its journal, the *Advocate*

⁶⁶ Randall, *Improper Bostonian*, 100-24.

⁶⁷ For more information, see Joyce Blackwell-Johnson, "Peace without Freedom Is Not an Option," 239–64.

of Peace, was widely read in the late 1800s and early 1900s, with a monthly circulation of around 2,500. The executive branch of the APS was almost always made up of only men, yet Andrews became an executive member before the war broke out. The group specifically emphasized treaties that included international arbitration. While the APS was the most well-endowed peace group in the United States, its conservative nature made it difficult for those who wanted to take action to work with, as its members did not like to take risks. This led to the founding of separate groups in 1914 when the APS refused to take action.⁶⁸

Internationally, two conferences at The Hague led many progressive activists to join with the APS and other groups with the goal of world peace. The first Hague conference met in 1899 at the Russian Tsar's invitation. While American peace activists attempted to create a more radical international organization, the first Hague conference did little to create any international government.⁶⁹ Instead the conference wrote rules of mediation and warfare with an emphasis on arbitration. It also vaguely encouraged nations to partially disarm. The second Hague conference in 1907 did little to improve on the first. While some new resolutions on the rules of warfare were put in place, delegates were more concerned with arbitration treaties between individual nations than in creating the international governing body that American peace workers wanted. These two Hague conferences set the stage for the international peace movement—though American peace workers had much higher hopes for them.⁷⁰

American peace workers also faced distractions from their international work. The Cuban independence movement against Spain in the 1890s caught the attention of many Americans.

⁶⁸ David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement 1887–1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 2–9.

⁶⁹ For more information on what this would have looked like and why some Americans wanted it, see Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 108–19.

⁷⁰ Women were not formally invited to either Hague Congress as official delegates, but many attended as guests. The international women's peace movement and connections to former Hague attendees will be discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 108–19.

Some believed that the United States should step in and liberate the Cubans and, later, other Spanish colonies like the Philippines, from Spanish rule. Others—worried that America might enter the war in order to take Cuba and other islands as colonies—formed new anti-imperialist organizations during the prelude to the Spanish-American War of 1898. Anti-imperialists implored their fellow citizens, and lawmakers, to stay out of the conflict and out of Cuba.⁷¹ When this tactic failed and the United States went to war with Spain over Cuba and the Philippines, anti-imperialists attempted to prevent any form of annexation, with limited success.⁷² Anti-imperialists continued their work, but as the war faded from the public mindset, many peace activists returned to national reforms and arbitration treaties. The anti-imperialist movement created national connections between women that would be used when the war started in 1914.

Once the war began in Europe, American pacifists began to focus their attention on keeping America out of the war and convincing Europeans to end the conflict. While some prominent progressives and pacifists showed concern as early as fall 1914, it was not until later, when the war did not end by Christmas—as promised by European governments—that more American pacifists became involved. Many progressives looked toward President Woodrow Wilson to help end the European conflict through a negotiated settlement. Wilson himself seemed to support this idea in many of his speeches up until 1917.

American peace workers continued their fight until April 6, 1917, but their broken organization left them with an uphill battle. The separation of the women's peace movement into

⁷¹ For more on the Spanish-American War and the anti-Imperialist movement, see Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), and Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 64–91.

⁷² Congress passed the Teller Amendment, which prevented the annexation of Cuba by the United States. Nothing was ever passed, however, that stopped the annexation of other Spanish colonies. The United States also forced the Cuban government to put into its constitution the Platt Amendment, which allowed the United States to interfere in almost all Cuban affairs. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 64–91.

different factions prevented the organizations from having a strong impact on Wilson and the United States government. After war was declared, many peace workers abandoned the fight and supported the government. Those who remained fought against conscription, censorship, and other coercive government programs. In the end those who continued to fight faced repressive measures from their fellow citizens and the American government, which had lasting impacts on their lives and careers.

The American Public

The public, and more specifically the American public, was an important concept for all three of the women I examine, and it shows up frequently in their writings and letters. Yet it is not an easy term to define, as there were no opinion polls during this time, and understanding the average American in the early 1900s is not an easy task for historians. Histories of America in World War I frequently argue that the war was popular in 1917, or became popular after Wilson declared war, based on the assumption that a nation at war generally is more patriotic. Direct comparisons are often made to the European powers in 1914, when politicians and rulers worried that their people would not support the war, only to be flooded with volunteers once war was declared.⁷³ Recent monographs on America during World War I, however, focus on dissent or the coercive measures put in place to enforce support for the war. Kazin's *War against War*, Christopher Capozzola's *Uncle Sam Wants You*, and Thomas's *Unsafe for Democracy*, both point to an American public that did not support the war.⁷⁴

⁷³ Hochschild, *To End All Wars*, 75–139, and Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 300–9.

⁷⁴ Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), 8, 11, 213, William H. Thomas Jr., *Unsafe for Democracy: World War I and the U.S. Justice Department's Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 1–50, and Kazin, *War against War*, 1–17.

For my purposes *the public* refers to voting-age white adults, since that is who the three women I examine were mainly trying to appeal to. While only men had the federal right to vote, Addams, Balch, and Andrews appealed to women as well. Many states had passed limited voting rights for women at this time, and women could still persuade men and politicians, as well as donate, without the vote. The public Addams and others appealed to were generally literate as well, and had time to participate in activities outside the home and/or work. Based on the materials they published, and the speeches they gave, Addams, Balch, and Andrews, as well as their organizations, did not attempt to appeal to African Americans, or to the less educated. The public for these three women was a means to an end: they needed politicians and policy makers to believe that a majority of voters wanted peace. The idea that Addams, Balch, and Andrews spoke for the public was more powerful than the actual public.

Historians have generally divided the American public and their support for the war based on their location within the United States. The country is usually broken down with each geographical area representing a different opinion. New England and Washington, DC, were seen to be pro-war and pro-Entente, as they were populated by many Anglophiles, with strong financial connections to England that grew stronger as the war progressed. In addition, as the financial and political center of the country, this population was listened to more than any other, and most peace organizations were centered here as well. Meanwhile, the Midwest, with its large German and other immigrant population, was primarily anti-war. Wisconsin has become the focal point of much research on the anti-war movement during World War I with the whole state facing federal attention in 1917 from the Justice Department for.⁷⁵ The South too was anti-war, with its politicians being the most vocal advocates for the United States to remain neutral, but

⁷⁵ Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*, 1–50.

southerners generally focused more on the racial impact of war and the worry about African American soldiers: Southern politicians did not believe in whites killing whites and did not want the United States to be part of what they saw as a racially detrimental war.⁷⁶ Finally, the Western United States had a different perspective: they were focused on the immigration issues that preceded the war and on the U.S. relationship with Japan and China—and wanted any postwar agreements to include yet further immigration restrictions on Asian populations and protections for American, white workers.⁷⁷ Balch and Andrews were based in Boston, and Addams worked out of Chicago, yet all three women were focused on the New England area. They all understood precisely where the power lay.

Once Wilson and Congress declared war on April 6, 1917, the public again became important, but for a different reason. The vocal public, those who were published in newspapers or participated in public events, seemed to support the war. Yet the majority of the public was silent—and this silence was seen as support. From the point of view of Addams, Balch, and Andrews, the public turned against them. Historians now know that many or most Americans did not want war—only those with access to power supported it. But then it seemed as though pacifists had lost the public.

⁷⁶ Chad Williams, *Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 63-104.

⁷⁷ Erika Lee, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” *Pacific Historical Review* 76, no. 4 (November 2007): 537–62, University of California Press, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/stable/10.1525/phr.2007.76.4.53>; Stanford M. Lyman, “The ‘Yellow Peril’ Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 13, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 683-747, Springer Publishing, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/stable/20020056>; Nicholas Wiseman, “‘Beware the Yellow Peril and Behold the Black Plague’: The Internationalization of American White Supremacy and its Critiques, Chicago 1919,” *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 103, no. 1 (Spring 2010) 43-66, University of Illinois Press, <https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/stable/2570125>.

However, similar to the debate over how World War I began, my dissertation is not about the public, or their view of America's role in the war. This dissertation examines how Addams, Balch, and Andrews worked for peace from 1914 through mid-1917. The term *the public* appears frequently here—and is used as Addams and others used it. Public support was a tool for Addams, Balch, and Andrews. They believed they spoke for the average American based on their own elite point of view. The fact that Addams, Balch, and Andrews had limited access to the average member of the public, which skewed their view of it. However, they understood the power in having claim to public support, and they used it to garner even more support for their arguments.

Chapter one examines the creation of the Women's Peace Party (WPP) in January 1915 as a reaction to the lack of leadership from the APS, and the challenge presented from the arrival of European women in America in late 1914. This chapter also follows Jane Addams and Fannie Fern Andrews as they navigated the traditionally male-led peace movement, radical European activists, and calls for women's leadership for the peace movement.

Chapter two focuses on the Women's Congress at The Hague in April 1915 and the changes that the congress made to Addams and other peace workers arguments concerning peace. While all three of the women this dissertation focuses on attended the congress, Addams and Balch are highlighted in this chapter as they not only attended the congress, but also travelled to the European belligerent and neutral countries afterwards to attempt and convince leaders to support a neutral conference and a negotiated peace. These arguments also are present in Addams's speeches in the United States in July 1915, which begins chapter three. Both

chapters one and two focus on the creation of the moderate peace organizations that brought women activists together for the first time in the fight for peace.

Chapters three and four cover the same time period, July 1915 through December 1916. Chapter three examines the domestic issues that peace activists faced from 1915 through 1916, and their work to move American public and political sentiment toward peace. This chapter covers the preparedness movement, as well as the 1916 presidential election, which both served as a distraction and offered opportunities for public recognition.

Chapter four examines the international scene from July 1915 through December 1916. It focuses on how Addams, Balch, and Andrews negotiated with their international colleagues as the war continued to ravage Europe. Using the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP) as a main focus, I examine how Addams became a clearinghouse for international decision making, even when different organizations believed different methods were needed. This chapter also looks more closely at Andrews's work, as she attempted to spread the word about a new international peace organization she founded. It is in chapter four where we start to see the separation between Addams, Balch, and Andrews—and where the true breakdown of the women's peace movement can be seen. By the end of 1916 the movement was beyond repair, even if international events allow for the fractures to be covered up for a short period of time.

Chapter five examines the final phase in American neutrality by focusing on the collapse of the women's peace movement after a very brief moment of false hope. With President Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech in January 1917, female activists had a moment of unity before the international crisis of February 1917 destroyed it for good. The crisis began when Germany restarted unrestricted submarine warfare; this, along with several other breaches

of trust (from the American point of view), led to a diplomatic break with Germany, and eventually to the American entry into the war on the side of the Entente Powers. Addams and Bach, representing moderate and radical peace workers, joined together to prevent this from happening and continued to fight for peace after America entered the war in April. Andrews, however, a true conservative activist by this time, decided that the reforms she fought for were more important than peace and chose to support President Wilson in his fight against Germany. The split between these three women is representative of the split among all women's peace organizations that ended the cohesive women's peace movement in the United States until the 1920s.

My dissertation concludes with a brief narrative that covers the events after war was declared, in order to highlight the intersections of progressive internationalism and cosmopolitan patriotism. Addams and Balch attempted to navigate these roads in more volatile circumstances and with no protection from President Wilson. I also discuss the peace movement after the war and its long-term successes that demonstrate the influence of the women's peace movement despite its failure to prevent American entry into World War I.

This dissertation attempts to better clarify the importance of American women's peace movement during World War I. Though they were unable to keep the United States out of the war, Addams, Balch, and Andrews all helped found a peace organization that still exists today, and is considered one of the first ever nongovernmental organization (NGO). Addams and Balch both went on to earn the Nobel Peace Prize, and Andrews helped establish American civil education in public schools. So while the World War I peace movement itself failed, the women who worked within it succeeded in many ways. It is my hope that this dissertation helps showcase Addams, Balch, and Andrews's roles in this important part of American history, and lead to a better understanding of the women's peace movement and its role in America during World War I.

CHAPTER 1: THE FOUNDING OF THE WOMEN'S PEACE PARTY

On August 5, 1914, *The Chicago Tribune's* headline read, in oversized type, "England At War." The size of the headline demonstrated the importance that the *Tribune* editor attributed to this event. If one goes back through the front pages of the previous days, however, one finds that the political cartoons indicated a different sort of emphasis. Leading to the start of the Great War, the *Chicago Tribune* published one cartoon of the angel of death riding into Europe with a figure labeled "war" and another of a veiled woman labeled "Humanity" on her knees, begging for peace, while the soldiers of Europe turned away. Another portrayed the King of England protecting the English Channel, with the caption "The Sport of Kings."⁷⁸ While the headlines acknowledged the gravity of events, the cartoons revealed the United States' reaction to the European war: the conflict was destructive, not in the interest of humanity, and an "old world" problem.

The Chicago Tribune was the paper read by Hull House founder, progressive, suffrage activist, and peace advocate Jane Addams. As the country first learned about the war, Addams remained focused on political and progressive issues that demanded her immediate attention. Britain's entrance into the war—and the urgent support for it that came from so many former European pacifists—caused concern among Addams and other peace advocates, who began to look to the United States' government to help stop this senseless European conflict.

⁷⁸ These cartoons can be found in the image appendix as images A.1. and A.2. respectively. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 1–5, 1914, front page, found in "Chicago Daily Tribune (1872–1922); Chicago Ill. *Proquest Historical Newspapers*. <https://proquest.com>.

As war engulfed Europe with the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914, Americans became divided. Ethnic groups such as German-Americans and Irish-Americans seemed to support the Central Powers, while Anglophiles, particularly on the east coast, supported the Entente Powers. President Woodrow Wilson presided over the divided nation and gave a speech on August 4, 1914, declaring that the United States needed to be “neutral in thought and action.”⁷⁹ The overwhelming opinion among Americans seemed to be that the war was Europe’s problem, not theirs.⁸⁰

Progressive activists, however, were more concerned about the war than their fellow Americans. Their work to better the United States, and the world, had created connections with Europe that now were severed by the war. Suffrage activists and socialists in particular saw the war as an international issue because of the effect it had among belligerent states. Some European groups that had before pushed for international cooperation—and swore never to fight against their brothers or sisters in other countries—now publicly supported the war and were asking their members to enlist. One such group was the British suffragettes, led by Emmeline Pankhurst, who had been the bane of male British politicians in office before August 1914. They had destroyed property, including the home of MP and future Prime Minister David Lloyd George, gone on hunger strikes while in prison, and generally were seen as a public menace by many in Parliament. Now that England had entered the war, Pankhurst and her elder daughter,

⁷⁹ Woodrow Wilson, *Message to Congress*, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Doc. No. 566 (Washington, August 4, 1914), 3–4.

⁸⁰ For more information on American public opinion before and during the war see: William J. Breen, *Uncle Sam at Home: Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National Defense, 1917–1919* (London: Greenwood Press, 1984); Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Petra DeWitt, *Degrees of Allegiance: Harassment and Loyalty in Missouri’s German-American Community during World War I* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); David Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); William Preston Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933*, second ed. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Clemens P. Work, *Darkest Before Dawn: Sedition and Free Speech in the American West* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 2005).

Christabel, called for the suffragettes to stop agitating for suffrage and work instead to support the government and the war. This drastic switch, along with the abandonment of peace by British socialists, undermined the peace movement in Britain, and dismayed many of Pankhurst's followers, including her middle daughter Sylvia.⁸¹ This drastic change also caused alarm among American progressive activists, as they watched former anti-war activists abroad—their former allies in the fight for peace—begin calling for war.

This chapter examines the beginning of the war in August 1914 through the founding of the Woman's Peace Party in January 1915. Despite initial American apathy towards the European war Jane Addams, Emily Balch, and Fannie Fern Andrews worked for peace in Europe, first through previously formed male-led groups, and then, when faced with these groups non-action, through their newly created organization, the Woman's Peace Party. This Party represented the first national women's peace organization in the United States and established the moderate women's peace movement. While there were a multitude of different opinions concerning peace among activist women, the WPP managed to create a seemingly unified organization of women all fighting for peace based off of the same set of resolutions and core principles. In reality, however, the WPP was founded to prevent a more radical women's peace organization from coming into being and despite its moderate leanings, many of its resolutions remained too controversial to overcome the many different points of view of what "peace" looked like and needed to remain permanent.

⁸¹ For more information on British dissent movements and the national turn toward supporting the war, see Hochschild, *To End All Wars*, 65–130.

The War Begins

When President Woodrow Wilson officially declared America's neutrality on August 4, 1914, he also stressed the position America was in and the role Americans would play in the world:

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. ... The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. ... Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. ... Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend. ... The United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought, as well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.⁸²

While acknowledging the divisions within America, Wilson emphasized the importance of not dividing America at this crucial time in history. He offered impartial mediation to the warring powers and held America up as the "city on a hill" for peace and neutrality in a world at war.

Unfortunately for Wilson, two days after this address, his wife of 29 years, Ellen Axson Wilson, died. Her death shook Wilson, and though he kept himself updated on the European war, he did not give any more public statements on the conflict for several months.⁸³

With President Wilson choosing to enforce impartiality on the United States, his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan worked to remain loyal to his president's cause. As the war went on, Bryan became more and more certain that America needed to lead in ending the European war. A progressive peace activist even before he became Secretary of State, Bryan,

⁸² Woodrow Wilson, *Message to Congress*, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Doc. No. 566 (Washington, August 4, 1914), 3–4.

⁸³ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 32-35.

like Adams, believed in the progressive peace cause and the ideals behind internationalism. Progressives and peace advocates rejoiced when he was named Secretary of State, believing they had an ally leading the State Department. Bryan did write an article supporting the peace movement during the first months of World War I, yet he remained loyal to Wilson until June 1915, when he resigned his position. After his resignation, he did not take a directly adversarial position against Wilson, but began to advocate for an American-led peace.⁸⁴ Bryan will remain a coveted voice in the American peace movement. Organizations worked to win his approval of their arguments and resolutions. Despite being courted by many peace organizations, including ones run by women, and being friends with many peace activists, such as Addams, Bryan would only endorse a few organizations after his resignation in 1915.

APS Inaction

With Wilson's August 1914 address, many peace activists looked to the American Peace Society (APS) for leadership—yet the APS did not make any concrete movements toward a public call for peace. Instead, members of the executive committee withdrew from peace work, and either removed themselves from office or said nothing.⁸⁵ As a member of the executive committee, Fannie Fern Andrews corresponded between August 1914 and January 1915 with Arthur Deering Call, the Executive Director of the APS, concerning the APS's work for peace. This correspondence demonstrates Call's belief in conservative internationalism.⁸⁶ Though

⁸⁴ Bryan was in contact with and published articles alongside Jane Addams, which will be shown below and in later chapters. For more information on William Jennings Bryan and his work with the Wilson administration, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 21-22.

⁸⁵ Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 2-3.

⁸⁶ One example of Call's conservative internationalism can be seen in a series of letters between him and Andrews concerning a peace exhibit at an upcoming Pan-American conference. Call expressed his and others' reservations about the exhibit: "There is an opinion among a few that the great peace exhibit is the war now going on in Europe. The view has been advanced that anything we may do at San Francisco would, in the presence of the situation now before us, seem trivial and purile." Letter from Arthur Deering Call to Fannie Fern Andrews, September 30, 1914. Call worried that the public would believe the peace society was taking advantage of the European war to advance their agenda. Andrews advocated for the exhibit, and Call approved it; however, he appointed several men to the

Andrews would become a firm conservative internationalist by 1916, at this early stage in the war she still believed that the United States should lead in helping create a negotiated peace settlement that would end the war.⁸⁷ Andrews's attempts to convince the APS to act was critical to the creation of women's peace organizations in the United States. If the APS had began working on more progressive lines and supported arguments like those made by Andrews to Call in their correspondence it is possible that women would have worked through the APS and not developed their own organization. The APS's inaction is one of the main factors that drove Addams and other progressive women to create their own organization in 1915.

Attempting to win over Call and the APS to her current ideas of progressive internationalism, Andrews published a pamphlet entitled "The War: What Should be Said About It in the Schools?" in November of 1914. Andrews's pamphlet emphasized that teachers "should point out that every boy and girl who really loves America will 'act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality,'" that "with its [America's] historical background and unique mixture of peoples, our nation is peculiarly fitted, again quoting the President, to 'play a part of impartial mediation,'" and that "teachers should lead pupils to understand the historical causes of the war, to look upon this spectacle of human suffering and devastation with horror, to contrast a world at war with a

exhibit committee who "expressed themselves as doubting the value of the exhibit." Letter from Arthur Deering Call to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 1914. These appointments seem to undermine the idea of a peace exhibit before one had been created. On November 2, 1914, Call resigned from the committee and wrote to Andrews, "I am thoroughly convinced that the exhibit, however well it may be devised, could, in the light of the awful world situation, be little short of a travesty." Letter from Arthur Deering Call to Fannie Fern Andrews, November 2, 1914. As executive director of the American Peace Society, Call decided that an exhibit on peace would be seen as in poor taste because of the European war. His decision to pull out doomed the exhibit, and while the APS participated in the Pan-American Conference in San Francisco, the peace exhibit, as envisioned by Andrews, did not come to fruition. All letters cited can be found in Fannie Fern Andrews Papers 1896–1941, A-95, folder 43. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁸⁷ This can be seen in chapters three through five.

world at peace... [and] to realize that every boy and girl has an interest in the movement which shall bring about the reign of law in place of the reign of the sword.”⁸⁸

Andrews’s first point demonstrates her support of Wilson’s policies, specifically his ideas of American-led internationalism. American-focused internationalists frequently argued that an American-style democracy was good for all nations, but that what was good for the world was also good for America and therefore America was uniquely situated to lead Europe in ending the war.⁸⁹ Andrews also contended a world at war was inherently bad for America, and therefore its government and people needed to work for both an end to the war and permanent peace. Coinciding with Andrews’s ideas about the role of education in creating permanent peace, her pamphlet argued that through teachers, students would learn the tenets of what she termed internationalism—and what I call American-led internationalism—which would create a generation who believed in peace over war.⁹⁰

Andrews sent this pamphlet to Arthur Call, to get his opinion and to have the APS order copies. Andrews hoped that Call would support her argument because of his belief in American exceptionalism and the need for American leadership.⁹¹ While Call agreed to order copies, he replied:

You ask me for ‘comments’. The spirit of reserve with which it has been written is calculated to produce as little harm as possible. It is growing into my conscience that neutral talk at the present time is emasculated talk. I see no hope for any arrangement based upon international agreement unless first it may be predicated that international agreements are to be kept. The significance of this to my mind is that ‘peace talk’ which

⁸⁸ Fannie Fern Andrews, *The War: What Should Be Said About It in the Schools?* (Boston: American School Peace League, 1914), 5–6.

⁸⁹ Hanson, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 137.

⁹⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews, *The War: What Should Be Said About It in the Schools?* (Boston: American School Peace League, 1914), 5–6.

⁹¹ In letters between Andrews and Call, they both express their belief in America’s leadership capabilities and the necessity of the “new world” leading the “old world.” In Andrews’s letter accompanying her pamphlet, she expresses hope that he will support her argument for a negotiated peace. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Arthur Deering Call, November 1, 1914, A-95, folder 43. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

leaves out of account the ruthless, criminal action of Germany in Belgium is useless if not harmful.⁹²

Call argued that public neutrality in the face of Germany's actions was emasculating, and potentially harmful. His ideas were more closely aligned with those of Teddy Roosevelt, which were often termed jingoism by peace workers—and seemingly were against Wilson's stated neutral policy.⁹³

It is in this critique of Andrews's pamphlet that we see Call's reasoning for not actively using the APS to pursue a negotiated end to the European war. He worried that the German invasion of Belgium indicated collapse of international norms and agreements. Yet Andrews, like many other advocates for a negotiated peace, believed that for permanent peace to occur countries needed to forego retribution or repayment. What was happening in Belgium was horrible, but Andrews saw it as a demonstration of the horrors of war, not as actions that deserved revenge. In these two arguments we see the conservative and progressive arguments on what was needed for permanent peace. Conservatives believed that the invasion of Belgium and the atrocities committed there proved that only by defeating German militarism could world peace flourish. Progressives, however, believed that the atrocities in Belgium proved that war was horrible and only through negotiations not more conflict could permanent peace exist.

Women's Reluctance to Lead

With the APS refusing to support a negotiated peace, female peace advocates had few avenues to explore. Progressive peace advocate Addams and suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt were also reluctant to provide leadership to the growing women's peace movement wishing

⁹² Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Arthur Deering Call to Fannie Fern Andrews, November 11, 1914, A-95, folder 43. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁹³ For more information on Roosevelt and jingoism, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 48–49.

to work for peace within their own circles of activists. As women struggled to find existing organizations to support their arguments, two women arrived from Europe with radical ideas concerning America's role in the world. Rosika Schwimmer, a Hungarian peace activist, and Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, a British suffragist, peace advocate, and wife to a member of the House of Commons, arrived in 1914. These two radical women scared moderate progressive peace advocates and forced them to act.

Schwimmer and Pethick-Lawrence (hereafter referred to as Lawrence) represented the radical wing of the growing international women's peace movement. Schwimmer believed that only through quick radical action could peace be achieved. Like militant suffragettes, Schwimmer believed in her cause and methods so strongly that she did not care how her actions affected her reputation. Schwimmer fled Hungary when the war broke out, over fear she would be imprisoned for her pacifist beliefs. After arriving in England, Schwimmer found the country just as intolerable toward pacifism after that country declared war in August 1914.⁹⁴ Lawrence, while not as divisive as Schwimmer, represented a more militant wing of women's activism, having learned her methods from the British suffragettes. Her techniques and her connection to the Congressional Union for Women, a more militant American women's suffrage organization founded in 1913, made women like Addams and Catt wary of her and her supporters.⁹⁵ Yet Lawrence and Schwimmer drew large crowds of women when they spoke, and inspired people to support the peace movement.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Jane Addams, August 17, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

⁹⁵ This fear and reluctance can be seen in letters between Catt and Addams in late 1914. Letters between Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt, September–December 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

⁹⁶ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 44–47.

With the war raging in Europe, President Wilson refusing to call for an end to the war through neutral mediation, and Lawrence and Schwimmer calling for American women to rise up and take control of the peace movement, the more moderate progressive activists such as Catt and Addams worried. Catt had just taken over the presidency of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA); she did not want to lead any women's peace movement, but she wanted someone to lead the movement who was not a supporter of Schwimmer or Lawrence. Catt decided Addams should lead the movement: then moderate progressives would have a chance at keeping the peace message focused on a negotiated moderate peace, and getting mainstream Americans to support it. Catt's support for Addams's leadership proved critical to even getting Addams to consider it, as she was very busy with other movements at this time.⁹⁷

Addams's Views on the Peace Movement

As Schwimmer and Lawrence toured the country pushing for radical peace plans, Addams and Secretary of State Bryan published a joint article in the November 1914 edition of *The Ladies Home Journal* outlining their beliefs on peace. The article demonstrated Addams's moderate ideas for peace, as well as her connections with leading policy makers in Washington, DC. These qualities, along with her ongoing friendship with Catt, made Addams an ideal candidate to lead the American women's peace movement.

Addams's piece made two major arguments. First, she contended that one could not label international arbitration as a failure based on this war alone. To dismiss international arbitration

⁹⁷ Addams's correspondence at this time is filled with requests from politicians, organizations' leaders, and others for her support and presence as they attempted to win over progressive voters and/or more financial support. She was also invited as the guest speaker for many events and also had to deal with the business of Hull House, which required her periodic attention. The Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

agreements would be, in her view, to reject the possibility of there ever being permanent world peace.⁹⁸ Secondly, she argued:

The rulers of the nations involved in the war have each carefully explained that there was no alternative for him, that some one else was responsible for this war. When, even in the excitement of the first weeks, the neutral nations condemned and the warring nations apologized, may we not say that public sentiment has at last turned against war and that the unconscious reservist of the army of peace are reinforcing the vanguard?⁹⁹

The very work that belligerent European leaders put into crafting their declarations of war—and apologizing for their decisions—served to Addams as proof that people had moved beyond wanting war—and that these leaders understood that. The work of Addams and other peace activists' work was, in her view, paying off, even if the European war was a setback at the moment.

Secretary of State Bryan's statement also underscored that the peace movement was not a failure just because Europe had started a war. In his view, the war actually represented a failure of the idea that preparedness led to peace. He used his statement to tout the value of mediation, including the work done by South American countries in helping Mexico and the United States avoid war just a few months before.

In April of 1914, President Wilson had ordered the occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, after a German ship was reported to be coming to supply the new, unsupported leader of Mexico, Victoriano Huerta. Wilson had underestimated the response from the Mexican leaders, and neither he nor Huerta wanted a war—so neutral nations Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered to mediate a peace conference. The ABC conference of May 1914, as it was called, helped end the

⁹⁸ Jane Addams, "Is the Peace Movement a Failure: Personal Statements by Jane Addams of Hull-House, Chicago, and William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State," *The Ladies' Home Journal*, November 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

⁹⁹ Jane Addams, "Is the Peace Movement a Failure: Personal Statements by Jane Addams of Hull-House, Chicago, and William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State," *The Ladies' Home Journal*, November 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

conflict peacefully and was seen as a victory for peace advocates and for the concept of neutral mediation.¹⁰⁰

Bryan's statement referred directly to the acceptance of mediation by the United States and Mexico: "Henceforth it will be easier in the Americas to preserve peace and more difficult to excite discord."¹⁰¹ Bryan argued that mediation solved problems that led to war, whereas preparedness, which was often sold as a preventative measure against war, actually caused it:

If preparedness were a preventive surely Europe had a guarantee of permanent peace, for they were all ready to take up arms at a moment's notice. Hereafter preparation for wars—preparation for wars that should never come—must be defended upon some other ground than that it preserves peace. The peace argument, based upon preparedness, overlooks the fact that such preparedness cannot be continuous without a cultivation of the war spirit, and the war spirit is impossible unless there is some real or imaginary foe against whom the nation's antagonism can be directed. Passions must be fanned in the name of patriotism, and man-killing devices must be planned in the alleged interest of brotherhood! This war may be worth its awful cost if it buries forever this fallacious theory.¹⁰²

Bryan's argument was a preview of the main argument that pacifists would use in 1916 when the United States government began its own preparedness program.¹⁰³ When Bryan resigned as Secretary of State in 1915, it was over President Wilson's support of preparedness. Bryan, like most peace advocates, believed that countries needed to begin disarming in order to achieve permanent peace—an argument that echoed Kant's argument in 1795 that standing armies needed to be abolished over time so that only a defensive force remained.¹⁰⁴ Bryan's statement

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars*, 25–30.

¹⁰¹ William Jennings Bryan, "Is the Peace Movement a Failure: Personal Statements by Jane Addams of Hull-House, Chicago, and William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State," *The Ladies' Home Journal*, November 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹⁰² William Jennings Bryan, "Is the Peace Movement a Failure: Personal Statements by Jane Addams of Hull-House, Chicago, and William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State," *The Ladies' Home Journal*, November 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹⁰³ See chapter 3 for an analysis of the fight against preparedness in the United States.

¹⁰⁴ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 4–5.

updated Kant's for the modern age, and used the current war as a rebuttal to those who argued that the United States needed to begin preparedness measures in order to preserve peace.

While Addams and Bryan made different points, the theme of their pieces was the same. Both writers believed that the European war was not cause for peace advocates to stop their work, and both believed that because of the war, people would come to understand why peace was necessary, and what was needed to create permanent peace. Addams focused on international arbitration and public sentiment, while Bryan concentrated on rebutting preparedness and upholding mediation. Both activists, however, were focused on the peace movement continuing its work, and ending the European war.

Addams's moderate beliefs earned her Catt's support to lead the women's peace movement, yet Addams was reluctant to lead any women's movement—and was skeptical of plans that tried to accomplish more than she thought they should. In a letter to Paul Kellogg, the editor of the progressive newspaper *The Survey*, Addams wrote, "I am sending a copy of Miss Schwimmer's plan which you may have seen ... I don't like to dampen any plan which is so widespread, but it doesn't seem very feasible."¹⁰⁵ When Kellogg requested that she write a piece for *The Survey*, Addams wrote him again that she felt less than confident in her own knowledge of the war: "My editorial may come along later, I am having my usual ill luck with the war editorial—or rather the subject is too much for me."¹⁰⁶ Addams experience as an activist made her cautious of overambitious plans that she did not think could be accomplished without major controversy, as well as made her a firm believer in the use of known experts to help make her

¹⁰⁵ Letter from Jane Addams to Paul Kellogg, September 15, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

¹⁰⁶ Letter from Jane Addams to Paul Kellogg, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

points. Addams may not have felt that she was an expert on the war and worried that writing it would undermine her work in other progressive fields where she was considered an expert.

In a series of letters, mostly to Catt, from November through December 1914, Addams expressed her reluctance to lead a January 1915 meeting of women in Washington, DC, originally planned by Schwimmer and Lawrence. She had reservations about how the meeting would be perceived by the American media, the actual abilities and power of the female attendees, and the actions of other groups, such as the Congressional Union, involved in the meeting. This meeting is first mentioned in a November 30 letter from Addams to Madeline McDowell Breckinridge, a friend, fellow suffragist, and progressive activist from Kentucky:

There are so many demands in every possible direction for a Women's Peace Meeting that I am inclined to see what I can do toward helping to call such a meeting together. Mrs. Pethick Lawrence, as well as Madame Rosika Schwimmer...they are both, as you know, quite keen that women should take a very definite part in the final adjustment. Mrs. Pethick Lawrence has already formed committees in New York, Boston, and Washington (the Washington people, I am afraid, consisting largely of the Congressional Union membership) and a big women's meeting is to be called for January.¹⁰⁷

Many progressive activists like Addams looked down on the Congressional Union, which copied many tactics of the suffragettes in England before 1914. Many American progressives did not approve these militaristic tactics and did not appreciate their importation.¹⁰⁸ Suffrage and peace groups also feared association with the Congressional Union because of the negative press it received in the United States.

Addams understood the enthusiasm for a women's peace meeting, but in the same letter to Breckinridge she expressed a desire for more control over attendance: "Personally, I should

¹⁰⁷ Letter from Jane Addams to Madeline Breckinridge, November 30, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

¹⁰⁸ Some progressives did not protest the importation of the techniques; similar techniques were used by American women engaged in the prohibition fight before 1914. Prominent suffrage advocates and peace advocates, though, did not approve of the militarism of the suffragettes or, later, of the Congressional Union.

rather have a meeting of ‘social workers’ [meaning progressive activists with experience in social movements] and others representing the new point of view ... and have men as well as women invited.”¹⁰⁹ Addams did not approve of a mass meeting of women; she wanted people involved in the progressive movement to be the only attendees.

Throughout the month of December 1914, Addams wrote to potential attendees and other supporters of the peace movement, sometimes expressing her worry that a large group of women who were simply excited about working for peace would not ensure progress toward getting the American government to actively support peace in Europe. In a December 11 letter to Rosika Schwimmer she wrote, “There is naturally much emotional reaction against the war, and people are eager to meet and talk about it, but I must say that I dread a large and ill assorted assemblage and doubt if we could do anything with it.”¹¹⁰ In a December 14 letter to Catt, Addams also expressed her doubts about the value of a large women’s peace meeting in DC. “I quite dread gathering together women from all over the country merely because they are eager for Peace. We would certainly confront a good deal of emotionalism and I doubt the value of such a conference.”¹¹¹ These two letters indicate that Addams did not believe that a gathering of women in DC would help bring about peace.

The language in Addams’s letter is also revealing. Words and phrases like “ill assorted,” “emotionalism,” and “emotional reaction” were frequently used by men at this time to argue why women should not be given the vote, or be involved in politics. And now, Jane Addams, a suffragist, was using these terms to describe the women advocating for peace. Addams

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Jane Addams to Madeline Breckinridge, November 30, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

¹¹⁰ Letter from Jane Addams to Rosika Schwimmer, December 11, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

¹¹¹ Letter from Jane Addams to Carrie Chapman Catt, December 14, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

understood that politicians listened to her, and to other prominent women, mainly because of her education, class, national following, and the international connections that she had made before the war. A large gathering of women without any standing in the progressive political community could backfire on the peace movement and make it look unorganized and “feminine,” which Addams wanted to avoid. Female activists already faced scorn for being naïve and weak, especially in the realm of war and politics, so it is likely that Addams wanted the peace movement to avoid as much bad press as it could. A meeting of women without supported credentials, could, in her view, harm the women’s peace movement, or even the peace movement as a whole.

Addams was not the only peace activist worried about the political impact of a large meeting of women. In a December 17 letter, Lillian Wald, a settlement house worker and peace advocate in New York who worked closely with Addams on many issues, expressed her and Kellogg’s concerns about the meeting: “All of us are very sceptical [*sic*] about that Washington meeting. It would seem to me that it would be nagging the President to do something, when there is nothing that he can do.”¹¹² Wald, like Addams, used a stereotypical gendered term—“nagging”—to describe the potential gathering. How the group of women would be perceived by male politicians seems to be of the utmost importance to Wald as well as Addams; both worried that because of the gendered nature of the gathering, the group would be viewed negatively and therefore was not a good idea.

Throughout these letters, Addams expressed a fear that the women’s meeting would not accomplish anything—and would actually set the women’s peace movement back because the country would see it as a failure created by women. Yet despite her concerns about public

¹¹² Letter from Lillian Wald to Jane Addams, December 17, 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:07.

perception, about her own knowledge and abilities, about the radical influence of Lawrence and Schwimmer, Addams agreed to lead the meeting. Why? I argue Addams chose to lead the January women's peace meeting for several reasons. First, if Schwimmer and Lawrence led the meeting, the growing women's peace movement would be lost to radicalism, undermining American support for a negotiated peace plan. However, if Addams led the meeting, more moderate activists would attend—and resolutions would be based on moderate progressive internationalism. Second, Addams also believed that public discussions of government policy was the best way for citizens to participate in democracy. This ideology of social democracy aligns with Addams's belief in cosmopolitan patriotism: that patriots questioned their government through public discussions, creating stronger citizen connections to democracy and in turn strengthening the government.¹¹³ Addams's desire for women's participation in this critical discussion, as well as her commitment to women's place in foreign policy, ultimately trumped her worries about potential political backlash.

Even as Addams decided that the women's peace meeting was worth any political backlash, Catt remained concerned with public perception. Catt communicated with Addams frequently about the potential problems with the meeting, and tried to keep her own name out of press releases and letters.¹¹⁴ Addams, however, frequently used Catt's name in her letters calling for attendees, and named Catt as one of the conference's founding members. While it's possible that Addams simply ignored Catt's request to keep her name separate from information about the meeting, it is more likely, based on their friendship and frequent letters, that Addams believed that Catt's name would encourage attendance by like-minded women. Catt's name resonated

¹¹³ Hanson, *The Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 128.

¹¹⁴ This was despite the fact that Catt encouraged Addams to head such a meeting and wanted Addams's name on all publications about it.

with activists across America. As the president of the NAWSA, Catt also maintained many transatlantic connections, corresponding with and organizing talks by English women. As the meeting was to be about the European war, as well as the larger idea of permanent peace, having connections to belligerent countries was important. The back-and-forth nature of Catt's and Addams's letters demonstrated the caution of these women as they attempted to negotiate the public status of their own names, and balance their progressive activism alongside their new leadership roles.

The Woman's Peace Party

The creation of the Woman's Peace Party (WPP) in January 1915 brought about an official all-female peace party for the first time in the United States. The WPP represented the ideas of Addams: Addams helped craft the preamble and platform, and accepted leadership of the new group. It should be noted that Balch and Andrews too attended the WPP meeting as members, and believed in the platform's ideals— that women were different, but still equal to men and crucial to permanent peace worldwide, as Addams personally believed. Historians contend that Addams believed in a maternalist argument: that women are naturally peaceful and opposed war as the biological givers of life. Whether women have children or not was irrelevant; because they were able to have children, they naturally opposed anything that destroys life, such as war. Addams and other activists believed that if given the vote women would have a calming effect on politics, and their differences in relation to men did not mean they should not be politically equal to them.¹¹⁵ This argument will become one of the centerpieces of the moderate

¹¹⁵ Degen, *The History of the Woman's Peace Party*, 17.

women's peace movement and their main defense of keeping a controversial resolution, women's suffrage, in all their manifestos.¹¹⁶

The WPP brought together women who believed in peace, despite their other ideological differences. For example, members consisted of both anti- and pro-women's suffrage advocates, although those opposed to suffrage would have to accept a pro-suffrage statement in the national platform.¹¹⁷ Both Michael Kazin and David Patterson also argue that the name *Woman's Peace Party* was itself a political statement: by calling the organization a party, its founders subtly and deliberately declared their right to be part of any party, such as a political party. Yet despite this political naming tactic and the suffrage resolution, many anti-suffrage women joined the organization.¹¹⁸

The Woman's Peace Party identified as a women's party. Their preamble affirmed their identities as women, and their maternal role in the world:

We, women of the United States, assembled in behalf of world Peace, grateful for the security of our own country, but sorrowing for the misery of all involved in the present struggle among warring nations, do hereby band ourselves together to demand that war be abolished. Equally with men pacifists, we understand that planned-for, legalized, whole-sale, human slaughter is today the sum of all villainies. As women, we feel a peculiar moral passion of revolt against both cruelty and the waste of war. As women, we are especially the custodians of the life of the ages. We will no longer consent to its reckless destruction. As women, we are particularly charged with the future of childhood and with the care of the helpless and the unfortunate....As women, we have builded [*sic*] by the patient drudgery of the past the basic foundation of the home and of peaceful industry. We will no longer endure without a protest that must be heard and heeded by men, that hoary evil which in an hour destroys the social structure that centuries of toil have reared. As women, we are called upon to start each generation onward toward a better humanity.... Therefore, as human beings and the mother half of humanity, we demand that our right to be consulted in the settlement of questions concerning not alone the life of individuals but of nations be recognized and respected.... So protesting, and so

¹¹⁶ The idea of women's suffrage being a cause of permanent world peace relates to the larger international peace movement and will be discussed below.

¹¹⁷ This raised objections from some state branches of the WPP, and would raise even more in 1915 after the creation of the ICWPP. These disputes with state branches will be discussed later in this chapter; those after 1915 will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

¹¹⁸ Kazin, *War against War*, 17–50; and Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 46–50.

demanding, we hereby form ourselves into a national organization to be called the Woman's Peace Party.¹¹⁹

This preamble both called into consideration the women's roles as mothers and caretakers, but also as human beings. The women separated themselves by the particular aspects of their sex, but at the same time declared themselves equal to all other pacifists. Almost every sentence of the preamble begins with "as women, we..."—calling the writers' sex to the reader's attention. The women also specified that, as women, they had a unique understanding of the effects of war on society, because women suffered uniquely during a war. By clearly making their argument for why, even as women, they should be involved in policy making regarding the United State's foreign policy, the WPP's founders worked to counter any future arguments over the limitations of their sex.

The WPP's platform consisted of eleven resolutions representing how the WPP believed war would be abolished. They wanted leaders in every nation to respect law and order over war, and believed an international organization of some type needed to be created in order to achieve permanent peace. The eleven resolutions read as follows:

1. The immediate calling of a convention of neutral nations in the interest of early peace.
2. Limitation of armaments and the nationalization of their manufacture.
3. Organized opposition to militarism in our own country.
4. Education of youth in the ideals of peace.
5. Democratic control of foreign policies.
6. The further humanizing of governments by the extension of the franchise to women.
7. "Concert of Nations" to supersede "Balance of Power."
8. Action toward the gradual organization of the world to substitute Law for War.
9. The substitution of an international police for rival armies and navies.
10. Removal of the economic causes of war [meaning reparations and war profiteering].

¹¹⁹ Read by Anna Garlin Spencer for the Woman's Peace Party, "Preamble," in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 4–5, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

11. The appointment by our Government of a commission of men and women, with an adequate appropriation, to promote international peace.¹²⁰

Though a few of the above resolutions were unique to the WPP, many were consistent with other peace movements in Europe, as well as platforms put forth by international women's organizations before the war.¹²¹ In Britain, for example, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), was one of the first peace organizations to form after the declaration of war in August 1914. The founders of the UDC believed that Britain entered the war because of secret agreements—between Britain, Russia, and France—that Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey arranged without any oversight or Parliamentary control. The UDC leaders, who were MPs and other prominent peace advocates in Britain, published four cardinal points within months after the first shots were fired. They also pushed for an end to secret treaties and a democratic way for the people to have a say in whether or not their country should go to war¹²²—an idea that was radical, but became popular among peace groups in democratic nations around the world during the First World War. Though the UDC had an all-male leadership when first founded, the group became the first British peace organization to have female members and executives; it officially supported women's suffrage in 1915.¹²³

¹²⁰ Read by Anna Garlin Spencer for the Woman's Peace Party, "Platform," in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 5, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹²¹ It should be noted that these were not women's peace organizations but international women's organizations. For more information, see Glenda Sluga, "Women, Feminisms and Twentieth-Century Internationalisms," in *Internationalism: A Twentieth-Century History*, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 38-60.

¹²² The other cardinal points were three ways to create a lasting peace in Europe. This included the creation of an international organization, no transfer of territories without a plebiscite, and the gradual disarmament of all nations. Union of Democratic Control, *The Morrow of War*, 1914, The National Archives of England, Wales, and the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter TNA), PRO 30/69/1833.

¹²³ Alison Steigerwald, "Opposition and Reaction: The Union of Democratic Control, the Press, and the British Government's Suppression of Dissent during the First World War" (masters thesis, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2015).

The UDC argued that if the British public had voted in August 1914, Britain would not have entered the war. This idea that the public did not, or would not, support a war, despite the decisions of their government, became a recurring theme in the international peace movement. The writers of the WPP's platform were well informed of the UDC's platform and arguments and they too believed the public wanted peace. In addition to calling for the creation of an international organization, the WPP was the first American peace society to support democratic control of foreign policy, and the first to connect its resolutions so obviously with other international peace organizations.

Components of the WPP's preamble and platform are also similar to the resolutions adopted by the International Council of Women (ICW) during their fifth quinquennial meeting in May 1914. Founded in 1888 in Washington, DC, by leaders of the women's movement from the United States and eight other countries, the ICW was the first international women's organization.¹²⁴ As the ICW grew, it gained members such as German peace advocate Bertha von Suttner, the first woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize, and a very important figure at the prewar Hague conferences, despite not receiving formal invitations. The ICW, which is still in existence today, worked to combat gender-based social injustice, and at the time was a main component in the internationalization of the women's movement and the women's suffrage movement.¹²⁵

At their May 1914 meeting, the ICW introduced a set of resolutions that they hoped would be discussed at a third Hague meeting, which never took place due to the outbreak of war.

¹²⁴ The other countries were Canada, Ireland, India, Britain, Finland, Denmark, France, and Norway. Leaders included Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Rachel Foster Avery, and Caroline Elizabeth Merrick. Sluga, "Women Feminisms and Twentieth-Century Internationalism," 38–60.

¹²⁵ "History," International Council of Women, <http://www.icw-cif.com/01/03.php>; and Sluga, "Women, Feminisms and Twentieth-Century Internationalisms," 38–60.

These resolutions titled “Women and War”—designed as an appeal to all women— made several arguments that the WPP repeated in their preamble and platform, primarily that women suffer uniquely during a war. Both the ICW and the WPP contended that as the givers of life women are uniquely scarred by war and faced trauma that men could not understand. Both the ICW and the WPP also maintained that war was a direct violation of womanhood, in that it allowed for women to be physically violated and harmed by soldiers and war. War also led directly to the destruction of life, which women created; and women therefore felt the loss more acutely than men.

Both the WPP and the ICW called for the enfranchisement of women to create permanent peace. The WPP in resolution six pressed for “The further humanizing of governments by the extension of the franchise to women.”¹²⁶ Similarly, the ICW resolved, “When women obtain the franchise, they will have the power to affect legislation ... perplexing difficulties of legislation need the mother-heart as well as the father-heart to solve them. The mothers of mankind alone know the cost of human life! Therefore they should be to the front in its preservation.”¹²⁷ Both groups believed that through women’s suffrage, permanent peace could be secured. This was the critical reason that the WPP included women’s suffrage in its platform, despite the arguments that including it would alienate anti-suffrage female peace advocates. Though the WPP was a national organization, with American founders who believed in American-focused internationalism, their organization’s platform was one founded on international ideals.

¹²⁶ Read by Anna Garlin Spencer for the Woman’s Peace Party, “Platform,” in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman’s Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman’s Peace Party, 1915), 5, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹²⁷ Frances S. Hallows, *Women and War: An Appeal to the Women of All Nations* (London: Headley Brother, 1914), Chicago’s Women’s Peace Party Collection, Microfilm reel 938, filmed from the holdings of the New York Public Library, University of Chicago Library.

These links between platforms demonstrated how connected the founders of the WPP were to the British women's peace movement, a movement that began in earnest in 1870s England. Heloise Brown, in her 2003 book *The Truest Form of Patriotism*, maintains that the British pacifist feminism movement developed from the combination of three currents of thought: evangelical feminism, moderate internationalism, and the idea of the international citizen. Evangelical feminism asserted that the adoption of Christian principles allowed for both universal peace and the advancement of women's rights. Moderate internationalism opposed any expansion of empire and worked to develop international links between the different women's movements. International citizenship, similar to international socialism, fostered a "sisterhood" between women that crossed international boundaries.¹²⁸

The WPP incorporated these ideas for an American audience without any reference to the British women who created them.¹²⁹ While the WPP was a secular organization, it adopted the evangelical feminist idea that securing women's rights would also secure international peace, as women were seen as the more levelheaded and caring sex. The WPP's founders believed that colonialism helped cause the war and self-determination was needed to prevent future wars.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Despite women beginning their own auxiliary peace organizations in the late 1800s, male-led groups, such as the British Peace Society, believed that connections with women's groups would undermine their organizations. Women's groups also began to split, as some leaders wished to take a more secular approach to their work, while others remained connected to the evangelical movement. The division in leadership and unwillingness of male-led groups to share funding and membership meant that these organizations were not internationally active and did not survive to fight against European entry into World War I, though its ideas did. It would not be until World War I that women would create an international peace organization, discussed in the next chapter. Heloise Brown, *The Truest Form of Patriotism: Pacifist Feminism in Britain, 1870–1902* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) 1–13.

¹²⁹ Addams's papers contain no letters to or from any of the organizations that helped found the pacifist feminist movement, and many of the women involved in the early years of the movement were no longer alive when the Great War began. For more on these movements and those involved see Brown, *The Truest Form of Patriotism*, 1–13.

¹³⁰ Many of the WPP's founders were originally part of the anti-imperialism movement in America during the 1890s wars in Cuba and the Philippines. While anti-imperialists were more focused on keeping America from gaining colonies, the WPP was also concerned with the trading of peoples through conquest and the forced annexation of parts of Europe. It should be noted that many women within the WPP did not believe that nonwhite colonies should be made independent or even consulted. Women such as Andrews believed that nonwhite peoples needed to be

Finally, the WPP united most female activists in the United States—which would help lead to the creation of an international women’s peace organization later in 1915.¹³¹ While the WPP was an American organization, it fit into the larger international peace movement that persisted despite the European war.

The WPP’s resolutions also conformed to the philosophical framework that most peace activists referenced. Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace” had argued that states should come together in a pacific union that did not create dominion over states but brought them under the control of the public as a federation¹³²—an idea that could be interpreted as an international organization like the one the WPP proposed. Another interpretation could be that the people should have a say in their government’s foreign policy through an international organization. While Kant’s essay was published long before Word War I began, Addams, Andrews, and other non-U.S. activists, continued to cite it frequently.¹³³

In creating the WPP, Addams corresponded with, met, and worked with women from around the world, pulling all the pieces of their different organizations together. Addams’s correspondence reveals that she stayed current with the different movements from around the world, and kept in contact with her fellow peace activists in belligerent countries.¹³⁴ She learned news of the war from them, and even attempted to have the Secretary of State Bryan help her track down an aid worker taken into custody by the Germans took in Belgium¹³⁵—whom she

civilized before they could be independent. Yet they saw imperialism as a source of conflict which needed to be reformed so that colonizers would focusing on civilizing missions rather than exploitative ones.

¹³¹ This will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹³² Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 18–23.

¹³³ For more on Kant’s essay, please see the introduction. These ideas would have a direct influence on President Wilson and his calls for a League of Nations later in the war. For Wilson’s indebtedness to the peace movement, see Knock, *To End all Wars*, xix–xxx.

¹³⁴ Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹³⁵ Letters from Jane Addams to William Jennings Bryan, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

learned of from fellow peace workers and volunteers in Belgium.¹³⁶ Addams's communication with international peace advocates—and conversations with foreign activists like Schwimmer and Lawrence in the United States—led her to understand the different peace movements in the world. This helps explain why the women's peace movement fit so well with its international counterparts, such as the UDC. The international nature of the WPP's resolutions proves that the WPP was not created in a vacuum, and despite being a very American organization was also a cosmopolitan organization that demonstrated the international connections Addams and other peace organizational leaders had.

Addams's Arguments

Addams's presidential speech reaffirmed the importance of peace and established her as one of the leading women of the peace movement. She believed that the war was destroying the “concept of patriotism,” the “developed conscience of the world,” and “sensitiveness to human life.”¹³⁷ Patriotism, in her view, encompassed ideas about liberty as well as loyalty—and encouraged dissent and debate. The war, then, was reversing the modern notion of patriotism into a “tribal” form of patriotism, where only loyalty counted and no debates were tolerated. She argued that women had no place in such a “tribal” society because they could not fight to demonstrate loyalty: “A state founded upon such a tribal ideal of patriotism has no place for women within its councils.”¹³⁸ Addams made a similar argument about the sanctity of human life and war's effect on humanity's conscience: the war reversed society's progression, turning

¹³⁶ Letters between Jane Addams and an unnamed correspondent, Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹³⁷ Jane Addams speech, in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 10, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹³⁸ Jane Addams speech, in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 10, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

modern ideas about conscience and the sanctity of life into tribal ones and created a world where women did not belong.

With this speech, Addams abandoned her previously held critical views of the women's peace movement. She did not record in writing any of the reasons for this mental shift, but it is clear that her beliefs in pacifist feminism and cosmopolitan patriotism, along with progressive internationalism, spurred her to take up the mantle of leadership. This moment is critical for Addams as it marks her acceptance of her role as the leader of the American moderate women's peace movement, which will define the rest of her life's work.

Addams's speech also expanded on the idea that women felt war's destruction uniquely when compared to men, which had led her to the conclusion that women had not only a right, but an obligation to work to end all wars:

If we admit that this sensitiveness for human life is stronger in women than in men because women have been responsible for the care of the young and the aged and those who need special nurture, it is certainly true that this sensitiveness, developed in women, carries with it an obligation.¹³⁹

This statement echoes Addams's view of women's role in society even before the war began, when she spoke of women's obligation to work for the betterment of society.¹⁴⁰ In 1915 Adams once again preached obligation to convince women to fight, collectively through the WPP, against war.

The WPP connected American women, and the American women's peace movement, to an established and growing international one. American women felt the need to do something about the European war, especially after the arrival of women from belligerent countries, who

¹³⁹ Jane Addams speech, in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 11, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹⁴⁰ Fischer, *On Addams*, 74–91.

gave accounts of the horrors of war. But the WPP was also created to shape the feelings of American women and create a unified front against the war. Addams now turned to use this unified front to gain supporters in places of political power, and social influence. This, however, would turn out to be more difficult than she may have anticipated.

Reception of WPP's Resolutions

After the initial meeting and founding of the Woman's Peace Party, Addams reached out to her network to get the resolutions into the hands of as many influential people as possible. But the WPP's platform was not received exactly as Addams hoped. Several influential people disagreed with the group's resolutions, and some state branches of the WPP wanted to remove parts of the national platform. While not everyone supported the WPP, Addams did find those who admired her organization's resolutions and encouraged her to continue her work.

The mixed reception of the WPP's resolutions demonstrates one of the overall arguments in my dissertation. The peace movement, and even more specifically the women's peace movement was divided into multiple factions. While the long-term goal of all these factions was world peace, the short-term goals, methods, and strategies were different. Even as Addams brought American women together into the moderate WPP, other pacifists and internationalists were too divided to unite behind the movement.

Through Elizabeth Kent and Belle La Follette, the wives of House Representative William Kent from California and Senator Robert La Follette from Wisconsin, Addams circulated the WPP's resolutions among American politicians. While Congressman Kent was not an active supporter of the peace movement, Senator La Follette was: he had supported President Wilson's call for neutrality in August 1914, and hoped that America would lead the neutral powers in calling for peace as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile did for the United States and Mexico during the

Veracruz crisis in 1914.¹⁴¹ The ABC conference became the precedent for peace advocates calling for the United States to lead a neutral conference to end the European conflict. This is one of the reasons that the WPP put the call for a neutral conference into their resolutions, and why so many advocates, Addams included, believed that Secretary of State Bryan, who had helped with the ABC conference, would support such a resolution. It was to the dismay of Addams and others, however, when he did not.

In a letter from Belle Lafollette to Elizabeth Kent, Lafollette discussed the objections of Secretary of State Bryan to the platforms of the WPP, of which both women were members.¹⁴² As the wives of Congressmen, the two women played an important role as emissaries between the women's peace movement and Capitol Hill. Their access to individuals such as the Secretary of State made them important lobbyists for peace, even though as women they had no direct voting rights. According to Lafollette:

When we saw Bryan with a view of getting him to speak for us [the WPP] he read the platform; he objected to the first plank because the so-called neutral nations of Europe were all more or less biased one way or another by their environment or their previous relations, and so the warring nations were distrustful of such a conference lest it give one side or the other the advantage.¹⁴³

Lafollette wrote that she attempted to remind Bryan of the advantages of the ABC mediation, even when its success was considered questionable, but Bryan apparently held firm. Bryan's negative view of the European neutrals was not unusual. Many peace activists believed that no European nation could be truly neutral because they were physically close to the fighting, and might—understandably, in light of what happened to Belgium—be worried about a possible

¹⁴¹ Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*, 222–24.

¹⁴² A copy of the letter was sent to Jane Addams to inform her of their work in Washington, D. C.

¹⁴³ Letter from Belle Lafollette to Elizabeth Kent, January 26, 1915, in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Papers (hereafter WILPF), Woman's Peace Party (hereafter WPP) Correspondence, Swarthmore College Peace Collection. Microfilm Reel 133.1.

invasion. This belief—that even European neutrals were not unbiased because of their proximity to belligerent countries—was one of the reasons that Addams believed the United States to be the best country to lead a neutral peace conference. America’s physical separation, and political separation, would allow U.S. negotiators to be considered completely neutral.¹⁴⁴ Bryan’s lack of support for the WPP’s resolutions disappointed Addams, especially since they had been of similar minds earlier in 1914 when they wrote their joint articles on the peace movement. Indeed, Bryan was sympathetic to the peace movement and would have been a valuable ally and spokesperson. Unfortunately, Bryan at this time remained loyal to Wilson, who had made it clear that the job of the United States government was to preserve America’s neutrality.¹⁴⁵

Another disappointing reaction to the WPP’s resolutions came from Martha Carey Thomas, the first female president of Bryn Mawr College, where President Woodrow Wilson had taught from 1885 to 1888. A leading member of NAWSA and an influential women’s activist, Thomas did not approve of neutral nations calling for peace, and thought many of the WPP’s proposed resolutions were controversial and inappropriate for the current war. She wrote to Addams: “there seems to be serious division of opinion among the most ardent lovers of peace that I know. Many well informed people think that it will not be in the interests of universal peace for neutral nations to insist on a cessation of hostilities at the present time.”¹⁴⁶

She went on to explain:

¹⁴⁴ This will also be the argument behind preventing the U.S. from building up its military or trading with the belligerent powers as the war continues. Peace activists did not want any actions by the Wilson administration to create a conflict of interest that would prevent America from leading a neutral conference. This will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

¹⁴⁵ Knock argues that Wilson’s focus for the first 18 months of the war was to be the leader of a neutral country and to safeguard American neutrality. Behind the scenes, however, he would begin to believe that America could help lead Europe in creating peace and would send Colonel House to negotiate with belligerents in December 1915. This was all kept secret, and will be discussed in chapter 3.

¹⁴⁶ Letter from Martha Carey Thomas to Jane Addams, February 18, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

It would seem to be unfair, even if it were not impossible, as it is, during the course of a war for neutral countries to enforce provisions that have never been enforced in any other war ... If during the progress of the present war the Woman's Movement for Peace adopts such a non-neutral and pro-German [program] at a time when in the opinion of most neutral people the Allies are sure to win it will greatly lessen its influence.¹⁴⁷

Thomas's letter revealed one of her main reasons for not supporting the resolutions: her belief that the Allies were sure to win. It is important to note that at the time of Thomas's letter in early 1915, the Central Powers were in a more favorable military position. Further, it was believed that whoever was in the most promising military position when the war ended would receive the best terms in a peace agreement—so ending the war at that time result in more advantages to the Germans.¹⁴⁸ Thomas's ideas connect with the conservative international peace movement as well as with President Wilson's personal ideas. While most Americans wanted the United States to remain neutral in the conflict, many American elites were rooting for England and the Entente Powers. Anglophilia, combined with economic and political connections with the British, led to many Americans on the East Coast, and especially those in positions of political and economic power, to believe that an English victory was the only path to world peace.¹⁴⁹

What Thomas did not seem to understand was what kind of peace agreement Addams and other neutral conference supporters wanted. The neutral conference was supposed to remove the militaristic factions from the peace process. Addams, and others, believed that the military could never be trusted with the terms of peace, because they benefited from the war; yet a conference of neutrals would allow the belligerents to begin negotiations regardless of battlefield positions. This "safe space" would allow the war to end without a victor's peace, which Addams believed

¹⁴⁷ Letter from Martha Carey Thomas to Jane Addams, February 18, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁴⁸ This idea was widespread at the time. For more information on how this idea affected different attempts at international negotiation, see Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*. For information on the development of this idea, see Patterson, *Toward a Warless World*.

¹⁴⁹ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 48–52.

would just lead to another war. Unfortunately, Thomas's misunderstanding, intentional or unintentional, and seeming support for an Allied victory led her to not support Addams's proposed resolutions. Thomas could have brought NAWSA support to the women's peace movement, which could have provided more supporters and funds for peace work in the United States; losing Thomas's support helped keep the NAWSA and other suffrage organizations separate from the women's peace movement, which proved a critical issue several years later.¹⁵⁰

Not all of Addams's troubles came reaction to the WPPs resolutions. The women's suffrage plank that Addams included in the national platform was criticized by individual branches of the WPP. A member of the Massachusetts branch, for example, who was also a suffrage activist, informed Addams about her branch attempting to remove the suffrage plank from their platform. Addams also received a letter from the leadership of the Florence Nightingale Branch of the WPP out of Washington, DC, asking whether joining the WPP bound them to the suffrage plank of the national organization:

a number of us met Saturday Jan. 16, who were interested in the Peace Movement; but felt it unwise to bring the suffrage question into the discussions, or into any meeting with which we were connected. We were told, that various officers, among them yourself, had stated that the Woman's Peace Party desired the membership and, aid of all women interested in Peace, regardless of their feelings on any of the other planks in the platform. ... Will you kindly tell us plainly whether by being a branch of the Woman's Peace Party we in any way bind ourselves to the planks contained on page two of the enclose circular [the platform which includes the suffrage plank]?¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ It should be noted that not all members of the NAWSA felt as Martha Thomas did. Some joined the WPP and worked for suffrage and peace. The NAWSA never officially supported the WPP, and later in the war membership in the NAWSA would support American entry into the European war, like most American suffrage organizations. Individuals in both organizations would be forced to choose which movement they supported more, and many would choose suffrage over peace. Not having official ties between the suffrage and peace movements simply made it easier for the suffrage organizations to disavow the peace societies when America went to war in 1917. This will all be discussed in chapter 5.

¹⁵¹ Letter from Bell Merrill Draper, written by Secretary Mrs. Amos G. Draper to Jane Addams, President, Woman's Peace Party, February 2, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

Both letters stated that the suffrage plank caused disagreement within their local WPP chapters, but both sought Addams's approval, and did not want to lessen the impact of the national peace party. Even as these letters demonstrate the divisiveness of the issue of women's suffrage, even among female activists, they also demonstrate Addams's prestige, and the importance of the peace movement to these women. Even though members of both branches did not want to have the suffrage plank in their local WPP chapters, they sought approval from Addams to write their platform with different words, or reported that the branch decided that changing local platforms undermined the national one. After a meeting of the Massachusetts branch, Addams's friend wrote:

Mrs. [unnamed woman] then moved that we ask the National [WPP] to permit the various organizations to have their own platforms. This was tabled after a short discussion in which it was pointed out that quite aside from the question of suffrage the framing of different platforms by the various branches and groups would destroy all uniformity and cohesion in the movement and make too much confusion and greatly lessen the possibility of concentrated activity.¹⁵²

Despite not wanting to support women's suffrage, members of the WPP did not want to undermine its work either— demonstrating the strength of their desire for peace, and, despite disagreement on suffrage, the strength of their support of Addams and the WPP.

Another challenge Addams faced after the founding of the WPP was the relationship of the organization to more radical women like Schwimmer and Lawrence. Though they were thanked for helping inspire so many women to attend the original DC meeting, neither woman was given a leadership position, and were only honorary members of the WPP.¹⁵³ In order to appease the volatile Schwimmer, Addams temporarily allowed her to act as executive secretary,

¹⁵² Letter from Susan W. FitzGerald to Jane Addams, February 1, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁵³ Both of their speeches were short, with Lawrence describing the graphic details of the horrors of war, and Schwimmer simply thanking the American women who were joining the fight for peace.

but after the written protests of many women, plus some unexplained rumors surrounding Schwimmer's true purpose in America, Schwimmer was forced to resign her post.¹⁵⁴ Addams understood that Schwimmer and Lawrence's public addresses created excitement that helped in the creation of the WPP, but she was determined to control the message, and to keep the WPP from being seen as a militant women's organization. Addams was also concerned that giving full membership status to Schwimmer and Lawrence—who were both from belligerent nations, though different sides—might create the perception in the U.S. or in belligerent countries that the WPP was biased. If the WPP was believed to be biased, then it would hurt America's chances for leading the neutral conference. Addams herself was unbiased against the belligerents; she saw war as violence against all peoples and simply wanted to end it. All of this led to Addams to distance herself from Schwimmer and Lawrence as time went on.¹⁵⁵

Despite criticism of the WPP, members of other women's organizations expressed their support for the WPP's resolutions and mission. Representatives from the National Council of Women (NCW), founded in 1888, and the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union (NWCTU), founded in 1874, both wrote to Addams in February 1915 to express support and the wish to involve their own organizations. While the NCW was not a suffrage organization, it did support women's progressive social work outside the home. As the American branch of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the NWCTU worked to end the sale of alcohol and supported women's suffrage, among other progressive goals. Both the NCW and NWCTU

¹⁵⁴ Schwimmer was a Hungarian, and despite the fact that she was not welcome in her own country at the time, some Americans believed her to be a spy for the Central Powers. Schwimmer also had a tendency to exaggerate her own importance and make promises that could not be kept, leading many women to dislike her. Protests against her as executive secretary mainly consisted to a Hungarian holding an executive position within an American organization. Letters between Addams and Schwimmer, February 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁵⁵ This can be seen in Addams's writings, correspondence, and biographies.

were part of larger international women's movements that had started in the late 1800s whose support provided further national and international connections for the WPP.¹⁵⁶

As Addams juggled her correspondence over the WPP's resolutions and moved into the organization's national headquarters in Chicago, she received an invitation from Dr. Aletta Jacobs in the Netherlands to attend a women's conference in April 1915. A month later, Andrews received her own invitation to the same conference. Neither one of them knew that this international congress of women would do exactly what Carrie Chapman Catt had likened to "trying to organize a peace society in an insane asylum"¹⁵⁷: that is, assemble belligerent and neutral citizens in the same room in order to discuss peace.

¹⁵⁶ More on support for the WPP will be discussed in the next chapter, as it was really only after Jane Addams and others returned from the Hague Congress in April 1915 that politicians like President Wilson began to meet with them and discuss the WPP's resolutions. Letter from Anna A. Gordon to Jane Addams, February 10, 1915, and letter from Kate Waller Barrett to Jane Addams, February 3, 1915, in the WILPF Papers, WPP Correspondence, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm reel 133.1.

¹⁵⁷ Letter from Carrie Chapman Catt to Jane Addams, January 16, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

CHAPTER 2: THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1915

In April 1915, Addams, Balch, and Andrews, traveled over 3,000 nautical miles to attend the Women's Congress at The Hague, where women from belligerent and neutral countries discussed how to create peace in Europe without causing future wars. They brought together ideas that foreshadowed Wilson's 1918 speech outlining his Fourteen Points for peace, and forged connections between the women's peace movement and the male-led peace movement. Addams, as president of the Congress, and the other American delegates highlighted their separation from the European conflict while arguing for American-led leadership. The Congress led to the creation of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP), which in 1919 became the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

After the Women's Congress, Addams and Balch traveled as official ICWPP delegates to different belligerent and neutral countries. Their meetings were organized to present the resolutions from the Women's Congress to foreign dignitaries and leaders.¹⁵⁸ Addams, Balch, and Andrews were among the American peace delegates who brought with them American ideals that were debated and adopted by their international audience. While one of these ideals was inherently American, the other was already part of the European peace movement.

The concept of American-led progressive internationalism travelled to The Hague with the American delegation. American advocates used a version of American history that

¹⁵⁸ Balch traveled to the Scandinavian countries and Russia, while Addams traveled to all the belligerent countries with the exception of Russia. Both women ended their trips in England and returned to the United States from there. Jane Addams, Emily Greene Balch, Alice Hamilton, *Women at The Hague; The International Congress of Women and Its Results* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915). Andrews did not travel around Europe; she returned home to her work for education reform and peace. Her work after the Hague Congress will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1846–1941. A-95, boxes 93–95. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

demonstrated America's ability to lead the world in creating permanent peace.¹⁵⁹ While progressive internationalism was not an American ideology, and many of the women at The Hague conference believed in it, the idea of an American-led progressive internationalism was uniquely American. This difference led American delegates such as Addams, Balch, and Andrews to use American exceptionalism to justify America's place in leading such a peace conference, and to introduce potential resolutions that benefited America, and focused on keeping America out of the European war, rather than on ending the war.¹⁶⁰

The Women's Congress at The Hague also combined the ideas of the European pacifist feminist movement with ideas from the women's suffrage and the American peace movements.¹⁶¹ The combined beliefs of these three movements produced the resolutions for women's suffrage as a way to prevent future wars. Women were believed to be the more peaceful sex; therefore, giving women the right to vote would allow more pacifists to be elected and war to be prevented. By combining the women's suffrage and peace movements with pacifist feminist notions, the Women's Congress at The Hague worked to provide political power to women and prevent all future wars.

The Hague Conference of 1915 was the first moment of the war where women turned to the international stage to influence policy makers in neutral and belligerent countries to begin the

¹⁵⁹ By "their version of history," I am referring to the progressive middle class white woman's view of American history, that is, their frequent references to the United States having solved the issue of racial discrimination, and being a country without any kind of empire. Both of these things are untrue, but were generally believed at the time.

¹⁶⁰ Both Michael Kazin and David Patterson's respective works delve into the 1915 Women's Congress at The Hague as one of the highlights of the women's peace movement. Patterson's book *The Search For Negotiated Peace* traces the call for an end to the war through negotiations, instead of military victory as he narrates the events of the Women's Congress. Patterson argues that while American women came with a plan to end the war, the Women's Congress approved only vague ideas and resolutions. Kazin's book *War against War* also lays out the events of the Women's Congress but seems to give more credit than Patterson to the women at The Hague for passing concrete plans for a neutral conference. Both authors recognize the women for being the first to offer any kind of plan to end the war.

¹⁶¹ For more on the pacifist feminist movement, see the previous chapter or Brown, *The Truest Form of Patriotism*, 1–13.

process of peace making. I argue that while bringing with them the ideals of American-led progressive internationalism, Balch, Addams, and Andrews worked with their international allies to craft an international women's peace organization that combined the peace ideals from American and European countries, and gave all women in attendance legitimacy in their peace work. The establishment of the ICWPP created a moderate international women's peace organization that would remain the central women's peace organization throughout the war.¹⁶²

Preparing for The Hague

In the early months of 1915, while she prepared for the upcoming Hague Conference, Addams continued her work for peace, as well as for other causes, such as workers' education and well-being, immigration policy, and her Chicago settlement house, Hull House. Though she remained committed to these other causes, Addams began focusing more of her attention on peace work.¹⁶³ She hoped to gain public support, but first she attempted to gain President Wilson's official support for a peace plan. If Addams had received Wilson's support she would have helped start an official peace conference, or at the very least have travelled abroad with his

¹⁶² One final note needs to be made about the sources used in this chapter. During the Women's Congress, Addams and others had secretaries that kept notes, which were then turned into two different publications. First, a full accounting of the Women's Congress was published, including transcripts of all discussions, addresses, and resolutions written in the original language spoken. A second book was published for American audiences by Addams, Balch, and Alice Hamilton, another American delegate and medical expert, when the women returned home. What does not exist is unpublished materials detailing the Congress itself. While Balch kept a diary during her travels, she did not continue it once she arrived. Addams kept no personal records that have survived to become part of her archive, and after the war Andrews worked to hide the fact that she was even part of the 1915 Hague Congress. Balch's biographer, and personal friend who created her archive notes that the only unpublished materials are Balch's diary from the trip to Europe and a few letters that Balch wrote to Addams while traveling to the neutral capitals after the conference. This means that many parts of this chapter are based on the published records of the Congress. While these records provide important information, they are published—and therefore edited. Yet they still provide valuable information that otherwise would be lost to history.

¹⁶³ Jane Addams granted interviews to the editor of *The Ladies Home Journal*, Edward Bok, on topics such as the women's movement, and wrote editorials titled, "Need a Woman Feel Old at Fifty?", and "The Unmarried Woman: Is She Better Fitted to Take up Social Service Works?" Addams also aided Teddy Roosevelt in finding information about a soldier who contacted him for money. Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

official statement of support for the women's peace work. If Wilson had provided this support it would have altered the world's view of the women's peace conference at The Hague.

In March 1915, Addams received correspondence from President Wilson, telling her that while he would be happy to read any suggestions that she had for him regarding peace, he did not feel an interview on the subject of peace would be prudent at the time.¹⁶⁴ Wilson's response to Addams's request for an interview was consistent with his response to almost all of her attempts to get his public support for a peace plan. He thanked her for her work, and expressed appreciation for any and all suggestions, but only privately. He did not want to make a public announcement for peace because, unknown to Addams, he had Colonel Edward House in Europe attempting negotiations.¹⁶⁵ As Patterson and Knock have shown, Wilson did not willingly meet with peace workers during this time; on the advice of friends and his cabinet, he began meeting with Addams and others only when they returned from Europe in late 1915.¹⁶⁶ Knock in particular contends that Wilson was very independent minded and forceful in making his own foreign policy decisions, despite his professed lack of knowledge on the subject.¹⁶⁷

Addams did not let Wilson's refusal of an interview slow her down, however. In early 1915, she joined forces with Balch, Lillian Wald, and other progressive reformers. They met in New York City at Wald's Henry Street Settlement and discussed the European war and the importance of the United States remaining outside of it. They also confirmed the need for a negotiated peace instead of a coercive peace. This group, though originally unnamed, became

¹⁶⁴ Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Jane Addams, March 6, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁶⁵ House had traveled to England to discuss the war with British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. While House was supposed to push Wilson's ideas for a negotiated peace and not commit to anything, historians have noted that House was an Anglophile and promised much more than he was authorized to. For more information on House's trips and promises, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 45–47.

¹⁶⁶ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 104–35 and Knock, *To End All Wars*, 31–47.

¹⁶⁷ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 20.

one of the most important peace groups of the Great War, and was eventually named the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM).¹⁶⁸

Wald became the president of the organization, while Addams remained very involved in its publications and functions, through letters and recommendations to Wald. Addams did not publish anything for the AUAM, or publicly profess her association in speeches, yet her correspondence with Wald and other members proves that the work of the group was done with her permission and support.¹⁶⁹

The group's founders announced the establishment of the AUAM, then called the Henry Street Group, in the pamphlet *Toward the Peace That Shall Last*, published on March 6, 1915, and then in an article of the same name published in the journal *The Survey* on March 16, 1915. In this pamphlet and article, the group opened with the following statement:

Society has probably never before been self-conscious enough to note carefully the subtle reactions of war, inevitably disastrous to the humane instincts which have been asserting themselves in the social order. Whatever the outcome of the conflict, the people of the new world are concerned that certain things in the civilization of Europe and in each of the warring countries, shall not perish. Though the United States must, as a non-combatant nation, maintain a neutral attitude, so much is at stake in both war and reconstruction, that on the day when, as President Wilson has said, the nations of Europe come together for settlement, Americans should, as freeman and democrats and peace-lovers, express themselves in some affirmative way.¹⁷⁰

This statement explained several ideas that connected the AUAM with the current American peace activists. First, it made a distinction between America, the new world, and Europe, the old.

¹⁶⁸ This peace group's legacy has had a major effect on American history concerning the right to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, as the ACLU came out of this organization. When established in 1915 it had no official name beyond the Henry Street Group, but in 1916 it became the American Union Against Militarism, and in 1918 would splintered into two groups, one of which became the ACLU in 1919. Samuel Walker, *In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU* (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999). For the purposes of this paper I will refer to this group as the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), as that is how the group is remembered.

¹⁶⁹ Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁷⁰ The italics are original to the text, which was also written in all capital letters. *Toward the Peace That Shall Last*, March 6, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

It also pointed to progress, meaning the movement of society toward a better world, that the war had halted. Finally, it argued that the United States was neutral in the conflict and therefore the best position to begin the peace process.

The pamphlet also outlined the group's arguments concerning the war, and the contents of the peace treaty they wanted to see negotiated to end the war. Their main argument was that even though the world was at war, there were people everywhere who wanted peace, and through them war would eventually end.

It took the human race many centuries to rid itself of human sacrifice; during many centuries more it relapsed again and again in periods of national despair. So have we fallen back into warfare, and perhaps will fall back again and again, until in self-pity, in self-defense, in self-assertion of the right of life, not, as hitherto, a few but the *whole part of the world*, will brook this think no longer.¹⁷¹

This statement focused on educating Americans, and others abroad, on the horrors of war, to prevent future wars from occurring. The pamphlet also emphasized the right of American peace organizations to protest the war, even though they were from a neutral country. While the group first pointed out that they were lucky to live in a neutral nation, they argued:

By that comradeship among nations which has made for mutual understanding; by those inventions which have bound us in communication and put the horrors of war at our doors; by the mechanical contrivances which multiply and intensify those horrors; by the quickening human sympathies which have made us sensitive to the hurts of others—we *can speak as fellow victims of this great oppression*.¹⁷²

This need for American peace organizations to explain their right to speak for peace—even though, as Americans, they were not directly impacted by the war—is emphasized repeatedly throughout American's period of neutrality. International papers and speakers accused neutral

¹⁷¹ The italics are from the original pamphlet. *Toward the Peace That Shall Last*, March 6, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

¹⁷² The italics are from the original pamphlet. *Toward the Peace That Shall Last*, March 6, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

nations of not understanding the war, or of being under the influence of the enemy.¹⁷³ Here the AUAM highlighted the fact that, because activists were human and connected to belligerent nations through technology and trade, they too were victims of the war.

The AUAM became one of the leading coed peace organizations in the United States during World War I. Its members focused on Kantian ideals of permanent peace and worked to convince the public that American-led progressive internationalism was the only way to unite the world against war. Addams was a leading member of the AUAM but already was the president of the WPP; she often delegated her role to friends Wald and Kellogg. Though the AUAM was coed it sought the same moderate peace settlement that moderate women's organizations, such as the WPP, did. Though it was not connected internationally, its members, like Addams, were. The AUAM provided Addams with a larger national reach than she could have achieved with the WPP alone, however, the group would be effected by the same divisions as other peace organizations as the war progressed.

As she worked behind the scenes with Wald and the AUAM, Addams traveled through the United States giving public addresses on peace. She was the most prominent peace activist in the United States—in fact she led multiple peace organizations—and was treated by newspapers and politicians alike to treat her as a spokesperson for the women's peace movement.¹⁷⁴ Her membership and rank in so many organizations indicates her talent and prestige but also her status as an activist. As an upper-middle-class white woman, Addams had the money to work on a volunteer-only basis, and was seen as respectable in the public's eye. This respectability gave

¹⁷³ For information on gender and the war see Erika A. Kuhlman, *Petticoats and White Feathers: Gender Conformity, Race, the Progressive Peace Movement, and the Debate Over War, 1895–1919* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961).

¹⁷⁴ These organizations include Hull House, American Sociological Society, Anti-Imperialist League, the Chicago Public Art Society (CPSAS), the Progressive Party, the Juvenile Protective Association (JPA). Addams also worked with the University of Chicago and the Chicago Board of Health through her work at Hull House.

Addams the power to legitimize organizations, as she loaned her respectability to those whom she served with.¹⁷⁵

While Addams and Balch continued their peace work within the United States, Andrews traveled to The Hague, at the request of the Dutch organizers of the upcoming Women's Congress, to help write the rules, regulations, and initial resolutions. Organized by Dutch suffragist and peace worker Dr. Aletta Jacobs, the Women's Peace Congress at The Hague was designed to be an indication to belligerent and neutral governments that the public believed something needed to be done about the war.¹⁷⁶ Jacobs, a suffragist and friend of Addams, believed that if men would not lead the way to peace, then women would.¹⁷⁷ Under Jacobs's direction, the Amsterdam women formed their own committee and then invited women from peace and suffrage organizations around the world to attend a conference at The Hague, to be held at the end of April 1915. One member from each invited country was asked to send a delegate early, however, to represent them on the executive resolutions committee—referred to simply as the resolutions committee—and set the program for the Congress.¹⁷⁸ As the representative from the United States, Andrews worked with the resolutions committee at The

¹⁷⁵ The history of respectability among women as public speakers is complicated, and has much been written about it. For one argument concerning the respectability of white women in the eyes of American politicians, see William Preston Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963). For more on the rise of female-led organizations and public speakers, see Lisa Tetrault, *The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women's Suffrage Movement, 1848–1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). And for more on the rise of upper-class women volunteer workers in the progressive age, see McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent*, 2003, and Neuman, *Gilded Suffragists*, 2017.

¹⁷⁶ It should be noted that progressive-era activists like Addams and her European counterparts often believed that they understood the public's mindset even though they were not actually average citizens of their respective countries. This assumption led them to believe they spoke for the public when discussing reforms or peace. While they were correct in many instances, their lack of actual understanding of the public would lead to problems throughout the war.

¹⁷⁷ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 30–36.

¹⁷⁸ While the Women's Congress would not be held until the end of April 1915, with most delegates traveling in March, the delegates of the resolutions committee traveled earlier and met starting in March 1915.

Hague to set the rules for delegates, debate, and amendments. They also wrote five resolutions that would not be debatable.¹⁷⁹

The Resolutions Committee

The resolutions committee of the Women's Congress had two primary goals: to create rules for attendance and to write a tentative platform that would become the main point of discussion. While the congress was to be open to the public, voting membership could be achieved only by women who agreed to two main principles:

Women only could become members of the Congress and they were required to express themselves in general agreement with the resolutions on the preliminary programme. This general agreement was interpreted to imply the conviction: That international disputes should be settled by pacific means; That the parliamentary franchise should be extended to women.¹⁸⁰

The resolutions committee decided that these two resolutions made up the crux of the Women's Congress.¹⁸¹

The resolutions committee also drafted the initial resolutions that the Women's Congress would finalize, including resolutions about the horrors of war and how to prevent it. While debates on important issues to the American delegates will be discussed later in this chapter, I will first examine the first five resolutions because these were written with no intent to debate or rewrite them. Therefore, in addition to agreeing to the congress's two main principles above, all delegates also had to agree not to debate these five resolutions. These resolutions become the

¹⁷⁹ The five resolutions will be discussed later in this chapter. Patterson, *Search for Negotiated Peace*, 53–56.

¹⁸⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁸¹ Because Andrews did not keep a diary, we do not know her private thoughts on this matter. Her own branch of the WPP was not keen on including suffrage in their platform, and Andrews's own American School Peace League did not openly advocate for women's suffrage. Andrews herself was a women's suffrage supporter, however, and it is possible that she knew going into this meeting that suffrage would be part of the platform. Dr. Jacobs, who called the meeting, was a devoted suffrage supporter, so it would make sense that suffrage was included.

basis for the moderate international women's peace movement, which most female peace advocates were part of for the first part of the war.

Parts of the first five resolutions were commonly included in peace movements around the world. These included: peace based on justice not victory, no transfer of territory without the consent of the people within it, democracy for all people who wanted it, and the creation of an agreement that bound governments to arbitration instead of warfare.¹⁸² The idea of peace based on justice and reason—not just military victory—and the idea of a treaty binding governments to arbitration had already been agreed to by the American women of the WPP in January 1915.¹⁸³ Many peace organizations believed that arbitration agreements, which had begun before the war broke out in 1914, were the best way to force nations to resolve international disputes.

The idea of peace without victory—which would become a rallying call for Woodrow Wilson in 1917 but is seen first with the women's peace movement—was to ensure permanent peace. The women of the resolutions committee, like most peace advocates, wanted to end the European war so that war would never occur again. While this idea of “peace without victory” was unique to the women's peace movement in 1915, it was not an entirely new concept. In 1795 Kant argued in his study on peace that “No treaty of peace shall be esteemed valid, on which is tacitly reserved matter for future war.”¹⁸⁴ The Women's Congress wanted to ensure that peace would be negotiated—not dictated to make a “valid” peace treaty. These resolutions, influenced by Kant, in turn influenced Wilson. The idea of a negotiated peace being the key to any future world peace became a critical to his later arguments and to his famous Fourteen Points. Although

¹⁸² Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁸³ See chapter 1 for details on the creation of this group.

¹⁸⁴ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 2.

Wilson has received the historic credit for this argument, without the Women's Congress at The Hague in 1915 he would not have been familiar with it.¹⁸⁵

Many of the resolutions were common within the international peace movement, yet one specifically addressed women's role in the war and in the peace movements, and was unique to this all female organization.¹⁸⁶ Resolution two, "Women's Sufferings in War," addressed the unique position war placed women in: "This International Congress of Women opposes the assumption that women can be protected under the conditions of modern warfare. It protests vehemently against the odious wrongs of which women are the victims in time of war, and especially against the horrible violation of women which attends all war."¹⁸⁷ This resolution addressed war atrocities that specifically affected women, established the delegates' focus on war as an abhorrent event, and revealed why women would want peace even more than men. This resolution was needed to counter arguments that women were not fit to debate war or peace. As Addams had argued earlier that year during the founding of the WPP, women were connected to the war and had every right to protest it.¹⁸⁸

The other two resolutions passed without debate, before the start of the congress, were in line with the values typically held by white, middle- to upper-middle-class progressive women: that no territory should be transferred without the consent of those governed, and that democracy

¹⁸⁵ For more on Wilson's indebtedness to the women's peace movement, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, Preface.

¹⁸⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁸⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁸⁸ See chapter 1 for more information on this speech. Jane Addams speech, in *Addresses Given at the Organization Conference of the Woman's Peace Party* (Chicago: Woman's Peace Party, 1915), 10, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

should be available to all peoples.¹⁸⁹ What needs to be noted though, is that these resolutions were specifically added to support Polish, Irish, and other European nations currently under another nations' control; the women who wrote these resolutions generally believed that they did not apply to colonized nonwhite peoples. Only European women spoke on about these two resolutions, as no nonwhite delegates attended the Congress. Colonized peoples came up only when a Belgian delegate objected, as she believed her people were being referred to as "backwards." Addams quickly clarified: "The Chair wishes to explain, that the term 'backward peoples' applies to savage nations, such as the Congo and other places where civilization is not established. It cannot apply to a European nation."¹⁹⁰ Addams's statement, and its acceptance by those listening, demonstrated the attitude that a majority of the women at the Congress had toward nonwhite colonized peoples.¹⁹¹

The resolution concerning self-determination is important to note because it became one of the defining differences between the moderate and radical women's peace factions in 1916. While moderates took the stance that self-determination only applied to white European nations, similarly to Wilson and other Western political leaders, radicals believed that the concept should be applied to all peoples including the colonized. This controversial application added to the lack of political acceptance that radical peace advocates received.

¹⁸⁹ They read: "That no territory should be transferred without the consent of the men and women in it, and that the right of conquest should not be recognized;" and "That autonomy and a democratic parliament should not be refused to any people."

¹⁹⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Third Day, Friday, April 30, Afternoon Session, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁹¹ It can be inferred that the women who heard Addams agreed with her because all people in the room had the right to speak, and some women did interject when they vehemently disagreed with a remark. While Addams was an advocate in her own way for African American civil rights, and Balch would later work to help Haitians regain their independence from the United States after the war ended, neither of them worked to aid peoples conquered by the European governments gain any sort of rights. This mindset also coincides with President Wilson's opinion on the matter as can be seen in Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 3–34.

The final rules agreed on by the resolutions committee were the limits to be placed on discussion. Two topics were prohibited for all delegates and proposed resolutions: first, the responsibility for the present war, and, second, the conduct of the present war.¹⁹² The resolutions committee, which was made up of delegates from belligerent and neutral countries, knew these two topics, if allowed, would create chaos. The women traveling to The Hague already faced numerous insults, as well as accusations of treason. Many peace activists also worried that a meeting of any kind of belligerent peoples would result in controversy. Even before Dr. Jacobs has sent them invitations, Catt had written to Addams that to have belligerent women meet would be the same as having a peace meeting in an insane asylum.¹⁹³ By prohibiting discussion of blame for starting the war, as well as accusations for the conduct of the war, the resolutions committee hoped to avoid all conflicts and present the women members as united against war.¹⁹⁴

Traveling to The Hague

Once the Congress was organized by the Dutch delegation, Jacobs wrote to Addams to ask that she head the conference as its president. Addams agreed and prepared for her departure. Her first goal in was to recruit peace activists to serve as American delegates. One of the first women she wrote to was Emily Balch, then working as a professor of economics and sociology

¹⁹² Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

¹⁹³ Catt choose not to attend the Women's Congress. Letter from Carrie Chapman Catt to Jane Addams, January 16, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

¹⁹⁴ This is my argument based on the sources I have available to me. Unfortunately, records of the resolutions committee were folded into the printed transcripts of the Women's Congress as a whole, so we do not have access to the private arguments or accounts from the attendees. Based on other letters and arguments within the printed records we do have, I have made the above inferences.

at Wellesley College.¹⁹⁵ Addams's invitation propelled Balch into the international women's peace movement, which became a defining part of the rest of her career.

A total of 47 American delegates to the Women's Congress at The Hague traveled across the Atlantic aboard their ship, the *Noordam*. Balch kept a diary and wrote frequently about different events, talks, and discussions on board. Addams had also invited Louis Lochner, a member of the Chicago Peace Society and friend of Addams and Balch, to travel along with the women as a peace expert. He gave daily talks on different aspects of peace, arbitration, and international relations in order to educate the delegates. Addams's invitation to Lochner to attend as an expert is consistent with her personal history of reliance on male experts as educators and spokespeople. Bringing him with the all female delegation allowed Addams to borrow some of his legitimacy as a male peace expert, despite the fact that she had just as much experience as he did.¹⁹⁶

When the *Noordam* reached England, however, the delegates ran into trouble. The British had cut off all sea traffic with Holland, citing increased submarine attacks from the Germans. This meant that the American women were stuck off the coast of England. According to Balch's diary, both she and Addams wrote to the American ambassador in England for his help in freeing their ship, yet he did not respond until after they had already been allowed to leave, demonstrating the lack of political support the women aboard had from their own political elite. After three days the *Noordam* was allowed to set sail for The Hague, with the American delegates arriving just in time for the start of the Congress.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Correspondence between Jane Addams and Emily Green Balch, and between Emily Greene Balch and Wellesley President H. Kim Bottomly, February and March 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

¹⁹⁶ Journal of Emily Greene Balch 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

¹⁹⁷ Journal of Emily Greene Balch 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

The British women's delegation, however, had far more trouble than the Americans. Out of the 180-person delegation, only three British women arrived at The Hague; the others were not permitted to leave England because of passport and visa restrictions. Of the three British women who did arrive at The Hague, two had been in the United States when the conference was called and traveled with the American delegation; the third got out during a brief agreement between the British government and the women advocates. In his book *The Search For Negotiated Peace*, Patterson contends that the British government felt it could not allow so many women to demonstrate their unhappiness with the war because it would injure morale or affect Britain's international standing.¹⁹⁸ His argument is supported by what was printed in British newspapers. The arguments are worth briefly examining because they demonstrated the hostility toward the woman's peace group meeting as well as how the British government's reliance on patriotism interfered the women's attempt to hold a peace meeting.

The British government, and many British people, wanted to prevent the British women from attending any conference at The Hague for two major reasons. First, German women were among those invited. The idea that British women would meet and discuss peace with the enemy—while British and German men were fighting at the front—caused an uproar in Britain. Public figures also worried that the British women knew too much about the war effort and might reveal important information to German women, who would then tell their husbands, brothers, etc., endangering the British war effort.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 51–81.

¹⁹⁹ Newspaper articles pertaining to this include "Folly in Petticoats," *The Sunday Pictorial*, April 11, 1915; "Passports to Meet Germans," *The Daily Mail*, April 12, 1915; "Indiscreet Women," *The Standard*, April 10, 1915; and "The Lady at the Table: Women and Peace, Proposed International Congresses," *The Referee*, March 14, 1915. Manchester Library, International Woman's Suffrage Alliance (hereafter IWSA) box 3, folder 106.

The second reason was that the British government and people did not believe it to be a good time to discuss peace. In 1915, the German army was in a better position militarily than the British or French. This meant that if peace negotiations began, the Germans would have the upper hand. The British government and people therefore saw any discussion of peace—and the British peace activists themselves—as a threat to British war aims and morale, that is, as a potential threat to national security. The British government wished to stop the women activists by any means necessary. While the British government worked behind the scenes to prevent the women from attending, newspapers focused on the public’s fear of the Women’s Congress.²⁰⁰

In her diary, Balch noted the restrictions put on the British women by their government, and stated that both she and Addams believed that the reason the *Noordam* was held for so long off the English coast was because they were headed to The Hague. Balch and Addams reasoned that the British government was trying to prevent the Women’s Congress from taking place; it was only after realizing they could not stop it that they let the *Noordam* through. Balch stated, “The opinion gained ground that the whole holdup of traffic with Holland was to prevent the holding of the meeting.”²⁰¹ Balch also commented on how bizarre the situation was, as the neutral American delegates were interned on the ship:

It has only gradually become real to us how curious our situation is. ... We are not allowed to go on shore – except that the Captain and Purser might if they chose – nor can anyone but the English officials come on board to us. We are practically interned altho’ neutrals.²⁰²

As there were two British women on board the *Noordam*, it is very possible that the British government wanted to prevent them from going to the peace meeting. Having British women at a

²⁰⁰ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 51–81.

²⁰¹ Journal of Emily Greene Balch 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁰² Journal of Emily Greene Balch 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

peace conference with other belligerent women could have been construed as a sign that the British public did not support their government's war effort. In addition, delaying the ship—and the American delegation—could also have a significant impact on the congress. The *Noordam* was carrying Addams, the chair of the congress, and the American delegation, the largest of the delegation, besides their Dutch hosts. If England had prevented them from attending the meeting, the congress might have been damaged irreparably.

After arriving off of England on Thursday, April 22, the *Noordam* was finally informed on Monday, April 26, that it had permission to leave. It is possible that the English government decided to release the ship because, like all belligerent leaders, they worried about their international image. By letting the American ship travel to the Hague in time for the Women's Congress, British leaders could assure the world that they still hoped the war would soon end—that they too wanted peace. The ship departed Tuesday morning, April 27, and the women arrived at The Hague on Wednesday, April 28, at 4 o'clock a.m. The conference began that same afternoon.²⁰³

The Hague Conference

The International Congress of Women met from April 28 to May 1, 1915, creating the International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace (IWCPP), which still exists today.²⁰⁴ The Congress brought together more than 1,200 women from almost every Western power, and focused on the creation of resolutions to end the current war and prevent future wars.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Journal of Emily Greene Balch 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁰⁴ The organization changed its name in 1919 to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); it is considered one of the first nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). More information on their current activities can be found on their website at <https://www.wilpf.org>.

²⁰⁵ The twelve countries represented at the Congress were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Note that Austria and Hungary were listed as separate countries instead of as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The organizers also noted that expressions of

Women's organizations around the world were invited to send two delegates, provided they agreed with the resolutions of the preliminary program.

After passing the five resolutions discussed earlier, the congress continued. Amendments could be proposed only by delegates, in writing, and passed to the chairperson. As the chair of the congress, Addams enforced these rules and moderated debates of the amendments. An amendment needed a delegate to propose it and another delegate to second it. Once an amendment to a resolution was seconded, five minutes were allotted for each of the two supporting delegates to explain it. After being introduced, the amendments were either voted on or tabled for later discussion. Only with approval from the women who proposed it could an amendment be tabled.

In my examination of the transcript of the debates, I found Addams worked very hard to promote friendly discussion, but also strictly enforced the rules, especially concerning time and topic. Often she forced a delegate back on topic, or cut a delegate off after her five minutes had expired. Her adherence to the rules was respected by the women, and very few attempted to get around the rules; those who wished to keep speaking would request more time, which needed to be approved by the delegates and Addams. The respect for Addams at the Congress indicates the position she held not only within the Congress, but also within the community represented there. This was a meeting of peers, and while some debates were more contentious than others, overall, the women got along and worked together.²⁰⁶

sympathy, but not delegates, were received from Argentina, British India, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, and South Africa. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Crystal Macmillan, *The History of the Congress*, August 27, 1915, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²⁰⁶ The words *delegates* and *women* are used interchangeably because all delegates to the congress were women. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace,

The enforcement of the rules was extremely vital to Addams; she knew how important it was—and how careful the women had to be—to prove to the world that belligerent women could meet without incident. People in both belligerent and neutral nations expected that the worst would happen. Reporters, too, were present at the congress, recounting everything that happened. By enforcing the rules that prevented debates from becoming too contentious, Addams ensured that press reports would document that the women of the belligerent countries could come together and discuss peace. One of the criticisms of the women's congress, from other women frequently, was that by bringing women from all belligerent countries together the congress's organizers were courting chaos. Addams was determined to prove that women, unlike more violent men, were more than capable of meeting peacefully and conducting themselves in a respectful manner. By enforcing the rules of the congress, Addams worked to ensure that the women only presented a unified calm front that proved to the rest of the world that peace between belligerents was possible.

Debates at the Congress

The American delegates at the Women's Congress at The Hague focused on three main issues: they introduced the ideas of democracy in foreign policy, of government control over the manufacture of munitions, and of creating an international government organization and court. Both Balch and Andrews helped support these resolutions and introduced two of them to the rest of the Congress, while Addams, as the president of the congress, could not introduce or debate any resolutions. However, as I will analyze later, she did reinforce these resolutions in her closing speech.

International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

The resolution on democratic control over foreign policy indicated how the American delegates viewed the relationship between democracy, peace, and education:

Since war is commonly brought about not by the mass of the people, who do not desire it, but by groups representing particular interests, this International Congress of Women urges that Foreign Politics shall be subject to Democratic Control; and declares that it can only recognise [*sic*] as democratic a system which includes the equal representation of men and women.²⁰⁷

While the resolution eventually passed without amendment, the debate over potential amendments was revealed challenges to its practicality. The Americans proposed an amendment that would have included the word *possibly* or *may* in the above phrase “who does not desire it.” This change caused an uproar because it allowed for the possibility that the people of a country might one day vote to go to war. To the American delegates, the Women’s Congress was not trying to eliminate war completely but wanted to prevent wars that the people did not support: “We are not asking that there shall be no war, but we ask that there shall be no war except one wished by the people of the world ... And then, if the people of any country should decide that war has to be made, let them decide themselves, but let otherwise no war occur.”²⁰⁸ The entire point of the Women’s Congress was to create a world without war. The fact that the Americans acknowledged that war might still occur was disconcerting to the rest of the delegates. Other countries’ delegates protested the American amendment and argued adding it would defeat the purpose of the congress altogether, while the American women, explained that they simply wanted to enforce the notion that democracy comes from the people and sometimes the majority opinion did not fit with what the progressives, or educated classes, wanted. The American

²⁰⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²⁰⁸ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Mrs. F. Post, Discussion of Resolutions, Second Day, Thursday, April 29th, Democratic Control of Foreign Policy, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

delegates believed that the public needed to be educated in international relations so that they would choose peace over war. By allowing for the possibility of war to occur, they were reinforcing the need for this education, and protecting what they saw as the true idea of democracy. The debate, however, proved that the amendment would not pass and the Americans withdrew it before the vote could take place.²⁰⁹

The difference in opinion between American and other delegates goes to show the different beliefs and opinions that existed within the women's peace movement. During the Women's Congress there was no other international women's peace organization, the members there were creating the first one. So despite disagreements and difference in opinions, the women there compromised around a set of moderate resolutions. Despite this compromise, when given the chance to join or organize groups that better fit their ideological points of view, women would take that opportunity.²¹⁰

American delegates proposed two additional resolutions to help limit any need for a nation's people to ever vote for war. First was a resolution that called for governments to take over the manufacture of all arms, in order to enforce disarmament. More important, however, was the second resolution, which called for the creation of an international government and court that would help nations prevent and resolve disputes without going to war.²¹¹

Andrews introduced the American amendment to the resolution on an international organization, which called for a Society of Nations to be formed out of the previous Hague

²⁰⁹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Discussion of Resolutions, Second Day, Thursday, April 29th, Democratic Control of Foreign Policy, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²¹⁰ This would not happen, however, until 1916 and is discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The women who joined other organizations generally remained in the ICWPP despite the difference in resolutions.

²¹¹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Discussion of Resolutions, Second Day, Thursday, April 29th, General Disarmament, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

conferences, as well as for the Hague conference to be made permanent and meet at regular intervals.²¹² Speaking for the entire American delegation, Andrews proposed:

In place of the periodic Hague Conferences ... a permanent International conference, in which women shall take part, to make constructive proposals with respect to further International Cooperation among the States; and so constituted that it could formulate and enforce those principles of justice, equity and goodwill in accordance with which the interest of the great Powers... A permanent International Court of Arbitration to settle international questions or differences ... A permanent Council of Conciliation and Investigation, for the settlement of International differences arising of out conflicting interests... [and] an International Court of Justice.²¹³

This international organization that Andrews proposed was very different from the Hague Conferences that had come before the war. The American delegates preferred an international organization that could investigate and enforce its members' decisions, not just an organization that would help arbitrate disagreements. The amendment passed and all three of her proposals — the International Court of Arbitration, the Council of Conciliation and Investigation, and the International Court of Justice—were incorporated into the final resolutions.

The delegates at The Hague, especially the Americans, believed that a strong international organization was the only way countries would truly avoid war. They recognized that disagreements between countries were not going to stop with the end of the European war, and that another war could potentially happen. They hoped that the horrors of the war would convince the nations of the world to give up a little of their sovereignty to this theoretic international organization to keep the hard-won peace. Again the women's argument here foreshadows Wilson's argument for what would become the League of Nations. Much like the

²¹² Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Discussion of Resolutions, Third Day, Friday, April 30th, International Organization, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²¹³ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Discussion of Resolutions, Third Day, Friday, April 30th, International Organization, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

idea of a dictated peace, the women's resolutions on an international government influenced Wilson's future policy decisions during preparations for peace in 1918.²¹⁴

Despite their willingness to work with women from all different countries, and hypothetically agree to give away some of America's sovereignty, American delegates discussed throughout the conference how detached from the war America was. In the speech that closed the conference, Addams professed, "We from the United States who have made the longest journey and are therefore freest from these entanglements – although no nation in the civilized world is free – can speak our admiration for these fine women from the neutral nations as well as from the fighting nations."²¹⁵ Addams referred directly to the absence of diplomatic treaties between America and European nations, as well as a lack of geographical connections with the warring nations in Europe. In Addams's view, America was a neutral beyond the European neutrals, such as the Netherlands, because there was no threat of war in America. Put simply, because America did not face the threat of invasion, Americans could protest the war differently from their European counterparts: they could speak out against the war without worry. The fact of American separation, influenced by the idea of American exceptionalism, was proposed by all American delegates, including Addams, Balch, and Andrews. Despite this they also focused on internationalism, or the idea that all nations in the world are connected and need to adjust foreign policy based on that idea.

During the discussion of amendments, other American delegates used American history to demonstrate the differences between America and Europe. As one American delegate noted,

²¹⁴ For more information see Knock, *To End All Wars*, Preface.

²¹⁵ Addams refers to the diplomatic, military, and personal entanglements that threatened to pull neutral countries, or people in Europe, into the war. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

“it was our [American] duty to lead the way so that the terms of peace to be made would be terms of permanent peace and if possible of eternal peace. We therefore bring in an amendment which comes forth from American experience.”²¹⁶ She continued to explain that the Americans found a way to coexist with Great Britain, in the form of Canada, even after the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. She emphasized the lack of border walls between Canada and the United States and how animosity became friendship through international relations built on trust and mutual goodwill—and that America uniquely understood having an enemy on your border and working through hostilities to become allies. While there is history that obviously is left out, her argument, like Addams’s, was clear: the United States had a unique role to play in peace negotiations because of its unique history and place in the world.²¹⁷

President Wilson, too, believed that America had an unique role to play in the creation of a new world order. As Knock points out in his examination of Wilson’s relationship with internationalists during World War I, this belief can be seen in Wilson’s many peace overtures to the belligerent leaders during the war. Up until the resumption of German unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, Wilson thought that America, and he himself, would lead the peace process as a neutral.²¹⁸

Addams at the Congress

Despite Addams’s inability, as the president of the conference, to introduce resolutions or amendments, she did have the opportunity to give a concluding presidential address. Addams’s

²¹⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Discussion of Resolutions, Third Day Friday, April 30th (Afternoon Session), Democratic Control of Foreign Policy, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²¹⁷ For more information about the use of American exceptionalism in American foreign policy and relations, see Michael Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2007).

²¹⁸ Knock, *To End All Wars*, Page 34–36.

speech highlighted her own personal views about the horrors of war and the importance of the conference. One of her main points was that the women who attended the conference had faced hardships together—many had traveled to The Hague without the support of their country, or their families—but they understood their struggles were worthwhile if they brought about an end to the war: “I therefore venture to call the journey of these women, many of them heartsick and sorrowful, to this Congress, little short of an act of heroism. Even to appear to differ from those she loves in the hour of their affliction or exaltation has ever been the supreme test of woman’s conscience.”²¹⁹ Addams tried to make the rest of the world understand that the desire of these women want to end the war did not mean they were anything but patriotic:

Those great underlying forces in response to which so many women have come here, belong to the human race as a whole and constitute a spiritual internationalism which surrounds and completes our national life even as our national life surrounds and completes our family life; they do not conflict with patriotism on one side any more than family devotion conflicts with it upon the other.²²⁰

By comparing the relationship between internationalism and patriotism to the relationship between patriotism and family life, Addams made an inherently gendered argument. As a supporter of women’s suffrage, Addams frequently made the argument that having the right to vote would not detract from a woman’s life in the home. In fact it would allow women to better serve their families: by electing politicians who would pass measures that affected education, children, and the home, which, Addams argued, women inherently understood better than men, women would strengthen their country.²²¹

²¹⁹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²²⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²²¹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

These statements also indicated Addams's belief in cosmopolitan patriotism.²²² European nations frequently referred to the women who attended the congress as treasonous because they were discussing peace while their country was at war. Addams, however, contended that these women were more patriotic than those who supported their government's decisions in the current climate because they were trying to help their country and countrymen survive. The bravery they showed in bucking the national patriotic climate and fighting for peace proved their patriotism.

Addams's address also discussed how the current war corrupted all the progress that had been brought about by progressive reforms and technical changes:

It is to late in the day for war. For decades the lives of all the peoples of the world have been revealed to us through the products of commerce, through the news agencies, through popular songs and novels, through photographs and cinematographs, and last of all through the interpretations of the poets and artists. Suddenly all of these wonderful agencies are applied to the hideous business of uncovering the details of warfare.²²³

Addams contended that up until the war began, the people of the world had been getting to know and understand each other through the new forms of technology, communication, and commerce. This understanding led the world away from war and violence and towards peace and diplomacy. Addams implied that the world was moving away from a masculine world, where nations solved problems through military might and war, and towards a more feminine world, where the world's leaders discussed solutions in rational ways that allowed for peace to prevail. While these are stereotypical ideas of gender today, at the time, fighting was considered a male prerogative that allowed them to demonstrate their might and courage, while discussion and diplomacy was seen as more timid, and therefore more feminine.²²⁴

²²² Hanson, *The Promise of Patriotism*, xiii–xxii.

²²³ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²²⁴ For information on gender and the war, see Kuhlman, *Petticoats and White Feathers*. For information on the Spanish-American War, gender, and the peace movements, see Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American*

Addams's speech attempted to bring together two main ideas of the American women's peace movement at the time: that the desire for peace and the belief in internationalism was not detrimental to patriotism, and second, that for the world to progress, it needed to move beyond the simplicity of war, to the more complex art of diplomacy and international relations. These ideas emerged from the two movements Addams worked in before the war began: women's suffrage and the progressive movement. Those who advocated for suffrage believed women would have a calming effect on politics because women, as nurturers, naturally advocated for peace. Progressives believed that through their reform work they were moving society toward a brighter and better future. Addams combined these ideas in her advocacy for peace: bringing women into politics would lead the world towards a brighter, more peaceful future.

After Addams's speech marked the end of the Women's Congress, most delegates, including Andrews, returned immediately to their home countries, while Addams and Balch remained in Europe to begin work as representatives of the congress. A resolution had been passed that called for representatives from the Congress to travel to as many nations as possible to present the women's resolutions. Addams was chosen to lead a delegation to all the belligerent countries except Russia, and Balch headed one that went to the neutral countries and Russia. While both women were well received by all the heads of neutral and belligerent nations, their trips demonstrate both the want of the belligerent countries to appear peaceful even while at war, and the power of the United States in other nations' foreign policy decisions. Despite all their preparation at the Women's Congress, however, no one was prepared for the first major crisis of American and German relations.

Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

The Sinking of the *Lusitania*

One of the first major tests of the resolutions of the congress, particularly for American women, was the sinking of the *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, just as Addams and other delegates arrived in England. The *Lusitania*, one of the fastest passenger ships in the British fleet, was carrying nearly 1,300 passengers, as well as ammunition, shells, and other military cargo. Struck twice by German torpedoes from the U-boat *U20*, the *Lusitania* sank in 18 minutes, killing 1,198 people and leaving 761 survivors. Over 120 Americans died when the ship sunk, which caused a crisis for the American and German governments.²²⁵

Addams in particular made many statements over the sinking of the *Lusitania*, using the tragedy to call for an end to the war. In a special cable from The Hague to the *New York Times*, Addams wrote:

The feeling in The Hague among pacifists is that the *Lusitania* incident should be made the occasion of pressure for the co-operation of all neutral nations to end the war. Talk of reprisals or aggression can only increase the spirit of bitterness and horror of the present situation before which the people in Europe already stand aghast.²²⁶

Here Addams chose to not discuss the horrors of the incident or the deaths of Americans, but instead used the attack on the *Lusitania* to encourage the neutral powers to work together and end the war. Her tone, however, soon changed in her next public statements, where reporters interviewed her for the *New York Times*, or quoted a speech she gave while in London. When asked two days later, at a reception in her honor in London, she replied, “I cannot talk about it.

²²⁵ For more information on the sinking of the RMS *Lusitania*, and Wilson’s correspondence about it with the German government, see Justus D. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 70–88.

²²⁶ Jane Addams, “Miss Addams’s Comment: Thinks *Lusitania*’s Loss Should Stir Neutrals to Peace Move,” Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES, *New York Times* (1857–1922); May 11, 1915, 3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The New York Times*.

Public feeling is, of course, highly inflamed, but I sincerely hope there will be no war.”²²⁷ And the following day, during an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, Addams reflected:

The thought of the Lusitania is too awful to dwell upon. It strikes too near the heart. But when it comes to saying that Americans ought to go to war on the Lusitania episode, I don’t agree. America ought to be the one great-nation to keep clear of the war. When this terrible conflict is over all Europe, indeed all the world, will look to America to act as the balance in the readjustment of the relations of the nations.²²⁸

Both quotes made similar points about the *Lusitania*: it was an awful event that proved America should remain outside the war, but neither addressed the deaths of Americans.

Addams’s phrasing and tone shifted over time as she gave public statements concerning the *Lusitania*. Her first statement, in which she used the event to explain why Americans should remain outside the conflict, received bad press; later she revised her statements, saying that the sinking of the ship was too horrible to discuss. Instead she spoke of how she hoped America would not enter the war—and trusted Wilson not to bring America into war. She went on to say that even though it was horrible, the Lusitania event should not bring America into the European conflict, because the United States had a greater role to play. This revised argument remained with Addams throughout the rest of the war. She sympathized with those affected by the war, and discussed how awful war and the actions of warring nations were; but America needed to remain neutral because a powerful neutral country would be needed when the war ended. That neutral country would then have the opportunity to rebuild the world in a progressive image. If America were to enter the war, it would no longer be the “city on a hill” for the rest of the world

²²⁷ Jane Addams, quoted in “Jane Addams Is Hopeful: Wants Country to Avoid War over the Lusitania,” *New York Times* (1857–1922); May 13, 1915, 4; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The New York Times*.

²²⁸ Jane Addams, quoted in “Miss Addams for Peace: Thinks President Wilson Can Keep Us out of the Conflict,” Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES, *New York Times* (1857–1922); May 14, 1915, 5; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The New York Times*.

and would lose the ability to negotiate an end to the European conflict in the way Addams hoped it would.²²⁹

This argument went directly against those who called for America to enter the war in order to be part of the world's fight against militarism, particularly German militarism. It also went against the argument President Wilson would make in 1917 that America needed "a seat at the table" in order to be able to influence peace terms at the end of the war. Addams argued in 1915 that America exerted influence by remaining outside the conflict: by remaining neutral America was in a better position to lead the world. If America were to join the war, it would be one of many countries fighting, and therefore would no longer be a leader. This argument conformed to American foreign policy at the time and to the theory of American exceptionalism that most Americans subscribed to as well.²³⁰

Both Addams and President Wilson believed in American exceptionalism, and, in 1915, that America needed to be neutral to help end the war. The American public generally seemed to agree with their president. Many Americans did not pay attention to the war in 1915, but those who did were divided about whom to support. The East Coast generally supported the Entente Powers, especially Britain, and some organizations loaned money to support the British war effort. The Midwest, however, with its high German immigrant population, wanted the United States to stay out of the conflict, and believed that even loaning money to one side or the other posed a conflict of interest because the United States was supposed to be neutral.

Two camps of internationalists also existed in the United States: the progressive internationalists, including Addams and Wilson, and the conservative internationalists.

²²⁹ This is similar to Secretary of State's arguments about why America needed to remain neutral, as well as John Quincy Addams argument about American "leading by example."

²³⁰ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 118.

Conservative internationalists also wanted an international body to help prevent war, but believed that only through the military might of the combined countries could war be prevented. This stance is very different from that of Addams and other progressive internationalists; they were working for disarmament with economic incentives and global education practices to help prevent future wars. The distinction between the two camps is critical, as Wilson needed support from one or the other to achieve his goals.²³¹

European Travels

Despite the *Lusitania* crisis, Addams and Balch continued their European tour in order to promote the ICWPP's newly written resolutions. The two women managed to meet with leaders and foreign dignitaries in almost every country they traveled to, and took these meetings, along with the promises made, as a sign that the world wanted peace. While these women knew that many countries' leaders would mislead them to maintain the perception that they were reluctantly fighting a defensive and unwanted war, Addams and Balch still saw hope in what they learned.

There is not much source material for Addams's trip around Europe despite her many official meetings. Addams herself did not keep any kind of journal or diary while traveling, and because of her hectic schedule she did not write many letters. A few members of her entourage wrote to their families, which gives us some account of her travels, but most of the information we have on Addams's meetings with European officials comes from her own published accounts. While there is no reason to discount these writings, one does need to take into consideration that

²³¹ Who supported him, and when, will be discussed in future chapters. Knock, *To End All Wars*, vii–x and 118.

they were edited for publication and therefore may emphasize or leave out particulars, depending on the situation.²³²

Addams's published accounts indicated that her meetings with belligerent officials went quite well. She reported that while no belligerent leaders were willing to call for peace negotiations to begin, they did support the women delegates at The Hague, and believed that the war needed to end soon.²³³ Addams, however, underscored the fact that the delegation did not meet with any military officials, only civilian ones. Further, she was careful to highlight the fact that the delegation was surrounded by civilians who wanted peace; she understood that as a peace activist and citizen of a neutral country, despite the lack of many rights because of her gender, she would be told certain things, and would only meet people who agreed to meet with a peace activist.²³⁴

Addams also traveled to Belgium as a neutral observer of the German occupation. Alice Hamilton, a fellow American delegate, traveled with Addams and wrote about the conditions in Belgium to her family.²³⁵ Hamilton's letter underscored the hostile conditions that persisted under German occupation and the importance of peace to the average Belgian citizen. Despite the information Hamilton and Addams received about the horrors of occupation, they remained believers that peace was the only thing that could help the Belgians.²³⁶ While many British and

²³² The lack of sources is documented in Mercedes M. Randall's biography of Emily Greene Balch, *Improper Bostonian*, in which she included a chapter on Addams's travels around Europe and highlighted the unfortunate lack of resources available to historians. Randall, *Improper Bostonian*, 166–79.

²³³ According to Addams, each nation justified its fighting as self-defense and claimed it would stop as soon as possible. Addams also argued that the young men doing the fighting were pacifist in nature and were only fighting because they had to. Addams's final argument was that the war only continued because military officials and the press pursued every single slight as the end of the world, and fanned hatred of the enemy in such a way that the average person could not understand the true nature of those they were fighting.

²³⁴ Jane Addams, "The Revolt Against War," in Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Alice Hamilton, *Women at The Hague; The International Congress of Women and Its Results* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915), 55–81.

²³⁵ Hamilton was a medication specialist and is best known for her work in organizing American nurses during the First World War to ensure all volunteers were properly trained.

²³⁶ Because Hamilton was writing this letter to her family, is it valuable in that it was not meant for publication, making it one of the few unedited sources we have about Addams's European trip. Unfortunately, Hamilton was not

American war advocates used the occupation of Belgium to argue that Germany needed to be defeated to get them out of Belgium or because of what they did in Belgium, the women argued that defeating Germany and forcing them out of Belgium would be the worst thing for the Belgian people.²³⁷ In her letter, Hamilton wrote, “That is why nothing can save Belgium but a compromise peace. If the Germans remain victorious Belgium will be enslaved and the people who can will emigrate to America. If the Germans are defeated, they will be driven back through Belgium and will destroy everything as they go.”²³⁸ Hamilton, like Addams, believed that peace without victory was the only way to save Belgium from destruction.²³⁹ Their belief that Belgium would be worse off if German forces were forced to retreat helps explain why the plight of the Belgians under German occupation did not move the women to work for American intervention. If Belgium was liberated, more Belgians would die and more Belgian territory would be destroyed. A negotiated peace, however, would allow for the orderly return of Belgian territory, which would spare the people and land.

Meanwhile, Balch took her delegation to the Scandinavian neutral countries, and then to belligerent Russia. Balch’s trip produced more fruitful conversations, which historians have better access to because Balch wrote infrequent reports to Addams while traveling.

Balch’s interviews produced little concrete action, but in Stockholm the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Agathon Wallenberg took a more firm position that encouraged Balch and the other delegates. Balch wrote to Addams:

allowed to bring any paper out of Belgium; she wrote her account several days after it occurred. While this may obscure some information, I believe that for the most part she reported what she saw.

²³⁷ See the introduction for more information on the invasion of Belgium and reported German atrocities, along with the women’s attitudes toward them.

²³⁸ Alice Hamilton, letter from Hamilton home, Amsterdam, May 15, 1915, Alice Hamilton Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, A-22, box 1, folder 3.

²³⁹ Alice Hamilton, letter from Hamilton home, Amsterdam, May 15, 1915, Alice Hamilton Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library, A-22, box 1, folder 3.

We brought Mr. Wallenberg to more and more concrete positions. He finally said that he would be willing to take the initiative in regard to a neutral conference if he had sufficient evidence that it would be “not unacceptable” to the belligerents. We pressed the question of what would be sufficient evidence and got him to say that if a lady for instance brought a little billet from the two chief representatives on both sides that would be enough.²⁴⁰

Balch and others took this assurance very seriously and attempted to get the Russian officials to put their acceptance of neutral mediation in writing. Russian foreign minister M. Sazonov told Balch that he would have no issue with the calling of a neutral conference, but he refused to put it in writing.²⁴¹ When the women returned to Sweden, Minister Wallenberg was sympathetic but would not move forward without written proof that the belligerents would support neutral Sweden’s call for a neutral conference to end the war. Balch wrote to Addams: “He [Minister Wallenberg] asked us to come back and tell him if we had anything further to report. All this sounds more negative than the first interview.”²⁴²

While neither Balch nor Addams was able to make any headway on ending the war, what is important to note, is that these women—unofficial delegates from a neutral country that did not grant them any voting or citizenship rights—were able to meet with so many important government officials, and even tour occupied Belgium. Yet one of the reasons Addams and the others were allowed so much access may have been because of their gender: as women they could not be considered political officials, and as U.S. citizens, they were nonpolitical actors from a neutral country. This status allowed them access that men could not have had and even women from a belligerent country could not have had. As nonofficial delegates the women were

²⁴⁰ Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, July 3, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁴¹ Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, July 3, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁴² Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, July 3, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

at an advantage: political leaders did not fear their actions to the same degree as they would in the case of formal diplomats. The consequences, however, is that the women were not privy to official secrets or decisions, or any kind of state intelligence that would have given them crucial information concerning foreign affairs.²⁴³

In the case of Belgium specifically, Addams's and Balch's status as self-proclaimed peace activists from the United States meant that they wanted America to remain neutral in the war—which is also what Germany wanted. The German government understood that a good report from these women on the conditions in Belgium would have a positive influence on American public opinion toward Germany. The German government saw these women as an opportunity; because of their status as women without direct political power, the Germans did not need to be concerned about them as a military or political threat.

Addams and Balch's trip allowed for the women's peace movement to connect with different countries peace activists, both men and women, as well as leading politicians and diplomats in the belligerent and neutral countries. The promises and assurances the two women received while traveling would be used in propaganda for the moderate women's organization as well as boosted morale among moderate peace activists who believed that they indicated the world's want of peace. Unfortunately these same assurances would be used against the women who participated in the meetings as proof of their complicity with one belligerent side or another. More radical female peace activists would also take these conversations with belligerent political leaders and use them to their own ends, one which would culminate with one of the most divisive events in the United States peace movement.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ It needs to be noted that while the women were official delegates from the Women's Congress, they were seen as unofficial by governments because they had not been sent from any place of national power. Without the backing of a government, they were unofficial diplomats. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 95–103.

²⁴⁴ This event was the sailing of the Ford Peace Ship, and is discussed in chapter 4 in detail.

Returning Home

Upon returning to the United States, Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Alice Hamilton published a short book of their collected writings about the trip in order to ensure that the general public understood the decisions made at The Hague in April 1915, as well as their views on Europe at the time.²⁴⁵ Titled *Women At The Hague; The International Congress of Women And Its Results*, it was published in the United States, London, India, Australia, and Canada.²⁴⁶

The prefatory note, which lists no author, explained the book's contents and the reasons for publication:

The following pages give an account of the International Congress of Women ... and of the journeys undertaken by two delegations from that Congress.... Much of the material has already appeared in *The Survey*, and is obviously journalistic in character. It may be of value, however, during these days of war correspondence, as a report of European conditions from the point of view of that peace sentiment which survives in the midst of every war, but which is not easily uncovered.... It is further hoped that this recital by three American women may correct the impression made upon the public by the contradictory accounts given through the press, and that the reader may become interested in the official report of the Congress.²⁴⁷

This preface is important to examine because it delineates what these three women hoped to accomplish. The most important, was to explain, in their own words, what happened in Europe, what was agreed upon, and how the International Women's Congress wanted the movement to proceed. The women wanted to ensure that positive accounts were published to counter reports made in Great Britain or pro-war American newspapers. *The Survey* published parts of the articles that are in this publication before the women returned to the United States, but readership

²⁴⁵ The semicolon in the title appears in the reprinted copy of this book, which is a reprint of the original.

²⁴⁶ It should be noted that Canada was a Dominion of Britain; Australia was called the Commonwealth of Australia and was also a Dominion of Britain; and India was a colony under the control of Britain.

²⁴⁷ Italics in original. Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Alice Hamilton, *Women at The Hague; The International Congress of Women and Its Results* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915).

for that newspaper was limited to progressives and peace advocates. The authors also maintained that a majority of Europeans wanted the war to end quickly but were being censored by their governments. This claim that there were pacifists in Europe was not easy to gain proof of in the United States in 1915 because of the intensity of the war at the time. The Allied and Central Powers also limited the information seen in neutral countries. While both sides presented themselves as peace loving, they both also wanted to ensure the United States government that they needed to end the war on their terms because of the barbaric nature of their enemy. The women, however, wanted to show that the average British or German civilian did not support the war and wanted a negotiated and fair peace. Their final goal in the preface was to get others to join the peace movement and donate to the new ICWPP.

Yet the idea that recurred most in Addams, Balch's, and Andrews's individual contributions to the book was that women had a unique role to play in the peace movement worldwide: women would be the first to move beyond national differences to meet in the spirit of ending the war.

Balch's article, "Women at The Hague: Journey and Impressions of the Congress" gave an overview of the Congress and the regulations passed during the first day of meetings. Balch, however, emphasized several times in her writing that women were the first to have this type of meeting, and that women had a unique role to play in ending the war:

Of all the international gatherings that help to draw the nations together, since the fatal days of July, 1914, practically none have been convened. Science, medicine, reform, labor, religion—not one of these causes has been able as yet to gather its followers from across the dividing frontiers. The women, fifteen hundred of them and more, have come together and for four days conferred, not on remote and abstract questions but on the vital subject of international relations.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁸ Emily G. Balch, "Women at The Hague: Journey and Impressions of the Congress," in *Women at The Hague: The International Congress of Women and Its Results*, by Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Alice Hamilton, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915), 1.

Balch sought to underscore that women achieved something that no other group had done: women had crossed national boundaries to discuss international relations, despite the animosity that existed between the belligerent countries.²⁴⁹

The Women's Congress had also maintained that the public was generally peaceful, and that if a declaration of war had to be approved by the people of a nation, then war would not occur—particularly if women had the vote. As Addams and others argued at The Hague, women were inherently peaceful and therefore would not vote for war.²⁵⁰ The Women's Congress contended that women had a role to play in diplomacy, particularly peace making, and they needed to accept this role and act on it. In her report on her trip through the Northern capitals, Balch may have expressed it best:

Never again must women dare to believe that they are without responsibility because they are without power. Public opinion is power; strong and reasonable feeling is power; determination, which is a twin sister of faith or vision, is power. When our unaccustomed representatives [the women sent by The Women's Congress to present the resolutions] knocked at the doors of the Chancelleries of Europe, there was not one but opened. They were received gravely, kindly, perhaps gladly, by twenty-one ministers, the presidents of two republics, a king, and the Pope. All apparently, recognized without argument that an express of the public opinion of a large body of women had every claim to consideration in questions of war and peace.²⁵¹

This powerful statement contained several messages that were important to the American women's peace movement: first, that women had a role to play in peace making; second, that women had power even without the direct political power of the vote; and third, that women

²⁴⁹ See the earlier section on Belgium and the reasons—in my view and that of historians like David Patterson—for the women being allowed into occupation zones. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 10–15.

²⁵⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Jane Addams, Presidential Address, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

²⁵¹ Emily Green Balch, "At The Northern Capitals," in *Women at The Hague; The International Congress of Women and Its Results*, by Jane Addams, Emily Green Balch, and Alice Hamilton, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915) 109–10.

were respected by foreign leaders as representatives of public opinion.²⁵² These were core arguments of the women's peace movement—internationally, but especially in the United States.

The published account on the Women's Congress at The Hague underscored the major arguments made by the delegates. Ideas of cosmopolitan patriotism and progressive internationalism were prominent among these arguments and were used by Balch and Addams to highlight the work of the delegates. Addams and Balch also stressed the cooperation of the women at The Hague, to prove that belligerent peoples did not all want war.

The Women's Congress at The Hague was the highlight of the international women's peace movement during World War I. It would not be repeated until the end of the war. Another meeting of international women would be called in 1919, but until then all communication was through letters and telegrams. As the war dragged on, censorship intensified, and many letters never made it to their intended recipients. Despite hardship, women in both American and Europe continued to correspond and plan for peace. Addams, Balch, and Andrews, like all American women, however, faced distractions on the national level as the president backed the preparedness movement, and the election of 1916 drew closer.

²⁵² This final assertion is probably the most problematic, as historians such as Patterson have noted. The women were important enough that policy makers were not able to simply dismiss them, but often policy makers did not give them all the information that they gave formal diplomats. At times, this put the women at a disadvantage when they tried to make decisions during the war. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 10–15.

CHAPTER 3: HOPING FOR MEDIATION AND FIGHTING FOR THE PUBLIC

“This fanatic feeling which is so high in every country, and which is so fine in every country, cannot last. The wave will come down of course. The crest cannot be held indefinitely, and then they will soberly see the horrible things which have happened, and they will have to soberly count up the loss of life and the debt they have settled upon themselves for years to come.”

—Jane Addams, Carnegie Hall, July 9, 1915

Speaking to a packed house of almost 3,000 at Carnegie Hall in New York in July 1915, Jane Addams laid out her arguments against war and for a mediated settlement. The audience listened, applauded, and laughed, as she advocated for the neutral countries of the world to come together in a peace conference to help the belligerent powers end the European war. She outlined the commonalities of the warring nations, the heartache of the families left at home, and the hope of the masses for peace.²⁵³ This speech marked the beginning of a speaking and publishing tour that Addams held immediately after her return from Europe. She brought home the resolutions passed by the newly formed International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP) to present to President Wilson, as well as newly strengthened arguments for the president to call for a neutral peace conference to end the war.

From mid-1915 through December 1916, moderate American peace advocates strove to convince the public and politicians that the war could be ended successfully only through American-led neutral mediation. The three women returned from Europe ready to fight for permanent peace, however, their focuses began to differ. While Addams remained convinced that neutral mediation, called for by Wilson and led by the United States, remained the best way

²⁵³ Jane Addams, “Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915,” *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

to achieve this goal, Balch and Andrews began to have different ideas. Their divergence from the moderate peace platform will be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter covers the effort to convince Wilson to lead the neutral powers in ending the war and the fight to stop anything that could thwart an official neutral conference.²⁵⁴ Addams is the focus of this chapter, as she did the most public work against preparedness and for the 1916 presidential election.²⁵⁵ However, the extent of her role in these movements can be understood more clearly by examining the personal papers of all three women. Through the correspondence and publications in all three sets of papers, one can more clearly see Addams's political savvy—and her firm belief that only through swaying public opinion could peace advocates achieve their goals. Addams role as the representative of the moderate women's peace program is also a reason for this chapters focus on her. Throughout these final three chapters, I argue that from the time she returned home from Europe to the resumption of German unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, Addams, as a moderate activist, fought to convince the public, and through them the policy makers, that the only way to end war was to have Wilson call for a neutral conference. This American-led conference would create a negotiated and lasting peace.²⁵⁶

Addams and moderate peace advocates, however, faced challenges—the two most prominent being the growing preparedness movement, which President Wilson endorsed in December 1915, and the presidential election of 1916. In the 1916 elections, for the first time

²⁵⁴ Other neutral powers included Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela. Female peace activists generally focused on the Scandinavian neutral countries, as well as Switzerland and the Netherlands, more so than any other country. Spain was generally not mentioned, and activists mentioned the Latin American neutrals only when Mexico was involved in any international disputes.

²⁵⁵ Neither Balch nor Andrews had the right to vote in 1916, and neither one recorded who they supported for president. We can infer from their writings and future publications that they probably supported Wilson's reelection, but there is no record in their papers. Their work in 1916 was more focused at the international level and will be examined in the next chapter.

²⁵⁶ Andrews was not included, as she had begun to transition to a more conservative point of view on peace. This transition is examined in chapters 4 and 5.

ever, many women would be voting, as many states had passed women's suffrage bills.²⁵⁷

Female peace advocates now had a newfound importance: a legitimate voice and more access to people in power. Addams in particular used this voice to attempt and persuade politicians to prevent any increase in America's military. Though they lost the fight over preparedness, Wilson's victory in November 1916 seemed a boon to the moderate peace movement—and many believed the war would end very soon.²⁵⁸

Throughout these fights, Addams and other moderate activists fought for the same outcome: peace, created through mediation by neutral countries, all led by the United States. Because of the destructive nature of this war, she saw neutral mediation as the only way for permanent peace to take hold in Europe. Addams understood that no belligerent power would sue for peace out of fear of looking weak internationally and at home. She also understood that peace would not be a quick venture—and did not want a quickly dictated peace. Instead, a neutral conference could provide an opportunity for the belligerents to safely discuss ending the war so that an actual peace conference could be called and the war could be brought to a successful end.

One challenge was that the concept of a neutral peace conference coupled with another official world peace conference led by belligerents meant the United States would have an official role only in the first step of the peace process, which was not ideal for some advocates and politicians. The concept of two conferences was also harder to explain to the American masses, many of whom were not as educated as the women involved in the peace movement's leadership. While the concept of neutral mediation was very popular among progressive

²⁵⁷ For more on the women's suffrage movement in the United States, see the introduction to this dissertation.

²⁵⁸ For more on Wilson's role in the preparedness movement and the 1916 election, see Knock *To End All Wars*, 58–69.

internationalists, conservative internationalists did not support it, as they believed only an Allied victory would bring peace.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, Addams and others kept working to persuade the men in power to call an official neutral peace conference to end the war.

Coming Home from The Hague

When Addams returned from Europe she immediately began speaking to crowded audiences about the Women's Congress at The Hague, as well as her meetings with the leaders of belligerent countries' governments. Her first public presentation was held on July 9, 1915, in Carnegie Hall in New York City. This prestigious location was completely packed, as many Americans were interested in learning what this famous woman had found while abroad.

Addams's speech at Carnegie Hall and her subsequent speeches, interviews, and publications during that month all focused on one idea: the war in Europe needed to end, and the best way to accomplish this was for President Wilson to call a conference of neutral nations. Addams explored the similarities between the belligerent countries' arguments for the war, described the horrors of war she witnessed and heard about, and related the people's desire for peace. In emphasizing the importance of a neutral conference led by President Wilson, she was careful to highlight the work of all the women at The Hague and the unity of the international women's peace movement.

Addams reported that while the belligerent governments could not call for negotiations to begin, she believed that they would all be open to peace proposals from a group of neutral nations to begin the process of ending the war:²⁶⁰

if neutral peoples, however they may be gotten together, peoples who will command the respect of the foreign offices to whom their propositions are represented, if a small group

²⁵⁹ The conservative point of view will be discussed in the next chapter.

²⁶⁰ During her speech, Addams reported that the belligerent countries' leaders had informed her as such, but she insisted that a neutral power calling for a peace conference would be different.

is willing to get together to study the situation seriously and to make propositions ... until some basis is found upon which negotiations might commence, there is none of the warring nations that would not be glad to receive such service.²⁶¹

The idea that warring nations refused to negotiate with each other because of a fear of perceived weakness became a crux for Addams's arguments concerning a neutral peace conference. She was aware that the belligerent countries might not support the initial proposals to emerge from a neutral conference, but she believed that eventually a neutral conference would lead to peace. In Addams's view, a negotiated peace was the only way to permanent peace. And if the belligerent powers would not begin negotiations, then the neutrals should at the very least begin the peace process.

In an interview with *The Chicago Tribune* on July 22, 1915, Addams more explicitly called for the United States to lead a peace conference of neutrals as its duty to the rest of the world. In her Carnegie Hall speech, her focus was on governmental power and influence, but here, speaking to a newspaper for the public, she tailored her argument and stressed the importance of the public:

...we [Jane Addams and the other women from the Hague conference] came away impressed with the belief that probably all of the thinking civil population would welcome advances looking to some settlement and that the most practical and acceptable advance would be some form of conference of neutrals guided by the United States. Personally, I am convinced that this is our really great opportunity and our undeniable duty.... Mediation, in the old sense, I think would be a failure. It would be impossible for any of the warring powers to accept an offer of the sort from us or any one. But if the United States should call a conference of neutrals I believe the action would be welcomed.²⁶²

²⁶¹ Jane Addams, "Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915," *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

²⁶² Jane Addams, "Interview for 'The Tribune,'" *Chicago Tribune*, July 22, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

Addams also discussed her meeting with the Pope: “It is his [the Pope’s] belief that the President of the United States is the most logical leader of movement toward such a peace.”²⁶³ Addams used the Pope’s belief to emphasize that she was not the only one calling for the President to lead; in fact, notable male peace leaders supported her argument for an American-led neutral conference. As mentioned earlier, it was characteristic of Addams to use male experts to support her arguments.²⁶⁴ She frequently discounted herself and the women of the peace movement in order to emphasize the work being done by male policy makers and progressive activists. She may well have done this deliberately and strategically to strengthen her arguments in a world that did not always listen to what women had to say. Many politicians believed that because women did not fight in wars, women like Addams had no place in discussing matters of war and peace—yet Addams’s use of experts helped undermine her critics’ arguments against her gender’s role in the peace movement.²⁶⁵

In speeches and publications, Addams referred to the horrors of war and the innocents who suffered because of it, as well as the suffering endured by the young men forced to fight, who did not want to kill. In her Carnegie Hall speech, she told stories she heard from German soldiers about their time at the front:

We met a young German in Switzerland. He had been in the trenches for three months and a half. He had been wounded in the lungs and had been sent to Switzerland to be cured.... And now here he was, at twenty-eight, facing death, because he was quite sure when he went back to the trenches death awaited him. But this is what he said: never during that three months and a half had he once shot his gun in a way that could possibly hit another man; nothing in the world could make him kill another man.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Jane Addams, “Interview for ‘The Tribune,’” *Chicago Tribune*, July 22, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

²⁶⁴ Many academics who have studied Addams and her political work toward peace, suffrage, or other progressive causes have also mentioned her use of experts in her arguments. For one example, see Mariyln Fischer, *On Addams* (Canada: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004).

²⁶⁵ More specifics on Addams’s critics and their arguments will be discussed later in this chapter.

²⁶⁶ Jane Addams, “Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915,” *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

Another story was recounted to Addams by a group of German nurses who were in charge of a hospital in Germany; they described “five young Germans who had been cured and were ready to be sent back to the trenches who had committed suicide, not because they were afraid of being killed, but because they were afraid they might be put into a position where they would have to kill someone else.”²⁶⁷ Addams also told similar stories that she had heard in France and England, reinforcing that the men fighting the war—on either side—did not want to be fighting. To Addams it was important to highlight the stories of reluctant soldiers because it proved her point that the war was unpopular, even among those who were fighting it. Belligerent countries propaganda argued that fighting in the Great War was a heroic venture and the war should be continued in honor of the sacrifices made by soldiers on the battlefield. Addams worked against this argument by calling for President Wilson to begin an official neutral peace conference and help save these poor men who were forced to kill for their country.

Addams also focused on the effect of war on women and the home. In a speech in Chicago on July 22, 1915, she said, “Now it is mostly women who are putting in the crops, gathering the crops, doing what they can to sustain the lives of the nation; and you have the feeling that from every point of view, from that of the women who are left at home to bear the burden of life with this tremendous burden of breaking hearts.”²⁶⁸ She stressed this point in an article titled “Women War, and Babies”:

At the present moment women in Europe are being told: ‘Bring children into the world for the benefit of the nation; for the strengthening of future battle lines; forget everything that you have been taught to hold dear; forget your long struggle to establish the responsibilities of fatherhood; forget all but the appetite of war for human flesh. It must

²⁶⁷ Jane Addams, “Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915,” *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

²⁶⁸ Jane Addams, “Address at the Chicago Auditorium,” July 22, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

be satisfied and you must be the ones to feed it, cost what it may.' This war is destroying the home unit in the most highly civilized countries of the world to an extent which is not less than appalling. Could there be a more definite and dreadful illustration of the tendencies of war to break down and destroy the family unit?²⁶⁹

These statements document Addams's hatred of war and her belief that the war was not just destroying the men who fought in it, but destroying the homes they had built and the families they helped create. Society itself was being destroyed by war, and if the belligerents would not begin the process of ending it, then it was up to the United States and President Wilson to do so. While her arguments about home and family helped appeal to conservative politicians and the conservative public, they also indicated her belief in the humanitarian aspect of progressive internationalism. Addams did not care who a person was or what country they were from: all she cared about was the effect the war was having on humanity. Addams's humanitarianism allowed her to create emotional arguments against war—and is one of the reasons she fought so hard to end the slaughter.

But her humanitarianism also opened her up to criticism from those who were not as invested as she was in ending the war for the sake of humanity. During her Carnegie Hall speech Addams offered this example of the horrors of war and its effect on the young men fighting it:

We heard in all countries similar statements in regard to the necessity for the use of stimulants before men would engage in certain bayonet charges, that they have a regular formula in Germany, that they give them rum in England, and absinthe in France. They all have to give them the 'dope' before the bayonet charge is possible. Think of that. No one knows who is responsible. All the nations are responsible and they indict themselves.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ Jane Addams, "Women, War, and Babies," *Harper's Weekly* 61, July 31, 1915, 101, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

²⁷⁰ Jane Addams, "Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915," *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

Addams's point was that all countries were responsible for the growth of militarism during the war, that using "dope" to get their soldiers to continue killing each other was part of that growing militarism. It was the horrors of war caused by militarism that she was trying to illustrate, and it was the progress of militarism that she wanted to stop. Addams saw her story as proof that the war was forcing these very good men into unimaginable situations.

Addams's critics, however, used her statement as evidence that she was disparaging soldiers, and that she believed that the heroes of the war were simply drugged. Barely a day after her speech, critics wrote to the editors of their newspapers; one such letter to *The New York Times* covers all the criticisms by her detractors, and is therefore worth quoting in full:

In this war the French or English soldier who has been killed in a bayonet charge gave his life to protect his home and country. For his supreme exit he had prepared himself by months of discipline. Through the Winter in the trenches he has endured shells, disease, snow, and ice. For months he had been separated from his wife, children, friends—all those he most loves. When the order to charge came it was for them he gave his life, that against those who destroyed Belgium they might preserve their home, might live to enjoy peace. Miss Addams denies him the credit of his sacrifice. She strips him of honor and courage. She tells his children, "Your father did not die for France, or for England, or for you; he died because he was drunk." In my opinion, since the war began, no statement has been so unworthy or so untrue and ridiculous. The contempt it shows for the memory of the dead is appalling; the credulity and ignorance it displays are inconceivable ... Miss Addams desires peace. So does every one else. But she will not attain peace by misrepresentation. I have seen more of this war and other wars than Miss Addams, and I know all war to be wicked, wasteful, and unintelligent, and where Miss Addams can furnish one argument in favor of peace I will furnish a hundred. But against this insult, flung by a complacent and self-satisfied woman at men who gave their lives for men, I protest. And I believe that with me are all those women and men who respect courage and honor.²⁷¹

Here we see the author misrepresenting Addams's statements. Addams never insulted soldiers, as she believed they were patriots forced to kill fellow patriots, which is why she hated war.

Addams's critics, however, took this one example of the horrors of war and made it seem as

²⁷¹ Richard Harding Davis letter to the editor, "A Gross Fable: What Jane Addams Does Not Know about the Man Tyrant," *The New York Times*, July 14, 1916, 8, *Proquest*, The New York Times Historical archives, Quotation marks and other punctuation from original article.

though Addams was insulting soldiers and their memories. Many of Addams's critics supported the Allied side against the Germans and may have simply not liked Addams's call for peace, or they may have misunderstood her arguments, or read someone's analysis of Addams's speech that only emphasized these kinds of statements. No matter the reason, Addams faced a level of public backlash after her Carnegie Hall speech. While it was not enough to force her to backtrack from her statements, which she did not do, it served as an example for her on the fickle nature of public opinion, which led her to be more cautious in the future.²⁷²

The need for an American-led neutral peace conference was the argument that motivated Addams from her return to America in July 1915 through the end of the American neutral period. This argument, however, would face many challenges as the years went on. While many of these challenges would be from outside forces and the consequences of war, some would come from within the women's peace movement. As factions formed the idea for an official neutral peace conference became the moderates idea alone as conservatives and radicals began putting forth their own ideas on how to bring about permanent peace.

The Importance of Public Opinion

With Addams and the other American delegates back in the United States, the moderate women's peace movement turned to the national stage in order to achieve their goal: getting President Wilson to lead a neutral delegation that would end the war. Though Addams met with Wilson in July 1915 to present him with the resolutions formulated at The Hague, he seemed

²⁷² Addams replied back to this particular critic in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*. She also reemphasized her points in her speech in Chicago later in July, and, even later, in a December article in *The Independent*, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

reluctant to initiate a neutral conference himself. This reluctance of Wilson's caused peace advocates to turn to the public in order to achieve their goals.²⁷³

In correspondence between Balch and Addams, Balch underscored the importance of the American public in the women's fight for neutral mediation. This letter laid the argument for public support and is worth examining in length because of its importance. Balch wrote to Addams after conversing with Dr. Aletta Jacobs, the organizer of the Women's Congress.²⁷⁴ Jacobs had managed to get a meeting with President Wilson as an unofficial emissary of the Dutch government. The Dutch wanted to know what Wilson's attitude would be toward the calling of an official neutral conference, and if he would be the one to call it, or would support one if called. They wanted Jacobs to bring back assurances that the United States would participate if such a conference was called. As one of the leaders of the women's international peace movement, Jacobs seeking to meet with the president of the largest neutral nation would not draw the attention of the media in the same way as a Dutch ambassador would have. The Dutch did not want to act unless Wilson acted with them and wanted to keep a low profile as they felt him out in this regard. Jacobs was well suited and more than willing to help her government and the peace cause.²⁷⁵

Unfortunately, Jacobs was unable to get assurances of support from President Wilson, as Balch reported:

²⁷³ We know that Wilson had sent Colonel House to Europe to discuss Wilson calling a neutral conference or aiding in the peace process in some way. Thomas Knock's *To End all Wars* covers this extensively and discusses how House's Anglophile nature interfered with his work: the end result of the meeting, known as the House-Grey Memorandum, was basically a way for England to seem as though they wanted peace, but to get assurances of America's military support. At this time America was loaning more and more money to the Allies, making America's economy increasingly dependent on an Allied victory. Wilson did not discuss these aspects of the war with the women, preferring to talk about peace, as he wanted to maintain their support for him in the upcoming election. However, it needs to be noted that, at this time, Wilson did not plan on America entering the war at all. Knock, *To End all Wars*, 73–75.

²⁷⁴ For more information on Dr. Aletta Jacobs, see chapter 2.

²⁷⁵ Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 100–3.

Dr. Jacob's interview with the President shows that he is not disposed to initiate such a conference, or appoint American commissioners; refusing to commit himself to anything which will tied his hands, and apparently believing that America when the time comes can act to best advantage alone. He also told Dr. Jacobs that he could not promise to act if Holland should call such a conference – or words to that effect.²⁷⁶

Yet Balch did not necessarily agree that the President was unable to be persuaded; in fact she added, "this position may not be final."²⁷⁷

We know that Wilson was in favor of America helping mediate the European conflict, though he did not want to begin negotiations until the belligerents were receptive. He made overtures many times to encourage the belligerents to state their war aims or express an interest in peace negotiations, but he was rebuffed every time.²⁷⁸ While the women did not know what Wilson was planning in private, they did believe that he too wanted America to be involved in the peace process.

Balch believed that public opinion was the key to convincing Wilson to change his mind on the value of immediate neutral mediation.²⁷⁹ Balch worried that Wilson's reluctance to call a neutral conference before the belligerents wanted him to, he would miss an opportunity to end the war:

The present danger lies in letting the opportunity when it comes, go by. The President is apparently acting after the event—that is, waiting for something to happen or somebody else to do something and then acting upon it, rather than forging something out himself. But we could perhaps turn this characteristic of the President to account, by making things happen in public opinion. We could look to action on his part toward a conference of neutrals if a widespread demand for it manifest itself in the public opinion of America.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁶ Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, September 21, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁷⁷ Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, September 21, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

²⁷⁸ For more on Wilson's overtures to Europe, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 73–75 and 111–16.

²⁷⁹ The weight that Balch accorded to public opinion was consistent with her social work before the war and her international work after the war. For more on Balch's ideas, see her biography, cited in the Introduction, or Nichols, *Promise and Peril*, 273–81.

²⁸⁰ Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, September 21, 1915, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 5.

While Wilson did not yet want to call a neutral peace conference, Balch argued that waiting to do so would cost precious time and lives. She believed that the best way forward was to convince the public that a conference of neutrals should be called immediately. The conference would not set out to end the war quickly, but would simply propose solutions to the conflict and would be ready to act as soon as the situation in Europe allowed it too.²⁸¹ If the public supported this unique form of mediation, Balch believed, the president would have no choice but to act.

Balch's letter to Addams gives us a look into the driving factors behind Addams's decisions during this time period. As we will see in this chapter and the next, Addams's main focus became how the public viewed her and her organization's actions. While this would not stop her from taking part in some unpopular movements, it would drive her to present herself to the public more carefully. Her caution would cause other more radical female activists to begin to implement their own ideas for peace which helped fracture the women's peace movement internationally.

The Preparedness Movement

Two major national events from late 1915 through 1916 provided distractions and opportunities in the fight for American-led neutral mediation. The preparedness movement, which President Wilson openly supported in December 1915, when he presented his program to a joint session of Congress, created a distraction for peace advocates.²⁸² Believing that preparedness would cause other nations to distrust America's overtures for peace, and thus doom

²⁸¹ At the time this letter was written, it was believed that any proposed settlement would benefit the Germans or Central Powers, as they had the more beneficial military position, holding parts of France and all of Belgium. Balch argued instead for a group that would patiently propose solutions until the situation in Europe changed and Germany was no longer seen as the benefactor, either through a change in military position, or a change in understanding among the belligerents.

²⁸² Knock *To End All Wars*, 58–69.

an American led neutral peace conference, Addams in particular worked on her own and with the AUAM, one of the largest anti-war groups in America, to dissuade the public from supporting the preparedness movement and keep America's claims for peace pure.

The American preparedness movement can be traced back the late 1800s, as military leaders asked for more men, ships, etc., especially as America entered onto the world stage. The outbreak of war in 1914, however, provided an opportunity that these advocates did not have before. Former President Theodore Roosevelt, one of the leaders of this movement, criticized President Wilson for not supporting it sooner. Wilson pushed against preparedness until December 1915 when—as part of his reelection campaign—he finally came out in favor of it for defense. Preparedness for defense was popular in most urban areas, particularly on the East Coast. Wilson campaigned throughout the country in 1916 to spread the “preparedness for defense” message to rural areas in the Midwest, and West. Overall, preparedness became quite popular among the vocal American public. Despite arguments in Congress and the work of anti-preparedness activists, a preparedness bill eventually passed as the National Defense Act in June 1916.²⁸³

For peace advocates, preparedness translated simply as a military increase, which went against everything they believed would prevent war. Kant's philosophy on permanent peace, which peace activists frequently cited to legitimize their positions, was that standing armies needed to be abolished over time, as these armies led countries to use them.²⁸⁴ In 1914 Secretary of State Bryan, published an article with Addams that explicitly stated that one of the lessons

²⁸³ For more information on the preparedness movement, Wilson's role in the movement, and the fight in Congress about the bill's specifics, see John Patrick Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974).

²⁸⁴ Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 4–5.

learned from the outbreak of the war was that large standing armies led to their use.²⁸⁵ Bryan resigned as Secretary of State in June 1915, as he feared that Wilson's seeming anti-German stance in regards to submarine warfare would lead America into the war. He remained a supporter of Wilson even as he publicly criticized the preparedness movement and some of Wilson's decisions as the years went on.²⁸⁶

In a direct attempt to undermine the preparedness movement, Addams appeared before the House Committee on Military Affairs on January 13, 1916. Representing the WPP, Addams worked to convince the congressmen that building up America's military was counterproductive to peace and international relations. She contended that preparedness would waste American money, as there would be a movement to disarm after the war ended. She also maintained that armies currently fighting would be too devastated to attack America after the current war; therefore, there was no reason to fear an attack. Finally, she argued that the proponents of preparedness were using the fear of invasion in order to line their own pockets.

As the largest neutral nation, America was, in Addams's view, the leader of progressive movements such as disarmament. If America decided to increase its army and navy, then other countries would follow suit—and the worldwide disarmament necessary for lasting peace would never happen. Addams also feared that an increase in the military would create distrust among America's international partners—and would undermine America's progressive international agenda and potentially prevent Wilson from being able to help negotiate an end to the war. Therefore the United States had a duty to the rest of the world not to increase its military.

Addams began her address to the House Committee with an observation that the current call for preparedness was simple anxiety and fear about what was happening in Europe:

²⁸⁵ For more information on this article and its argument, see chapter 1.

²⁸⁶ Kazin, *War against War*, 28–29 and 104.

I speak not only for the members of our organization, but for many women in all parts of the country, who feel that the talk so general throughout the country, urging a very marked increase of the Navy and the Army, is simply the result of what is happening in Europe; that the sentiment of the United States is unconsciously affected by the conditions of the other side of the Atlantic.²⁸⁷

Addams reemphasized this point later on: “It seems to us that many American citizens have come to their present viewpoint in a moment of panic, resulting from the state of affairs in Europe, and that if we increase our military preparation at this time of war contagion it is quite likely the Nation will live to regret it.”²⁸⁸ Addams also reversed the stereotypical gendered notion that women were the more emotional sex by telling the all-male panel of congressmen:

I do not like to say that men are more emotional than women, but whenever I go to a national political convention and hear men cheering for a candidate for 1 hour and 15 minutes, it seems to me that perhaps men are somewhat emotional. I think the same thing is true in regard to this war; men feel the responsibility of defending the country and they feel that it is “up to them” to protect the women and children, and therefore they are much more likely to catch with war spirit and respond to this panic.... Women are not quite so easily excited.... A woman in the midst of household duties, occupied with the great affairs of birth and death, does not so quickly have her apprehensions aroused because possibly sometime, somewhere, somebody might attack the shores of the American Republic.²⁸⁹

Some of Addams’s critics argued that as a woman she could not understand military preparedness because she did not serve, and could not serve, in the military. But by using gendered stereotypes to make her point, Addams was able to subtly counter her critics: she succeeded in calling the congressmen’s attention to her arguments against preparedness. At the same time, she made the case for women to be listened to.

²⁸⁷ Jane Addams in “Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs,” *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 201–2.

²⁸⁸ Jane Addams in “Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs,” *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 203.

²⁸⁹ Jane Addams in “Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs,” *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 203–4.

Addams's other main argument was that American military preparedness would cause other nations to increase their militaries and that if America increased its own military, it would be going against the best ideas for permanent peace, which needed disarmament to succeed. Addams argued: "If we proceed at this time to adopt this proposed policy of increase in the Army and Navy, the result will be that other nations will feel that they must copy us."²⁹⁰ Later she contended:

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, at the close of this war we will have arrived at a turning point in the world's history. The nations must decide whether the world is going through another lengthy series of years of armed peace, or whether the world is going to make a sharp turn as a result of the lessons learned in this war, and evolve some kind of agreement for international adjudication.... At this particular moment, therefore, the Woman's Peace Party feels that it would be a great mistake if the United States did not take advantage of the opportunity which presents itself to turn the world, not toward a continuation of the policy of armed peace, but toward the beginning of an era of disarmament and the cessation of warfare.²⁹¹

Here we see Addams invoking Kant's 1795 argument against standing armies—as well as Bryan's 1914 argument concerning the lessons of past preparedness movements in other countries: "If preparedness were a preventive surely Europe had a guarantee of permanent peace ... This war may be worth its awful cost if it buries forever this fallacious theory."²⁹² In her own statement, Addams called upon Congress to see that the idea of preparedness as a method to prevent war was a myth: as the outbreak of European war demonstrated, large militaries lead to conflict not peace.

²⁹⁰ Jane Addams in "Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs," *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 202.

²⁹¹ Jane Addams in "Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs," *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 202–3.

²⁹² William Jennings Bryan, "Is the Peace Movement a Failure: Personal Statements by Jane Addams of Hull-House, Chicago, and William Jennings Bryan Secretary of State," *The Ladies' Home Journal*, November 1914, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

In this argument, we also see Addams's position of progressive internationalism in combination with American exceptionalism, or, more specifically, her belief in America's need to provide "leadership by example."²⁹³ She maintained that if America increased its military, other nations would follow, and that America should instead lead the way in decreasing its military to prove its desire for world peace. Most explicitly she stated, "It seems to the Woman's Peace Party, therefore, that the United States ought to wait until after the war is over before it adopts a new policy, for if there is a chance for pushing the matter of proportional disarmament the United States would be the natural nation to suggest it."²⁹⁴ Progressive internationalists believed that America was interconnected with the rest of the world and that what the world did impacted America—but, more importantly, America impacted the rest of the world. So if America increased its military and continued the policy of armed peace, then the rest of the world would suffer for it. But if America pursued disarmament and built an international community based on diplomacy instead of arms, then the world would follow, and permanent peace would be the eventual result.

Addams's final argument—which turned out to be more persuasive than anything else she said to the House Committee—was the question of who would pay for, and who would profit from, preparedness. She called for the committee to appoint a commission that would have six months to investigate where the money for preparedness would go and how it would be spent. She believed this commission would find that the current funding for the army and navy was enough if used in an efficient manner. Addams observed that those supporting the increases in

²⁹³ This idea is attributed to President John Quincy Addams. This also aligns with the concept of America as a "city on a hill," which advocates like Addams also used to persuade Wilson and other politicians to lead the peace movement internationally, instead of waiting for the belligerent governments to ask for help.

²⁹⁴ Jane Addams in "Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs," *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 202.

the army and navy were those who would profit from the increase in military spending, and were the cause of all the panic and pro-preparedness arguments that Congress had heard.²⁹⁵

This argument—about who paid and who profited—was one of the few arguments that caught Congressmen’s attention. On January 19, 1916, during a hearing before the House of Representatives Committee on Rules entitled “Peace Propaganda Investigation,” congressmen questioned who was benefiting from preparedness. While they did not mention Addams by name, several congressmen discussed beginning an investigation into the Army and Navy League, a pro-preparedness organization, and other organizations, in order to better understand who was contributing to pro- and anti-preparedness organizations.²⁹⁶ While this was not the commission that Addams had called for, the fact that Congress was asking who benefitted from military preparedness demonstrates the effectiveness of Addams’s arguments.

Anti-preparedness activists also took their arguments directly to the public.²⁹⁷ The AUAM, of which Addams and Balch were leading members, and the WPP, now the American branch of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace (ICWPP), both published appeals to the public against preparedness. Yet the WPP, as a women’s organization, took a more gendered approach, examining such topics as the effect of military training on children, and the effect of war on families. Meanwhile, the AUAM, run by both men and women, focused more on gender-neutral arguments against war, such as economic issues and internationalism. The dual approach of appealing to politicians while also directly to the public was a common tactic for Addams and other progressive advocates. They did not put all their faith in politicians but hoped

²⁹⁵ Jane Addams in “Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs,” *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 204.

²⁹⁶ House of Representatives, “Hearing before the Committee on Rules,” *Peace Propaganda Investigation*, ed. Washington Government Printing Office (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916).

²⁹⁷ People working against preparedness were called, and referred to themselves as, anti-preparedness advocates, peace advocates, and pacifists, depending on what they were fighting for and the audience they were addressing.

through speaking to them, while also pressuring them through public support the politicians would do what the advocates wanted. Unfortunately pro-preparedness advocates also used this tactic and had access to the political and financial support of the Wilson administration. The funding disparity between the pro and anti preparedness movements was starkly obviously as the pro movement spread its message farther and through many more different mediums.²⁹⁸

The AUAM announced its arguments against preparedness in a pamphlet introducing itself to America. In their opening paragraph, which is worth quoting in full, the AUAM laid out all their arguments against preparedness:²⁹⁹

We are a committee of American citizens formed to protest against the attempt to stampede this nation into a reckless program of military and naval expansion. **No danger of invasion** threatens this country and there is no excuse for hasty, ill-considered action. We protest against the effort being made to divert the public mind from those **preparations for world peace** based on the international agreement which it might be our country's privilege to initiate at the close of this War. And we protest against the effort being made to **divert public funds**, sorely needed in constructive programs for national health and well-being, into the manufacture of engines of death. We are against all the various "preparedness" programs, **because they are extravagant, unnecessary, and contrary to all that is best in our national traditions.** Believing that this statement represents the thoughtful conclusions of a large number of patriotic Americans, we urge them to support us.³⁰⁰

The AUAM firmly believed that the country was in no danger from invasion, and that preparedness would lead to militarism, which threatened world peace, their ultimate goal. Their arguments aligned with those made by Addams before Congress.

²⁹⁸ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 100–47.

²⁹⁹ The pamphlet is not dated; however, the AUAM went through several different names, even though the organization did not actually change. Since it started out as the Henry Street Group in 1915 and changed to the Anti "Preparedness" Committee in late January 1916 before becoming the American Union Against Militarism in late 1916 I estimate that this pamphlet was published between late January and March 1916. In Addams's letters we also see her discussing her statements to Congress with fellow members of the AUAM. Their ideas, which differ from Addams's actual statements, as well as the similarity between the published pamphlet and Addams's statements, lead me to believe that Addams made her statements before this pamphlet was published.

³⁰⁰ The boldface and quotation marks are from the original: American Union Against Militarism, "The Anti 'Preparedness' Committee," in the American Union Against Militarism Collection [hereafter AUAM Collection] (DG 004), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 10.1.

The AUAM focused on the same financial argument as Addams—which members of Congress found persuasive. The organization asserted that while American taxpayers were forced to pay for preparedness, it was the private companies who supplied the army and navy who would benefit. The AUAM wanted Congress to pass bills making it the government’s job to supply the military, therefore removing all profit from the manufacturing of armaments:

We stand for a Congressional investigation as to the sources of the insistent demand for a large increase in Army and Navy appropriations.... We stand for taking all possibility of private profit out of armament manufacture.... We hold that any increased expense for armament should be met by income and inheritance taxes, and not by taxes which place additional burdens on the poor.³⁰¹

These three statements appeared in AUAM pamphlets and publications. They wanted the American people to understand how much money preparedness would cost, and that it was not the public pushing for the preparedness program, but rather the private companies who would profit from it. The AUAM hoped to convince the American public that preparedness was a waste of taxpayer money and would only benefit the corrupt business leaders who were advocating for the increase. By building their argument around the idea that the government was helping business grow rich off of taxpayer dollars while the public suffered, the AUAM hoped to build off of many progressive movements popularity from the previous decade.

Addams and the AUAM, however, took different stands on some issues. While Addams pushed for Congress to investigate the financial motives behind preparedness, she did not go as far as the AUAM in calling for the nationalization of American military manufacturing—a difference that demonstrates the formation of different factions within the peace movement, which eventually undermined it. As one of the founders of the AUAM in 1915, Addams worked to find a middle ground for almost all issues. It was while Addams traveled to Europe that

³⁰¹ American Union Against Militarism, “The Anti ‘Preparedness’ Committee” (AUAM, n.d., ca. 1916), in the AUAM Collection (DG 004), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 10.1.

members who took charge of the AUAM developed a more radical point of view on some issues, such as how the military industry should be organized.³⁰²

Political cartoons became another, favorite way for the AUAM to reach Americans with their message.³⁰³ In the pamphlet *Seven Congressmen on Preparedness*, the AUAM used political cartoons to highlight what the AUAM wanted the public to take away from the congressmen's published statements. One cartoon, captioned "The Humble Origin of the Navy League" depicts a very elegant room full of men in formal attire, with a butler serving them drinks. They are all smoking cigars with a figure who looks like Teddy Roosevelt.³⁰⁴ This cartoon is suggesting that the men behind the calls from the Navy League to increase the size and scope of the American navy are the very same men who would profit from the increase. The AUAM wanted the public to see the connection between the calls to increase the size of the Navy and the private interests behind the Navy League—and to see pro-preparedness advocates as untrustworthy.

The WPP, too, used cartoons to gain the support of the public, but took a more gendered approach, focusing on the impact war would have, or was having, on women and the family. One cartoon, captioned "Forward To Mutilation and Death," features a baby in his mother's arms that proceeds, in the style of evolutionary diagrams, to crawl away and become a soldier. As he "grows up," the boy climbs down a hill that sits on top of a pile of dead bodies, making the

³⁰² More radical members, such as Roger Baldwin, who would become the father of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in 1917–18, were willing to suffer the consequences of unpopular opinions. Baldwin went to prison in 1918 for refusing to register for the draft and for actively helping conscientious objectors avoid prosecution. For more on Roger Baldwin, see Robert Cottrell, *Roger Nash Baldwin and the American Civil Liberties Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

³⁰³ These images are in the AUAM Collection (DG 004), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 10.1.

³⁰⁴ Maurice Brocker, "The Humble Origin of the Navy League," in *Seven Congressmen On Preparedness*, page 8 ed. "The Anti 'Preparedness' Committee" (American Union Against Militarism, n.d.), 8, in the AUAM Collection (DG 004), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 10.1. This image can be found in the image appendix as Image A.3.

obvious connection between becoming a soldier and dying in war.³⁰⁵ This cartoon indicates a much more gendered argument than the economic arguments of the AUAM, as it implies that mothers were giving birth to children just to see them die in war. While the pamphlet itself made similar printed arguments to those of the AUAM, the cartoons focused on the destruction caused by war, not the economic or political policies that impacted it.

In the end, none of the groups were successful in combatting preparedness. The AUAM stopped fighting the movement after June 1916, when Congress passed the National Defense Act. Instead the organization focused on helping end the war through neutral mediation, and attempted to combat military training in schools. Anti-preparedness advocates won some small victories: preparedness advocates did not get as large a military as they wanted, and the military that was created was different from what most military experts desired.³⁰⁶ President Wilson also had to be very careful when advocating for preparedness, making sure that people understood that he only supported an increase in the army and navy to ensure that America was protected. After June 1916, anti-preparedness movements had to accept defeat, but there were plenty of other fights to be had, especially as the 1916 presidential election reached its peak.

The greatest consequence of the fight against preparedness was that it distracted from the larger goal of neutral mediation. As Addams, the AUAM, and other peace advocates became focused on the anti-preparedness fight, they were forced to put the call for neutral mediation aside. Anti-preparedness advocates also received no help from women's rights advocates, such as Catt and the NAWSA, because anti-preparedness was not as popular as neutral mediation and eventual world peace. This lack of support limited the funds available to anti-preparedness

³⁰⁵ This cartoon can be found in the image appendix as image A.4. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; “Forward to Mutilation and Death,” found in *For Your Boy*, cover, originally from *The New York Call*. A-95 Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁰⁶ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 73–90.

organizations—and severely limited the range of their publications and arguments at a time when the federal government was blanketing the country with pro-preparedness propaganda, including films, pamphlets, and speakers.³⁰⁷ The commotion of the preparedness movement led directly into the 1916 presidential election, which continued to pull resources away from peace organizations fighting for neutral mediation. While the election provided more opportunities for peace advocates than the fight against preparedness, it still eclipsed their message.

The 1916 Election

The 1916 election became a distraction, as peace activists were forced to choose who they should support for President, but it also provided an opportunity, as it helped drive the peace advocates' fight for public support. Politicians were out campaigning and seeking the support of the voting public—a voting public that had just expanded significantly, as suffrage was extended to women in some states—and policy makers were more susceptible to public opinion than during other times. Knowing this, peace advocates fought harder in later 1915 through 1916 to get the public—and therefore politicians—to support their ideas for peace. Addams in particular understood that Wilson's desire to be reelected made him susceptible to public opinion. As she wrote to fellow peace activist Lillian Wald in May 1916:

A new point has lately been made in regard to the Neutral Conference that we have so long hoped the President would call officially. Three or four people have suggested that there is no doubt that if the country is at war before the November election Wilson will be reelected on the general principle of not wishing to swap horses in the middle of the stream. But of course the same thing would be attained if we were in the midst of negotiations; while it could not be put so bluntly as that, and while it would be most unfortunate to have that presented as the motive, yet if it could be presented to someone near the throne it might possibly become a determining factor.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Finnegan, *Against the Specter of a Dragon*, 73–90.

³⁰⁸ Letter from Jane Addams to Lillian Wald, May 12, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

While there is no evidence that this idea was ever presented to anyone near Wilson, the discussion demonstrates the practical approach Addams had toward Wilson's reelection, and his motivations. Though Addams wrote to Wilson about neutral mediation, he never delivered anything more than a superficial response blaming the lack of progress on the belligerent nations.³⁰⁹

Addams's letter to Wald demonstrated the importance of public opinion during the election. The political savvy shown is important because both Addams and Wilson were campaigning, though for different things. As a leader of the peace movement, Addams understood politics and the cynical reasons that issues sometimes get resolved. For his part, Wilson understood that Addams could help or hurt his campaign, especially among female and progressive voters, and he wanted to secure her support. Addams's support proved to be critical for Wilson, as many progressive women volunteered for and voted for his opponent, upset that Wilson failed to call for a neutral conference, or for a federal suffrage referendum.³¹⁰

One of the reasons Wilson may have been worried about the support of Addams and other peace advocates was the official Democratic platform—which included a significant number of policies that would not have been supported by progressive peace advocates. Although Wilson and the Democrats made sure to call for an international organization, much of the platform touted the success of the Wilson administration. A few sections directly related to the European war, political dissent, and America's role in the world, including section four, titled “Americanism”:

³⁰⁹ Telegram from Woodrow Wilson to Jane Addams, June 28, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³¹⁰ Many members of the New York Branch of the Women's Peace Party, led by Crystal Eastman, in fact voted for Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes. Even in articles where Addams stated that she was voting for Wilson, reporters continued to indicate that there was speculation about who she would vote for, as though people were not sure she would support Wilson. In the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

The part that the United States will play in the new day of international relationships that is now upon us will depend upon our preparation and our character. The Democratic party, therefore, recognizes the assertion and triumphant demonstration of the indivisibility and coherent strength of the nation as the supreme issue of this day in which the whole world faces the crisis of manifold change. It summons all men of whatever origin or creed who would count themselves Americans, to join in making clear to all the world the unity and consequent power of America. This is an issue of patriotism. To taint it with partisanship would be to defile it. In this day of test, America must show itself not a nation of partisans but a nation of patriots.³¹¹

This section of the platform seems to be calling for a more traditional kind of patriotism than many peace advocates supported. As cosmopolitan patriots, Addams and Balch specifically believed that true patriotism included dissent and argument because only through debate could the country be made better.

Another section of the Democratic platform, however, would have received overwhelming support from Addams, Balch, and Andrews—the section titled “International Relations”:

The Democratic administration has throughout the present war scrupulously and successfully held to the old paths of neutrality and to the peaceful pursuit of the legitimate objects of our National life which statesmen of all parties and creeds have prescribed for themselves in America since the beginning of our history. But the circumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities of international action which no former generation can have foreseen. We hold that it is the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world, and, both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to assist the world in securing settled peace and justice.³¹²

This statement conforms to Addams, Balch, and Andrews’s arguments throughout the war, and Wilson’s indebtedness to peace movements such as the ICWPP and WPP. All three women called for America to play a greater role in international relations, and help lead the world to peace.

³¹¹ Democratic Party Platforms: “1916 Democratic Party Platform,” June 14, 1916, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, eds., *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273203>.

³¹² Democratic Party Platforms: “1916 Democratic Party Platform,” June 14, 1916, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, eds., *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273203>.

What is interesting, overall, is that the platform contains very few policies that Addams, Balch, and Andrews would have supported other than the one on international relations. For example, the platform calls for unity over dissent, and promotes defensive preparedness, which the women were against. So why did they and many other peace activists support Wilson and the Democrats? It is likely that Wilson received the Addams's support because while no promises were made or put into the platform, Wilson had always seemed open to a negotiated peace, and had publicly called for the United States to stay neutral in the war. Wilson had also supported all three women in their progressive work before the war, and had met with them on more than one occasion to discuss peace.³¹³ I argue that Wilson's willingness to discuss their ideas with Addams, his verbal support for progressive reforms, and the Democratic Party's declaration of support for an international organization made him the better candidate in her eyes.

The Republican Party's platform, published a week before the Democratic one, revealed that—in matters of war, peace, and preparedness—the differences between the parties were small. The Republican platform, too, called for peace and neutrality in the present war along with support for increasing America's army and navy for the purposes of defense. The only real difference in international relations was that while the Democrats agreed to work with all other countries in the establishment of some kind of world organization, while the Republicans very specifically called for a world court that would settle international disputes.³¹⁴ Now this might seem a very small difference, but peace advocates in 1916 would have noticed it. Republicans did not pledge to work with other countries towards peace; they did not support an international organization that would do anything but settle disputes; and they consistently blamed the current

³¹³ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 118–20.

³¹⁴ Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1916," June 7, 1916, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, eds., *The American Presidency Project*, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273328>.

administration for failing to uphold America's honor abroad. Republicans also did not have the history of supporting progressive reforms that Wilson and the Democrats did before the war.

Addams personally supported reelecting Wilson. While her poor health prevented her from giving public addresses on his behalf because of her poor health, she made public her intention to vote for him. For example, in a short article entitled "Woodrow Wilson Is Good Enough for Jane Addams," published in *The Day Book* periodical October 4, 1916, a reporter wrote, "Jane Addams will vote for Wilson."³¹⁵ Later in the article Addams was quoted as saying, "I am ill and not able to do any political work. I do not think I shall make any statement formally declaring myself. When I am asked the direct question about my vote I reply that I shall vote for Wilson."³¹⁶

In response to the article, President Wilson wrote to Addams thanking her for her support:

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of telling you how proud I am and how much strengthened I feel that I should have your approval and support. I know that you always act with such genuineness that no support could hearten me more than yours.³¹⁷

Wilson knew that with women having the vote in many states, including Addams's own Illinois, he needed supporters like Addams to help him win.

Wilson's victory in November 1916 gave his supporters hope that he would finally—now that he had no reason to worry about reelection—take up their cause of neutral mediation. Peace advocates also believed that Wilson must have understood that it was the peace votes that reelected him. In a letter on November 10, 1916, only three days after Wilson was reelected, the

³¹⁵ "Woodrow Wilson Is Good Enough for Jane Addams," *The Day Book*, October 4, 1916, 1, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

³¹⁶ Jane Addams, quoted in "Woodrow Wilson Is Good Enough for Jane Addams," *The Day Book*, October 4, 1916, 1, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

³¹⁷ Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Jane Addams, October 17, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

secretary of the American branch of the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation wrote to Emily Balch:

Mr. Wilson surely must know that it was the peace desire of the country that re-elected him. Our task is to make him see that the next step after keeping us out of war is to get the Europeans out of war. If he possesses even a small measure of the idealism attributed to him, he must surely see that America can hope for no position of leadership in the new world order, if the highest expression of our national life is found merely in gratitude for our own security.³¹⁸

Unfortunately, this did not happen. Despite receiving progressive support in the 1916 election, Wilson did not attempt to begin a neutral conference to end the war. Though many peace advocates, such as Addams, had put their faith in him based on past actions, Wilson continued to disappoint them.

Addams's fight for neutral mediation brought her before Congress, before the President, and before the people. She fought against preparedness, convinced it was a threat to permanent peace, and fought for Wilson, thinking him the most like-minded candidate. As she continued to fight for an official neutral peace conference, despite all distractions, she faced the fracturing of the women's peace movement. In 1916, international and national events forced female activists to choose sides which created cracks in the ICWPP and its branch in the United States the WPP. As Balch, Addams, and Andrews made their responded to national and international events the moderate ICWPP faced two new organizations, one conservative and one radical, that threatened to break apart the seemingly unified women's peace movement.

³¹⁸ Letter from Rebecca Shelly to Emily Greene Balch, November 10, 1916, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 6.

CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS, NOVEMBER 1915-JANUARY 1917

Despite a level of unification formed by the fight against preparedness in late 1915 and early 1916, the year saw widening rifts in the national and international women's peace movements. As Addams tried to maintain unity within the WPP and ICWPP, interpersonal disagreements, international events, and the creation of new international peace organizations heightened differences among the movement's factions.

Seemingly quiet about national events in 1916, Addams was much more active where international events were concerned. Bedridden in mid-1916, with a sudden illness doctors diagnosed as tuberculosis of the liver, which indicates to modern readers that Addams had abnormal growths on and within her liver possible meaning she was suffering from a form of cancer, Addams worked to stay involved in all peace events.³¹⁹ Though unable to travel, Addams wrote frequently and worked, to the detriment of her own health, to try and keep the women's peace movement unified. Despite her hard work, the movement was fractured even more in 1916 when two internal factions founded two new groups: the Central Organization for a Durable Peace and the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation.

The two new groups provided new avenues for both conservative and radical women's peace advocates to work toward their goals, using methods that better fit their personal motivations. Formed out of the much-maligned Ford Peace Ship, the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation appealed to more radical peace advocates who did not shy away from controversy. In an attempt to exert direct influence over events and politicians, the Neutral Conference focused on lawmakers in the belligerent and neutral states while also appealing

³¹⁹ Fischer, *On Addams*, 74–91.

directly to the public. Balch worked as an American delegate for the organization, recruiting influential United States peace advocates.³²⁰

The Central Organization for a Durable Peace, founded by Andrews for more cautious peace advocates, avoided controversy and sought to influence politicians and future peacemakers in a more traditional fashion. Focusing mainly on what elements were necessary for eventual peace—and for preventing future wars—the Central Organization faced some criticism from moderate peace groups such as ICWPP, but found support among mainstream peace groups such as the APS and a majority of American activists. Seeing this support, Addams and other moderate American peace activists began to act in more conservative ways, distancing themselves from radical groups in December 1916 and January 1917.

These new international organizations combined with national events, such as the 1916 presidential election, put more and more pressure on the moderate ICWPP; on its American branch, the WPP; and on the group's president, Addams. Though she worked to keep the peace among the ever-growing factions, Addams was never able to unite them behind one set of strategies and methods. While events in December 1916 and January 1917 provided a false sense of hope and unity, in reality the national and international women's peace movement was broken beyond repair.

This chapter examines the development of two new organizations in 1916, which created new avenues for female peace activists. While Addams maintained her moderate stance and attempted to keep the focus of women's peace work on an official neutral conference, Andrews and Balch took different paths. While Andrews pursued the more conservative ideas surrounding how to build a lasting peace once the war was over, Balch became part of an unwelcome

³²⁰ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 207–39.

unofficial neutral peace conference. While these new organizations allowed for more conservative and radical female peace advocates to work toward goals outside the moderate ones set by the ICWPP the chapter begins with a much more pivotal event. Though none of my protagonists were intimately involved, the Ford Peace Expedition marks a turning point for peace activism and the American public's opinion of it.

The Ford Peace Expedition

One of the more theatrical aspects of the American peace movement from 1915 through 1916 was the Ford Peace Expedition, also known as the Ford Peace Ship. Henry Ford, the automobile magnate, decided suddenly in late 1915 to fund a peace ship and take delegates to Europe to end the war. Ford was convinced by Hungarian activist Rosika Schwimmer to pledge himself and his fortune to the peace cause. Schwimmer also persuaded Ford to take up a modified version of a resolution proposed by the ICWPP at The Hague in 1915 and begin a neutral peace conference himself. Recruiting Louis Lochner to the cause, Ford chartered the *Oscar II* and planned to sail it to Europe in late 1915, with the slogan "Out of the trenches by Christmas."³²¹

Yet Schwimmer, who had been travelling through the United States and Europe on a mission to end the war since 1914, had her own agenda in mind. Ostracized from the mainstream peace movement in the United States and Europe because of her radical views and personality, Schwimmer wanted to reestablish herself as essential to the movement. A woman without a country because of her peace work, Schwimmer saw Ford, and his money, as the solution to her problem. A believer in direct diplomacy and not shy about creating controversy, Schwimmer

³²¹ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 67.

courted the press and public alike; through Ford she planned to establish a peace conference under her control that would end the war.³²²

Ford agreed to commit his time, image, and money to Schwimmer's plan, as he believed he was supporting the ICWPP's resolutions and plans.³²³ Schwimmer also convinced Ford that she had secret documents that proved European leaders supported this plan. In reality, Schwimmer had only the communications that Addams and the rest of the women's delegation printed earlier in 1915 after the Women's Congress at The Hague. As discussed in the chapter three, these were general messages that peace was welcomed by the belligerent and neutral nations, and that all countries hoped that the war would be over soon. No country had committed to the peace movement or to the women's resolutions—yet Schwimmer represented these letters as top secret communications and carried them around with her at all times in a black bag to emphasize their importance.³²⁴

During the planning stages of Ford's expedition, many mainstream peace advocates supported him. Addams intended to travel on the Peace Ship and even former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan took the invitation seriously.³²⁵ As the media circus formed, however, moderate peace activists like Addams began to worry about Ford's actual intentions. This worry only grew after President Wilson rejected Ford's offer to send official delegates on the ship to

³²² Dagmar Wernitznig, "Living Peace, Thinking Equality: Rosika Schwimmer's (1877-1948) War on War," in *Living War, Thinking Peace (1914-1924): Women's Experiences, Feminist Thought, and International Relations*, edited by Bruna Bianchi and Geraldine Ludbrook. 123-138 (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

³²³ In reality Ford was only involved with the peace ship until it reach Norway in early 1916. He was the public face of the ship, but left the planning and organization of it to Lochner and other subordinates. After leaving the ship, Ford would not bother with it, or its passengers, leaving the work to his representatives who did not want the ship to succeed. Though Ford is known for his 1930s anti-Semitism, his public addresses concerning the peace ship do not portray any of this bias, and the organization itself never publishes on the subject during its tenure. Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 124-39.

³²⁴ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 124-39.

³²⁵ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 81-96.

begin an official neutral conference. It soon became apparent that the Ford Peace Ship would be travelling without the support of any government, for a conference no country wanted.³²⁶

The notion of an unofficial peace conference combined with a media circus gave pause to Addams and other moderate activists pause as the ship prepared in December 1915 to set sail. Addams in particular felt torn: on one hand, she felt that press coverage was focused on the drama of sending a ship full of peace activists and news reporters across the Atlantic—while drawing attention away from the significance of an official neutral conference. On the other hand, Addams wanted the war to end, and if an unofficial neutral conference could help, then she wanted to support it. In the end Addams decided to travel with Ford on the *Oscar II*, though many other peace advocates and political officials decided they would not.³²⁷

It is these decisions where the significance of the Ford Peace Expedition lies, however. While the public generally viewed peace advocates, and especially female peace advocates as one massive unified group, individuals differed greatly when it came to goals, strategies, and motivations for peace. While most agreed that the long-term goal of world peace was the most desirable, how the world got there caused division. The Ford Peace Expedition forced advocates to choose sides within the peace movement. While Addams chose to join the risky venture, other moderates did not. Supporting the peace ship and the organization it created further fractured the women's moderate peace movement as the women involved began to choose sides.

Unfortunately for Addams, she fell ill and was bedridden for most of the following year.³²⁸ Though this illness was quite real, and serious, the timing led many to believe it was a

³²⁶ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 57–77.

³²⁷ These included William Jennings Bryan, Fannie Fern Andrews, Paul Kellogg, Lillian Wald, and David Starr Jordan. Ford ended up filling the ship with local college students and reporters. Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 57–77.

³²⁸ As mentioned above, Addams fell ill with what is thought to have been a form of cancer and was periodically bedridden from the very end of 1915 through much of 1916. Though she was able to travel to Washington, DC, in 1916 and make other short trips, most of her year was spent at home or in California at friends' homes taking in sun as prescribed by her doctors. Fischer, *On Addams*, 74–91; and “Jane Addams Forbidden Peace Ship Trip by

“political illness” made up to get her out of travelling. Despite this controversy and her actual illness, Addams remained a leader of the women’s peace movement; communications about the Peace Ship were sent to her as she recovered.³²⁹ While Addams continued to publicly support the ship, she remained of two minds about Ford’s expedition and what it could mean for the peace movement itself. This uncertainty led Addams to attempt to separate the moderate women’s peace movement from Ford’s radical efforts.

Severing the two moderate women’s peace organizations, the ICWPP and the WPP, from Ford’s Peace Ship was difficult for Addams, because Ford was operating on the premise that his peace ship was launched because of the ICWPP’s resolutions. Ford even promised 120,000 dollars to Schwimmer and the ICWPP. Schwimmer was put in charge of the funds and immediately offered 20,000 dollars to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, the European president of the association, keeping 100,000 herself to finance her personal work as an organizer of the Peace Ship.³³⁰ Schwimmer’s apparent hijacking of the money, however, made Jacobs and Addams skeptical about the entire enterprise.

In a letter to Addams, Jacobs wrote, “You never told us about your attitude towards the Ford pilgrimage. Also nothing about the money. Must we accept the 20,000, if Rosika keeps for herself 100,000? It seems to me so unworthy. I hate this whole business.”³³¹ Addams

Doctor,” *New York Tribune*, in Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

³²⁹ Addams mainly communicated with David Starr Jordan, a fellow peace activist and friend who did not support the peace ship. His arguments generally centered around the publicity that Ford was receiving and how this was detrimental to the peace movement. Initially, Addams believed that media attention could be positive if it highlighted the issue of the war and demonstrated that a neutral conference was the answer. Yet as drama enveloped the ship and the story remained focused on the people and not the mission, Addams became more convinced by Jordan’s argument. Letters between David Starr Jordan and Jane Addams, December 28, 1915, through January 27, 1916. Found in David Starr Jordan Papers, Box 11, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

³³⁰ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 76.

³³¹ As chair of the ICWPP, Addams technically outranked Jacobs, which is why Jacobs deferred to her here. The two women generally worked together internationally, and Addams generally recognized Jacobs’s authority on issues pertaining to Europe. Letter from Dr. Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, December 23, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

telegraphed back immediately: “Think committee should be kept distinct from Ford undertaking.”³³² Two days later she telegraphed Schwimmer: “have faith in ford expedition but consider it impossible for international committee to join in nongovernmental conference without formal votes of full committee.”³³³ Addams’s telegram to Schwimmer accomplished two things in very few words: first, it demonstrated that Addams was still torn about supporting the expedition, and, secondly, it established that the ICWPP would have no part in Ford’s Peace Ship. Addams further declared her reservations about the Ford Expedition in a letter to David Starr Jordan, fellow moderate peace activist and critic of Ford’s Expedition: “Our Women’s International Committee [ICWPP] could not of course, officially join, and I have been most anxious that it should not become confused with the Ford undertaking.”³³⁴

Addams and Jacobs’s decision to not take Ford’s money was surprising given how desperately the organization needed funding. Just one month later, in January 1916, the ICWPP published “The Price of an Hour,” a pamphlet that underscored the cost of the war for peace organizations such as the ICWPP, and how little money the group raised annually. “The Price of an Hour” also stressed how much had been raised to aid the war effort: “To deal out universal death and destruction the peoples have to contribute, whether they will or no, in taxes direct and indirect—and they have to contribute in billions.”³³⁵ The pamphlet continued, “For prevention of all this woe only a few hundreds have been collected.”³³⁶ The fact that the ICWPP created a

³³² Telegram from Jane Addams to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, December 23, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³³³ Telegram from Jane Addams to Rosika Schwimmer, December 25, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³³⁴ Letter from Jane Addams to David Starr Jordan, December 28, 1915. Found in David Starr Jordan Papers, Box 11, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives.

³³⁵ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Emily Hobhouse, “The Price of an Hour,” published by the ICWPP. A-95, box 30 folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³³⁶ Underlining in original. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Emily Hobhouse, “The Price of an Hour,” published by the ICWPP. A-95, box 30 folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

pamphlet—instead of a simple request for funding—demonstrates their desperate need as 1916 began.

Though Addams and Jacobs had together refused Ford's money and sought to distance the ICWPP from the Peace Ship, other ICWPP members, such as Chrystal Macmillan from the United Kingdom, and Schwimmer, believed that the decision was made by Jacobs alone. Hoping to convince Addams to take the money and support the Ford Program, they each wrote to her early in 1916.³³⁷ Macmillan's letter in particular highlights their concerns about Jacobs: "In Holland Dr. Jacobs seems to have lost all her courage." Macmillan continued:

When the news first came about Mr. Ford's money I thought Dr. Jacobs was going to recover her spirits because it seemed to be the money that was weighing on her; but she would not agree to send any warm message to Mme Schwimmer from the three of us [Macmillan, Jacobs, and Addams]. Everything we have been doing has had to be a compromise between Dr. Jacobs point of view and mine. At first she agreed to put at once a glowing notice in the press; than all at once she took fright, and nothing would induce her even to consider accepting the money till we were quite certain of conditions. This has meant that we have been prevented this last month from making the necessary extensions in the work of the office.³³⁸

Schwimmer too hoped Addams would decide to convince Jacobs to support the Ford Party and accept Ford's money.³³⁹ Yet Addams never wrote to Jacobs about these letters, and the organization never accepted the money.

The internal fight over accepting Ford's money, with Schwimmer's stipulations, indicates how moderate peace advocates reacted to the Ford Peace Expedition. While some members of

³³⁷ The misunderstanding can be attributed to the fact that Addams and Jacobs discussed the money in private telegrams and Jacobs was the one who actually turned down the funds. Addams's ambivalence toward the Ford Peace Ship also provided cover for her in this situation. Schwimmer had received nothing but support from Addams concerning Ford, and knew nothing of her private concerns.

³³⁸ Letter from Chrystal Macmillan to Jane Addams, January 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³³⁹ Schwimmer also makes a similar argument in her own letter to Addams. Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Jane Addams, January 16, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

the ICWPP believed the organization should accept the money and support the Ford Peace Expedition, others such as Jacobs, did not. Both sides, however, reached out to Addams, demonstrating her power within the organization. Though Addams was already publicly supporting the Ford Peace Expedition she chose not to tell Jacobs to accept the money. Though the organization desperately needed funds, Addams decided it was better to keep the ICWPP separated from the Ford Peace Expedition, further confirming what has been shown by her telegrams to Jacobs examined earlier.

Addams continued to send letters of support to Schwimmer and the other Ford organizer, Louis Lochner; however, she would never allow the Ford Peace Ship to override her commitment to the ICWPP and its resolutions.³⁴⁰ A peacemaker by nature, Addams did not want to create controversy by breaking with the expedition's supporters—despite her lack of support for the unofficial neutral conference that the expedition strove to create. As the spokesperson and leader for the American women's peace movement, Addams knew that her opinion on the Ford Peace Ship had a greater effect on other peace activists—and she strove to take both sides in the controversy surrounding the Peace Ship. Supporting it in public and in private letters to its members, but working as hard as she could to keep her own organizations separated from it, Addams faced an uphill battle.

Rise of the Conservative Women's Peace Faction

While the Ford Peace Ship was being organized and launched, the conservative faction within the women's peace movement grew. Led by Andrews and other more conservative

³⁴⁰ These letters offered support and informed Schwimmer and Lochner that Addams was available to help if they wanted. When Schwimmer requested this help later in 1916, however, Addams refused. Letters from Jane Addams to Louis Lochner and Rosika Schwimmer, February 18, 1916, and letters between Jane Addams and Rosika Schwimmer, August 19 and 22, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collections (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

members, new organizations formed that focused more on how to build a lasting peace—rather than on how to end the current war. With support from the APS and other mainstream, male-led peace organizations in the United States and abroad, the conservative faction grew through the end of 1915 into 1916.

This conservative faction of the women's peace movement had much in common with the conservative internationalists who made up the League to Enforce Peace (LEP).³⁴¹ Men such as future president William Howard Taft, who led the LEP, believed in internationalism but focused on future international organizations, not on how to end the current war. Conservative internationalists believed in an Allied victory—and feared that a German victory would lead to the fall of Western civilization. Andrews and other conservative members of the women's peace movement agreed with the LEP on building a strong international government and court system that would help manage world conflicts. Believing in sacrificing some sovereignty to an international organization that would have the power to enforce its rulings, the conservative women and the LEP's membership fought for similar goals.³⁴² The LEP, however, was a male-led organization and did not provide leadership roles for women—which drove conservative female peace advocates to the moderate WPP and to the ICWPP. However, in addition to their goals concerning international organization, these moderate organizations also focused attention on creating a negotiated peace settlement and passing controversial social reforms such as women's suffrage and disarmament worldwide. While individual conservative women may have supported some of these reforms, they did not consider them equal to the goal of world peace—and did not think these reforms should be allowed to hold the hope of world peace hostage.

³⁴¹ For more information on the LEP, see the introduction to this dissertation.

³⁴² Knock, *To End All Wars*, 48–50.

Andrews's speeches and publications from August 1915 through May 1916 show that her beliefs in American exceptionalism and international government aligned with those of the LEP. In August 1915, for example, she argued that the only the United States could lead the world to a lasting peace:

Certain it is, that the appeal of the embattled nations for our favorable judgment has conferred on us a sort of moral leadership, with all the obligations which this implies. And our traditions seem to fit us for the task. Founded on the principles for democracy, which make every person responsible for the common good, and wipe out race prejudices in giving freedom to every type of human being, the United states is distinctly the nation which can extend the idea of human well-being throughout the world. World brotherhood is but the expansion of American faith.³⁴³

In a second August 1915 speech, she reaffirmed her belief in American exceptionalism:

The upheavals in Europe have already affected our conception of future ideals, and have thrust upon us a responsibility for civilization which we must inevitably assume. ... The unique position of the United States, however, gives her the leadership in establishing a new form of world society which will lay the foundations of a higher world life. ... To the United States belongs the responsibility of organizing this world league, and each and every citizen should assist in creating this new organ of human society, whereby human justice may have full sway.³⁴⁴

Despite her convictions about United States exceptionalism, however, she still believed in the necessity of international governance.

³⁴³ In this quote we see some of the negative aspects of the mainstream peace movement, specifically its racism. While individual members, such as Addams and Balch, fought for civil rights and before and after the war (though not during it), many other members of the women's peace movement did not. Andrews implied here that the United States' success in "eradicating" racism made it the perfect model for other nations. Writing only fifty years after the end of the Civil War, Andrews demonstrates her own lack of understanding of race relations in the United States—and her own racism. As a white upper-class woman from New England, Andrews had the luxury of not paying attention to race relations: to her, and to many white progressives, the fact that slavery had ended and that, on paper, African American men had the same right to vote the same as white men meant that race relations in the United States were satisfactory. This, of course, ignored the reality of the situation for African Americans in the United States: with Jim Crow in the South and fervent, if overlooked, racism in the North, America was far from being a beacon of race relations in 1915. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, "The United States as Mediator," presented at the American School Peace League Annual Meeting, August 1915, A-95, Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. For more information on Andrews's ideas concerning race, see Threlkeld, "Education for *Pax Americana*," 515–41; for more information on women and Jim Crow in the South, see Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896–1920*, second ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019).

³⁴⁴ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, "The New Citizenship," presented at the Departmental Congress on Elementary Education, August 20, 1915, A-95, Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Andrews's philosophy of international government and democracy was founded on the ideas of Immanuel Kant. Andrews specifically addressed her belief in Kant's essay, which

Immanuel Kant, in his famous essay "Perpetual Peace," published in 1795, declared that the world will never attain universal peace until it is politically organized, and that it can never be so organized until the people rule. Thus, the greatest thinker of the eighteenth century, perhaps the greatest of all time, hinged the world's progress on the realization of an international federation and the universal extension of democracy.³⁴⁵

Kant's philosophy was also part of the philosophy of the ICWPP and the WPP. In Andrews's view, an international governing body would be based on America's system. She first proposed this "international federation" when she was a delegate at The Hague. The idea that the world needed an international body to help maintain order and justice, and prevent war, was nearly universal among peace advocates worldwide.

Even as she maintained her membership in the WPP and ICWPP, Andrews began to advertise for her new organization, the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. The roots of this organization traced back to a brief meeting in early 1915 when Andrews was abroad; it was through these international connections that Andrews helped officially found the Central Organization in July 1916. Its membership was kept secret, as European members worried they would be persecuted if their names were published.³⁴⁶ This new, non-gendered organization found support among conservative peace advocates, particularly conservative women, who believed that it was more important to discuss the international body and treaties that would lead to permanent peace, rather than to try and end the war. While most of these women also believed in ending the war and maintained dual membership in the ICWPP and the Central Organization,

³⁴⁵ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, "The United States as Mediator." Presented at the American School Peace League Annual Meeting. August 1915, A-95, Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁴⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, "The World Plan of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace," *The Advocate of Peace*, found in A-95, Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

the growing popularity of the Central Organization among mainstream American peace organizations and members of the federal government helped the conservative women's faction to grow throughout 1916.³⁴⁷

The Central Organization for a Durable Peace wanted to create lasting peace, and, to do so, designed a “minimum program,”³⁴⁸ which called for a new world order through the creation of two new international assemblies. First was a small international body that would create the terms of peace; the second, called through the same system as the two previous Hague meetings, would create international laws. This second, larger body would consist of all “civilized states.”³⁴⁹

The creation of this second international body was the main goal of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. This international law-making body would also create an international judiciary—what Andrews saw as the most important part of the minimum program and, in her mind, the most radical:

The most striking part of the Minimum-Program, and that which offers a great departure from present international procedure, is the provision for an international treaty, binding states to refer their disputes to a judicial tribunal or to the Council of Investigation and Conciliation, and further to use concerted diplomatic, economic and military pressure against any state that breaks the treaty.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Central Organization for a Durable Peace*, July 1916, found in A-95, Box 9. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁴⁸ The “minimum program” was the name the organization gave to the set of requirements and resolutions it believed would bring lasting peace after the war.

³⁴⁹ “Civilized states” would have meant all those in Europe. No colonies would have had the right as they were, in Andrews's view, in the process of becoming civilized. Andrews does not discuss what she thinks of Japan and other Asian nations not under direct colonial rule, but if her thoughts on race are to be applied, they more than likely would not have counted as “civilized.” Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Central Organization for a Durable Peace*, July, 1916, found in A-95, box 9 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁵⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Central Organization for a Durable Peace*, July, 1916, found in A-95, box 9 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Andrews was calling for nations to surrender a part of their sovereignty in order for the world to have peace. She believed that through an international judiciary, with provisions for economic sanctions and even military pressure to hold people to its rulings, the world would resist any call to war.³⁵¹ Though radical in Andrews's mind, this argument aligned directly with proposals of the LEP. Taft and others contended that the United States, amongst other nations, would have to sacrifice a little bit of their national sovereignty to an international body. So while the idea may have seemed radical based on the history of America, it was not a new idea.³⁵²

While the minimum program of the Central Organization upheld some ideas of other peace groups, it also departed from them. The WPP and the ICWPP, for example, both called for the creation of an international body and judiciary to help keep the peace. The Central Organization, however, allowed for a military option to enforce the international body's rulings. This was an option that most peace groups would not support.³⁵³ Further, the Central Organization made no call for any kind of neutral mediation that would end the current war, which was in opposition to the WPP and the ICWPP, along with most moderate peace organizations in the United States.³⁵⁴

The distinctions between the Central Organization and the moderate ICWPP are critical to highlight because where they differed will become resoundingly important in 1917. The Central Organization's minimum program avoided the controversial resolutions that remained within the

³⁵¹ This argument is similar to what Andrews argued during The Women's Congress at The Hague. For more information, see chapter 2.

³⁵² Knock, *To End All Wars*, 48–50.

³⁵³ During The Hague meeting in 1915 this idea was brought up by an American delegate in an amendment which many other women attempted to kill. For more see Chapter 2.

³⁵⁴ The Central Organization did call for a small international body to write a peace treaty that would end the current war, but they did not indicate what that body would be called, or who would sit on it, or what events would precipitate the conference. Other organizations were more specific, calling for neutral countries to begin negotiations that the belligerents could join in or take over. These other groups believed that the longer negotiations took to begin, the longer the war would last.

ICWPP and allowed for the support of a military operation while still advocating for peace. These distinctions allowed for peace activists to continue fighting for the ultimate goal of world peace, without having to sacrifice any personal standing within American society. The Central Organization provided a path that bridged belligerency with pacifism that many American peace activists took advantage of in 1917.

The Central Organization for a Durable Peace advertised itself as existing to create a better world after the war was over. This is very similar to arguments made by the British organization the Union of Democratic Control discussed in previous chapters. The UDC also argued that it only wanted to help create a better peace, which would lead to the eradication of war. Like the Central Organization, the non-gendered UDC did not specify how to end the war. Unlike the Central Organization, however, the UDC was very public about wanting to end the current war with a negotiated peace not military victory and faced a lot of criticism because of its program.³⁵⁵ The troubles faced by the UDC and other peace groups in belligerent nations helps explain why the Central Organization kept its belligerent membership secret, and why Andrews and other founders had felt a new organization was needed.

Andrews's Central Organization allowed conservative female peace advocates to support goals they believed in, without forcing them to fight for resolutions they did not uphold. While the growth of the Central Organization did not result in women leaving moderate groups such as the ICWPP, it did worry moderates such as Addams who wished to maintain unity among all the groups.³⁵⁶ For women like Andrews, however, the Central Organization offered leadership roles

³⁵⁵ Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 1914–1918* (London: University of Hull Press, 1996) 1–39.

³⁵⁶ Addams's reaction is discussed below.

that conservative organizations such as the LEP did not, and a way to fight for world peace without having to end the current war first.

Despite Andrews's role in creating the Central Organization, she maintained similar ideas as Addams and the ICWPP on the importance of public opinion. Public opinion mattered to Andrews especially on the issue of international governance. While Andrews believed that nations would need to give up a little piece of their sovereignty to make an international government successful, she also understood that governments rarely gave up power without a clear incentive. And though nations clearly expressed their want of peace, Andrews was a realist—and did not believe them. What she did believe in was the power of people to convince their government to act. Andrews's faith in the power of public support drove many of her strategies as she sacrificed more controversial goals, such as women's suffrage and disarmament, to the altar of world peace. The implications of Andrews's choice to sacrifice controversy were that she became less tolerant of any movement that courted controversy as the radical women's peace faction would with the Ford Peace Expedition. Andrews's beliefs led her to turn further away from the radicals and moderates of the women's peace movement and closer to conservative internationalists operating in the United States.

In her Peace Day address of May 18, 1916, Andrews argued that, in order to end war forever, it was important to cultivate public opinion on the matter of international law. As proof that public opinion matters, even to the belligerent powers, she pointed out that as countries prepared for war, they presented "proof" to their people about why the war needed to occur and why they were in the right. These countries then published their versions of how the war started to prove to the international public that they were in the right.³⁵⁷ Andrews argued that this

³⁵⁷ These are the so-called colored books that were mainly published in 1914 and 1915.

established the significance of public opinion, both national and international, to the different warring nations.³⁵⁸

Andrews then explained the value of public opinion in the current international environment:

Our [peace organizations and advocates] task is to strengthen public opinion, which is the only practicable sanction for international law. Nothing is more conspicuous in the present war than the sensitiveness of the belligerents to the charges of violations of treaties and the established law of nations. No breach of international law in this war will pass unnoticed. ... The present sensitiveness should develop into conscience, so that the peace which ends this unfortunate war and the means taken to prevent the violation of its terms will make a new era in international relations.³⁵⁹

Instead of using public opinion to end the war through a neutral conference, Andrews wanted to use it to create change in international diplomacy. This change in belief meant that Andrews was willing to wait until the war ended before pursuing permanent peace while moderates and radicals wanted to focus on ending the war first before pursuing the creation of international governments. She observed that the belligerent powers were very sensitive to accusations of international diplomatic violations, and frequently attempted to justify their decisions as being on the “right” side of international norms. She concluded that the public could be used to turn this feeling into new international norms and laws. By creating new international laws, with strong consequences for breaking them, Andrews believed that war would not occur again.

Rise of the Radicals

Along with the creation of female-led conservative international peace groups, a new radical co-ed peace organization formed out of the remnants of the Ford Peace Ship. The Peace

³⁵⁸ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, “The Celebration of Peace Day,” *The Advocate of Peace*, May 18, 1916, 138–39. A-95, Box 30, Folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁵⁹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, “The Celebration of Peace Day,” *The Advocate of Peace*, May 18, 1916, 138–139. A-95, box 30 folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Expedition had begun to disintegrate after it reached the neutral Scandinavian countries it. After the ship docked in Norway, Ford fell ill and returned to the United States—and could not be directly contacted by the organization again.³⁶⁰ Lochner and Schwimmer kept the mission running; however they had very different agendas. Schwimmer hoped to continue the mission under her leadership; despite being unable to reach Ford, she attempted to convince all remaining members that she was his spokesperson. Meanwhile, Lochner kept in contact with some of Ford's staff to maintain financial stability and worked to convince high-profile men and women to join in creating an unofficial neutral conference based on the idea of the ICWPP.

Despite Schwimmer's attempts to gain control, members rallied to support Lochner. After a series of arguments and votes Schwimmer was ousted in mid-1916 as Lochner took control of the newly named Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation.³⁶¹ The Neutral Conference was made up of two delegates from each member country, and its purpose was to continuously propose negotiated settlements that could be used by belligerent or neutral countries to begin genuine negotiations to end the war. Lochner was voted as one of the American delegates, and he proposed that Emily Balch be nominated as the second.³⁶²

Balch had continued her work for peace after returning home from the Women's Conference at The Hague in mid-1915. She also had returned to her teaching position at

³⁶⁰ Ford was being protected by his wife and staff, who believed his investment in this particular venture was ill advised. Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 175–86.

³⁶¹ Schwimmer and Lochner's arguments have been covered in depth by Barbara Kraft her in book about the Ford Peace Ship. In short, Schwimmer attempted to convince all the other supporters that only she spoke for Ford and that, without her, all of Ford's money would be withdrawn. Lochner argued that Schwimmer's overspending of Ford's funds on lavish gifts and herself accounted to fraud. Kraft contends that Schwimmer believed that only through money could support for the group be maintained; however, she did spend a lot on herself and no one was ever able to account for all the money she was supposed to have managed during her time working for Ford. While she maintained connections with peace organizations throughout the war, she was becoming persona non grata for many groups from 1916 into 1917. By the end of the war, her name is found on lists of suspected communist activists by the American Justice Department. Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 187–206.

³⁶² Jane Addams was also considered by Lochner; however, she was still ill and unable to travel at this time, in 1916 so he contacted Balch. Letter from Jane Addams to Louis Lochner, February 18, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

Wellesley College. Balch, like Addams, was a humanitarian and progressive internationalist. She believed in the necessity of doing anything one could possibly do to stop the slaughter of innocent men on the battlefield as well as women suffering at home. She did not care about gender, race, or country of origin; she wanted only to help people and saw peace work—above everything else—as the best way to do that. With this in mind she took a leave of absence from Wellesley College and travelled to Stockholm, Sweden, in the fall of 1916 to assume her role as an American delegate.³⁶³

The chief aim of the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation was to “help point the road to a speedy and fair settlement of the present disastrous war.”³⁶⁴ In a publication entitled “The Appeal to the Neutrals” as well as their published manifesto, the Neutral Conference mapped out its plan for peace, making similar points that Addams, Balch, and Andrews had made throughout 1915 and 1916. First was that the United States should lead a neutral conference as quickly as possible. Unlike the arguments made by Addams and Andrews in the United States, Balch’s Neutral Conference believed that by delaying the call for a peace conference, the United States was in part to blame for the suffering of those affected by the war: “the United States ought to lead...if the United States offered such leadership; European nations [sic] would readily respond.”³⁶⁵ The document also argued:

History will not be sparing in its judgment of the neutral countries if they remain merely spectators of the terrible conflagration. Moreover those who are suffering from the war, and the belligerents themselves, have made the neutrals judges of their cause. Otherwise to what purpose are all the books, white, blue, red, yellow – all the statements and all the commentaries which they have circulated in profusion in the neutral countries? May it

³⁶³ While other ICWPP members became delegates and supporters of the Neutral Conference, neither Addams nor Andrews were part of it, for reasons that will be discussed below. Randall, *Improper Bostonian*, 124; and Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 175–86.

³⁶⁴ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, September 7, 1916. A-95, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁶⁵ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, “The Appeal to the Neutrals,” enclosed in letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916. A-95, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

not be that the belligerents, like the neutrals are becoming persuaded more and more that a solution by force of arms will never be a solution.³⁶⁶

It was these arguments that made the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation a radical organization. While such arguments appealed to some peace activists, they also alienated many moderates and members of the public.

Documents created by Balch and other delegates argued that neutral countries who allowed the current war to continue without attempting to end the devastation were as guilty as those who were actively participating in the war. This accusation is very different from the assertions moderates and conservatives made about neutral countries. Addams and the ICWPP believed that, as the world's most powerful neutral nation, the United States had a duty to help lead the world to peace—yet never accused America or its government of being culpable for the death and destruction in Europe.³⁶⁷ Conservatives like Andrews and the Central Organization for a Durable Peace believed that the United States had no stake in ending the current war as it was not involved. These women activists believed that America should concentrate on helping create international organizations and courts to prevent future conflicts, as well as on educating citizens about the importance of international connections.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, "The Appeal To the Neutrals." Enclosed in letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916 A-95, box 20 folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁶⁷ This argument can be found in Addams's Carnegie Hall speech, analyzed in chapter three. Jane Addams, "Address of Miss Jane Addams, Delivered at Carnegie Hall July 9, 1915," *Supplement to The Christian Work*, July 31, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46. For more on the moderates ideas about neutrals, see Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, Box 20, Folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University; Telegram from Jane Addams to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, December 14, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Letters from Jane Addams to Dr. David Starr Jordan, December 28, 1915, and January 27, 1916. Found in David Starr Jordan Papers, Box 11, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives; Letter Dr. David Starr Jordan to Jane Addams, January 19, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09

³⁶⁸ This argument can be seen in Andrews's 1916 Peace Day speech, analyzed earlier in this chapter, as well as in the minimum program for the Central Organization for Durable Peace. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, "The Celebration of Peace Day," *The Advocate of Peace* May 18, 1916, 138. A-95, folder

Despite a lack of support from moderate and conservative female activists, Balch's Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation did provide an outlet for more radical women within the moderate ICWPP. Yet, as with the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, the women who chose to support the Neutral Conference as correspondents remained members of the ICWPP.³⁶⁹

One of Balch's main jobs for the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation was recruiting Americans to act as correspondents. These correspondents were expected to publish for American audiences, either under their own name or anonymously, information about the Neutral Conference, the war itself, or anything else that the Neutral Conference sent to them.³⁷⁰ Balch sought correspondents who were recognized within the peace and progressive movements—and supported those who did not want their name associated with the Neutral Conference. Some of the stigma from the Ford Expedition still clung to the Neutral Conference. Many in the United States believed that only trained diplomats should hold a peace conference, and viewed the Neutral Conference as futile.³⁷¹

Despite this stigma, the Neutral Conference saw publicity as its greatest weapon. As shown in the previous chapter, Balch believed that President Wilson would call a neutral conference only if the public was convinced of the necessity.³⁷² This idea also appeared in “The

137. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University; and Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Central Organization for a Durable Peace*, July 1916, found in A-95, box 9 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁶⁹ This can be seen by comparing the correspondent lists for the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation kept by Balch, and the membership rolls for the ICWPP. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; “List of Current Correspondents,” enclosed in a letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. Letter with included publication and membership lists and accomplishments from ICWPP to members, June 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³⁷⁰ The majority of the responses Balch received back were politely declining her offer.

³⁷¹ This was the main argument against the Ford Expedition from the point of view of progressive peace activists. For more see Kazin, *War against War*, 70-76.

³⁷² Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, September 21, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:08.

Appeal to The Neutrals”: “The majority of the Conference have from the very first believed that the greatest weapon of the neutral effort is publicity, and even the more conservative members have been brought to see the importance of publicity as a means of arousing an intelligent demand for an early and reasonable peace.”³⁷³ The recruited correspondents were essential to this publicity campaign.

Though Balch was able to recruit some correspondents, those she most hoped to recruit refused to help. Most of those Balch contacted were moderate peace activists, who had not been supporters of the Ford Peace Expedition. In writing to them asking them to act as correspondents of the new radical Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, Balch was asking for their, hopefully, public support. It is likely that Balch asked for moderate peace activist support in order to help distance her new organization from the Ford Peace Expedition, but with the stigma of the Ford Peace Expedition still attached most moderate peace activists, like Addams, refused to be involved with this new radical organization.

One example was former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Writing to him September 1916, Balch argued that he would as a well-known public figure in the peace and anti-preparedness movement, recruiting Bryan as a correspondent for the Neutral Conference would have boosted the new organization’s standing in the United States. However, I never found Bryan’s reply to Balch’s request in the archives, and I have found no record of him working with the Ford Peace Expedition. Bryan had refused to sail on the Peace Ship in December 1915, much to Ford and Lochner’s disappointment.³⁷⁴ In a letter to Addams before the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation was founded, Bryan supported Ford’s work in

³⁷³ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, “The Appeal to the Neutrals.” Enclosed in letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916, A-95, box 20 folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁷⁴ Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 81–82.

theory, but wanted to work with the Peace Ship only if he could remain in the United States, and did not have to do much work, or have his name heavily associated with the organization.³⁷⁵ The lack of response to Balch, and his attitude toward the Ford Expedition, indicate that he did not accept Balch's invitation.

While Balch never recruited Bryan, she did successfully recruit Andrews. Andrews was a perfect candidate for Balch: she was a member of the Women's Peace Party, had travelled to The Hague for the Women's Congress, and had spent the past year speaking and publishing about the importance of an American-led neutral conference. Andrews accepted the position as a correspondent for the Neutral Conference, but insisted that her name be withheld from any publication.³⁷⁶

Andrews's agreement to be a correspondent for the Neutral Conference, even anonymously, was surprising, because of her conservative peace advocacy. In fact, when one looks at her publications and correspondence after acceptance, Andrews did not publish anything supporting the Neutral Conference—and did not reply to the many letters Balch and Lochner wrote her and other correspondents.³⁷⁷ It is possible that Andrews agreed to Balch's request out of friendship or without understanding the motivations, goals, and strategies of the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Andrews's conservative internationalist nature did not fit at all with the radical arguments of the Neutral Conference; her own Central Organization for a Durable Peace avoided the very topics, such as disarmament and attempting to end the current war, that the Neutral Conference thrived on.

³⁷⁵ Letter from William Jennings Bryan to Jane Addams, January 22, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³⁷⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁷⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letters from Emily Green Balch and Louis Lochner to Fannie Fern Andrews, October–December 1916, Box 20, Folder 273–75. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Overall, Balch never succeeded in recruiting anyone willing to have their name associated with the group, who was not already committed to controversial peace activism.³⁷⁸ The stigma of the Ford Peace Ship never fully receded and Balch and the other members of the Neutral Conference would struggle with it again throughout the Conference's tenure.³⁷⁹

As both the radical and conservative women's peace factions grew throughout 1916, Addams and the moderate ICWPP struggled to maintain support for their middle approach. Both sides fought for her support, and she struggled with maintaining her own moderation. With both factions growing, Addams and the ICWPP decided to more clearly distinguish themselves from the new organizations.

The struggle to maintain moderation was for Addams a struggle to maintain legitimacy while remaining true to her beliefs. Addams attempted to strike a balance between complicated and controversial resolutions, such as a negotiated end to the war and women's suffrage, with the more popular ideas of the creation of an international government and eventual world peace. Addams's struggles exemplify the struggles for moderate peace activists around the world, but especially in the United States. Moderates were forced to make difficult decisions based on an ever-changing political and personal landscape as the war progressed. Addams also was in a unique position as her decisions could affect multitudes of women through the organizations she

³⁷⁸ Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 6.

³⁷⁹ This stigma can be seen in newspapers throughout the rest of the war. The Ford Peace Ship was used as a comical trope in cartoons and even during a business meeting. "Peace Ship Is Butt," *The Sunday Oregonian* (Portland, Oregon), January 16, 1916, 10; "Ford's Mission Was Lacking in Faith," *Bellingham Herald* (Bellingham Washington), February 10, 1916, 10. Both found in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09. These articles provide two examples of the kind of articles written about the Ford Peace Ship after conversion to the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation had already begun. The first discusses a business meeting during which, for entertainment, a skit was performed that mocked the Ford Peace Ship; the second argues that while Ford's motivations were sincere, the people he brought with him were undermining and sabotaging his grand efforts.

chaired. Seen as a spokesperson for peace activists, Addams did not make her decisions lightly and did her best to maneuver her organizations through the changing nature of the war.

Addams Maintains Her Moderate Position

With the foundation of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace and the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, Addams found herself called on to support both new organizations. Though no women had left the ICWPP, Addams could see the strain on the organization from both the right and the left. Even as she wanted to help any peace movement, Addams focused on maintaining her moderate position in the ICWPP. Though all three organizations supported an end to the European war the differences in strategy, methods, and short-term goals ensured that each organization appealed to a different faction of the women's peace movement. Instead of supporting one or both organizations, Addams attempted to maintain unity on behalf of the ICWPP.

In an attempt to create common ground with the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, Addams helped write a set of critiques of the Central Organization's minimum program. While the two organizations shared many of the same arguments and even members, the ICWPP contended that the Central Organization's minimum program needed to better fit the ICWPP's own. In a letter to its national branches, the executive committee, which Addams led, the ICWPP identified three points of the Central Organization's program that they believed should change.³⁸⁰ The executive committee wrote to the ICWPP national boards, and encouraged all ICWPP

³⁸⁰ Though bedridden at this time, Addams used letters and telegrams to communicate with the ICWPP executive committee. It also needs to be noted that in some of their letters the ICWPP's executive committee was also referred to as the Central Board. Both terms refer to the international group of women who made decisions for the ICWPP over its nations' branches; however, to avoid confusion between them and the Central Organization I consistently refer to them as the executive board.

members to promote these changes to the Central Organization's executive body before the Central Organization held its next conference:

1. It is felt in the Central Bureau and maybe your Committee will agree that it is both our privilege and our duty to insist upon more definite inclusion of the principle of the civil equality of Women, and to this end we might use our influence to interpolate, if not our entire Resolutions Nos. 8 and 9, yet at least their essence as embodying one of our fundamental principles. Again where as in No. 1 of the Minimum Programme the word "inhabitants" is used it should be plainly stated "male and female inhabitants" or some such definition.
2. In No. 6 of the Minimum Programme military action is sanctioned in the expression "the powers shall agree to take concerted diplomatic, economic or military action" where as the words adopted at the Women's Congress in Resolution 7 run as follows: "to unite in bringing social, moral and economic pressure to bear". These words reach out towards the higher standard of Permanent Peace.
3. No.7 of the Minimum Programme is short and inadequately defined. It might be useful to propose as a substitute No. 12 "General Disarmament" from the Resolutions which form the basis of our work.³⁸¹

The resolutions not only demonstrate the differences between the two peace programs, but also detail how the ICWPP proposed to unify them.

The Central Organization for a Durable Peace responded with their own resolutions that called for less change, but which would make the organization more palatable to conservative peace advocates and policy makers. Addams and the other members of the ICWPP executive committee hoped that with these resolutions they could unite the two groups behind similar programs and similar goals. The ICWPP did not want to absorb the Central Organization for a Durable Peace—yet many of the ICWPP's members were also joining the Central Organization, which meant it could not be ignored. Seeing the support the Central Committee was gaining among policy makers, Addams and others hoped to integrate the two programs which would unify female peace advocates behind a single program. Unfortunately for moderate peace

³⁸¹ The numbering and underlining are from the original letter. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace to the National Committees. A-95, Box 30, Folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

advocates, the Central Organization for a Durable Peace never changed their minimum program and continued to gain support among conservative peace advocates, building a larger conservative faction within the moderate ICWPP.

Around the same time as the ICWPP critique of the Central Organization, Addams took it upon herself to try and deal with the challenges they faced from the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Taking up her position of spokeswoman for the moderate peace advocates and the ICWPP, Addams attempted to distance herself and her organizations from the Neutral Conference. This different approach indicates how little value Addams now saw in the Neutral Conference and its strategies and methods, especially when compared to her reaction to the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. Addams decision to ignore the Neutral Conference while supporting the Central Organization indicates her decision to give more support to the conservative and more popular faction of the women's party over the radical controversial one. While Addams probably hoped that her policy would allow her to court conservative support while separating the moderate ICWPP and WPP from the unpopular radicals, in the end it did not work.

In the fall of 1916, Addams received two simple requests from members of the Neutral Conference, which she refused to accept. First Schwimmer asked Addams for help dealing with Henry Ford. After falling ill in Scandinavia and returning to America, he had continued to fund the Peace Ship and the Neutral Conference that came afterwards, but he did not communicate directly with any of the delegates. When Schwimmer had attempted to seize power in Ford's absence, she was faced with a growing backlash. As Ford seemed her only opportunity to stay in power, Schwimmer was desperate to get in contact with him—and she believed that Addams

could get through.³⁸² As spokeswoman for American women peace activists, Addams may very well have received a response from Ford, but she chose to not even attempt it. She wrote to Schwimmer: “I was sorry not to respond to your request in regard to Mr. Ford, but I feel that I could not ... I was utterly unable to follow the developments for the expedition and really ought not to jump in now.”³⁸³ Addams did not want to get involved in any interpersonal issues that were accompanying the Neutral Conference.

Addams also refused to help fellow ICWPP member and friend Rebecca Shelly, who had become the secretary for the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Shelly requested that Addams write a 100-word statement on whether America should jump in and help mediate an end to the war, or wait for an invitation—a statement that would be published under Addams’s name and used to influence the 1916 American presidential election.³⁸⁴ Addams had her personal secretary respond: “Miss Addams says that she feels that she has talked to the president several times about this and she has said to him all that she can on the subject.”³⁸⁵

Addams refusal in these cases demonstrates her desire to separate herself and her organization from the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. Addams had seen the stigma that surrounded the Ford Peace Ship, and now that stigma surrounded the Neutral Conference. More important, though, was the fact that the Neutral Conference was an unofficial peace conference—which Addams did not believe in. Addams and the ICWPP were advocating an official peace conference led by the United States. While an unofficial conference might have

³⁸² Letter from Rosika Schwimmer to Jane Addams, August 19, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09. For more on the drama that encompassed the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, see Kraft, *The Peace Ship*, 124–39.

³⁸³ Letter from Jane Addams to Rosika Schwimmer, August 22, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

³⁸⁴ Telegram from Rebecca Shelly to Jane Addams, October 10, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

³⁸⁵ Letter from Jane Addams via secretary to Rebecca Shelly, October 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

been useful, if not for the media circus created by Ford, it was now just a waste of time and resources.³⁸⁶

Addams's very different treatment of the two factions—the conservatives and the Central Organization encouraged to modify and join the ICWPP behind common goals, while ignoring the Neutral Conference—is reflective of how these organizations were perceived in the United States. The Neutral Conference had of course inherited the laughingstock reputation from the Ford Peace Ship became, while the Central Organization for a Durable Peace was popular with policy makers and mainstream peace organizations. While Addams tried to remain neutral in the hope that she could unify the ICWPP once more, she did understand the importance of public perception, and of policy makers' support.

Addams also never specifically denied the resolutions of either organization or derided them in public. This decision ties back to Addams being at heart a peacemaker. She would never publicly denounce anyone trying to end the war in Europe, even if she had private reservations. Both organizations also had fellow ICWPP members within them. Addams would not have wanted to fracture her moderate organization even more by alienating its members. Addams simply wanted unity among peace workers.

³⁸⁶ Telegram from Jane Addams to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, December 14, 1915, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Letters from Jane Addams to Dr. David Starr Jordan, December 28, 1915, and January 27, 1916. Found in David Starr Jordan Papers, Box 11, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives; Letter from Dr. David Starr Jordan to Jane Addams, January 19, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Letter from William Jennings Bryan to Jane Addams, January 22, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Letter from Jane Addams to Louis Lochner, February 18, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Telegram from Rebecca Shelly to Jane Addams and Letter from Jane Addams via secretary to Rebecca Shelly, October 10, 1916, and October 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10; Jane Addams quoted in "Ford, a Press Agent, Jane Addams Thinks," *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, 7, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

Addams's attitude represents a shift among moderate American peace workers in 1916. After witnessing the destruction of the Ford Peace Ship in the press, many American moderates maintained connections with conservative peace advocates and groups and distanced themselves from more radical ones. The goals of the different factions, however, show a closer relationship between radicals and moderates than between moderates and conservatives. For example, the WPP stated clearly that women's suffrage was one of the two main pillars of its program.³⁸⁷ The Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation also championed women's suffrage and asserted multiple times that women needed to be included in any plebiscite or vote.³⁸⁸ As the ICWPP's critique had observed, the Central Organization's minimum program did not include support for suffrage; even though its founder, Andrews, believed in women's suffrage, she did not include it in her program.³⁸⁹ Another issue that separated the two programs was disarmament—and the economic causes of war. Radical and moderate peace advocates contended that private manufacturing of military goods, along with large standing armies, provided economic incentive to go to war. This was one of the main arguments against the preparedness movement that Addams made in a 1916 address to Congress—which was published by the AUAM.³⁹⁰ Both the

³⁸⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, Box 20, Folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁸⁸ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Neutral Conference for Continuous Peace Manifesto, included in letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁸⁹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace to the National Committees. A-95, Box 30, Folder 365. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁹⁰ Jane Addams in "Hearing before the Committee of Military Affairs," ed. Washington Government Printing Office, *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States* (Washington D. C.: Washington Government Printing Office, 1916), 202; "The Anti 'Preparedness' Committee," American Union Against Militarism, in AUAM Collection (DG 004), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 10.1.

Neutral Conference and the WPP called for disarmament as a crucial part of any peace agreement.³⁹¹

Although nearly all peace organizations had in common the goal of international governance, American moderates such as Addams publicly kept connections with conservative organizations while ignoring radical ones. The moderate ICWPP merely critiqued the Central Organization, while ignoring requests from the Neutral Organization.³⁹² Moderate peace advocates like David Starr Jordan, Lillian Wald, and Paul Kellogg all chose to join the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. Working on behalf of the moderate ICWPP Addams reacted to international events in late 1916 and early 1917 using the conservative point of view.³⁹³

It is very possible that Addams and other moderates saw the value of conservative support for the issues that the two groups had in common. Conservative peace organizations, such as the Central Organization, also were very popular among ICWPP and WPP members. Addams, who wanted to ensure public support for her moderate organization, may have chosen to take a more conservative approach to events so as to not alienate conservative supporters. Addams had access to the programs of both conservative and radical organizations, and would have seen how much

³⁹¹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, Resolution eight, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, Box 20, Folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University; and Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Neutral Conference for Continuous Peace Manifesto included in letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, October 3, 1916, Box 20, Folder 273. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

³⁹² Letters from Jane Addams to Dr. David Starr Jordan, December 28, 1915, and January 27, 1916. Found in David Starr Jordan Papers, Box 11, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives; Letter from Dr. David Starr Jordan to Jane Addams, January 19, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09; Telegram from Rebecca Shelly to Jane Addams and Letter from Jane Addams via secretary to Rebecca Shelly, October 10, 1916, and October 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

³⁹³ Addams's actions in December 1916 and January 1917 will be discussed in the next chapter. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Central Organization for a Durable Peace*, July, 1916, found in A-95, box 9 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University; Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896-1941; Letters from Jordan to Andrews and Letters from Kellogg to Andrews, July-August 1916, found in A-95, box 10 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

more the WPP and ICWPP had in common with the Neutral Conference over the Central Organization. She might have worried that if she acted in accordance with the Neutral Conference she would lose conservative women members from the WPP and ICWPP, which would have weakened both the national and international organization. Many of the old peace groups in the United States leaned conservative; in taking a more conservative approach, Addams also may have been trying to appeal to the majority of peace advocates. Addams also might have simply been exercising caution after seeing the controversy surrounding the Ford Peace Ship and the damaged reputation that the Neutral Conference was still dealing with nearly a year after breaking away from the ship itself.

Whatever the reason—and Addams did not record one—when faced with an international event that required her leadership in December 1916 and January 1917, Addams took the conservative path. This decision opened her up to criticism from other leaders within the ICWPP. Addams stood by her decision, however, until a series of crises in spring 1917 forced the moderates and radicals together as the women's peace movement faced collapse.

CHAPTER 5: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

*As the possibility of a peace conference between the warring nations draws nearer, the Woman's Committees for Permanent Peace in various belligerent as well as neutral countries are preparing for the Woman's International Congress to be held at the same time and in the same place as the Official Conference, which shall frame the terms of the peace settlement after the war.*³⁹⁴

—Jane Addams, January 10, 1917

Despite the factions growing—and a crisis of leadership—within the moderate ICWPP, in January 1917 peace advocates had reason to hope. In a letter to members of her organization, Jane Addams conveyed this sense of hope that had captured the United States after President Wilson gave his now famous “Peace without Victory” speech. As Wilson’s address captured the idealism of the country and the world, a series of letters from the belligerent powers distributed in December 1916 and January 1917 led many in the women’s peace movement to reunite under the belief that peace was near.

Notwithstanding the hope of January 1917, the women’s peace movement remained fractured. Moderate peace advocates in the United States leaned toward their conservative allies when deciding how to best respond to the German letter of December 1916 calling for peace. European peace activists, however, took a much more radical stance to their response creating a crisis of leadership within the ICWPP. As Addams worked to quell the internal crisis, and maintain her authority within the organization, Wilson gave his famous address. Wilson’s address reunited the women’s peace movement under the idea that the war would soon be over. This hope proved to be short lived as the women’s peace movement faced the crises of 1917 and finally had to face the disunity within their own organizations

³⁹⁴ Letter from Jane Addams to ICWPP members, January 10, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

The False Hope of December 1916 and January 1917

On December 12, 1916, Germany distributed a note on behalf of itself and the other Central Powers to the neutral nations and Entente Powers. This “peace note” declared that the German Imperial government and its allies wanted peace negotiations to begin. Even though the note revealed plenty of belligerent tendencies and guaranteed continued conflict if negotiations were not started, some peace advocates saw it as the beginning of the peace process.³⁹⁵

On December 13, Dr. Jacobs telegraphed Addams asking advice on what actions the ICWPP should take.³⁹⁶ Three days later, Addams telegraphed back: “After consultation think it better to make no move at present.”³⁹⁷ Addams wanted to wait and see how the other belligerent powers, and President Wilson, reacted to the German note. A few days before telegraphing Jacobs, Addams had told the secretary of the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, “the Allies will hardly be likely to take up peace offers immediately.”³⁹⁸ Despite her desire for peace, Addams knew better than to believe that the German note marked the end of the war. However, she did believe that any step toward peace was a good thing, writing, “any talk of beginning negotiations is a very great advantage.”³⁹⁹ Addams wish to wait and see before publicly reacting to the German note displays her conservative lean at this time. Addams understood that conservative peace activists and conservative internationalists were suspicious of Germany. She may have worried that by publicly supporting the German note the ICWPP could be tying their reputation to the Imperial German government’s.

³⁹⁵ Imperial German Government, “Peace Note of Germany and Her Allies,” *New York Times*, December 12, 1916.

³⁹⁶ Telegram from Dr. Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, December 13, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

³⁹⁷ Telegram from Jane Addams to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, December 16, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

³⁹⁸ Telegram from Jane Addams, via secretary, to Rebecca Shelley, December 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

³⁹⁹ Telegram from Jane Addams, via secretary, to Rebecca Shelley, December 14, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

President Wilson's response to the German peace note demonstrated the caution the American president took when communicating with the European powers. The Wilson peace note, published December 18, 1916, explicitly stated that it should not be read in tandem with the German note, and simply called for the belligerent powers to state their war aims so that a discussion of peace terms could possibly begin.⁴⁰⁰ Both the Central and Entente Powers agreed with the spirit of Wilson's note, but only the Entente Powers responded with their war aims. These aims were not at all conciliatory, however, and were published only to demonstrate the Allies' willingness to begin the peace process in comparison with Germany, who published no aims.⁴⁰¹ On January 11, the Germans finally responded, criticizing the Entente Powers and seemingly shutting down any possibility of peace negotiations beginning soon.⁴⁰²

Despite the world's cautious, and sometimes hostile, response to the Germans, many moderate and radical peace activists felt that they needed to push neutral nations, like America, to act. Dr. Jacobs in particular felt that Addams's decision not to take action was wrong, and that the ICWPP should have used the German peace note to its advantage. She wrote to Addams:

We have received your cable referring to the German peace-propositions in answer to ours and we feel sorry your advice is to take no action at present. We, in the contrary, are of opinion that whenever, it was now the moment to bring our national branches in action. We believe it was our duty to arrange large meetings in each country, to rouse the people now to influence the different governments to begin peace-negotiations. But after having received your cable, we shall follow your advice and take no action.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador W. H. Page, *President Wilson's Peace Note* (Washington D. C.: Department of State, December 18, 1916).

⁴⁰¹ Ambassador Gerard to Secretary of State Lansing, *German Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note*, Telegram, American Embassy, December 26, 1916; Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State, *Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note*, Telegram, American Embassy, January 10, 1917. Also see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 106–13.

⁴⁰² "German Note to Neutral Powers Relative to the Entente Reply to the Peace Proposals," *Times* London, January 11, 1917.

⁴⁰³ Letter from Dr. Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, December 21, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

This letter underlines the issues that were creating calamity within the ICWPP. Both Addams and Jacobs had were used to their positions of leadership and to deciding things themselves. They also had very different views of the European conflict. Across the Atlantic, Addams was physically separated from the conflict and could only access material that got through censors, whereas in Europe, Jacobs had access to different reports about the war, as well as a sense of the war being so close. Their geographical division helps explain their differing reactions to the German note in other ways as well. Jacobs in Europe was surrounded by more radical members of the women's peace movement who were pushing her to act.⁴⁰⁴ Addams, on the other hand, was making decisions based primarily on the conservative women's approach in late 1916, after witnessing the public's reaction to the Ford Peace Ship and the growing support for conservative peace organizations in the United States.⁴⁰⁵

Addams's reply to Jacobs showed her surprise and sadness at being accused of disloyalty by her good friend, but also indicated that Addams believed she made the correct decision in regards to the German note: "In regard to the action of the I.C.W.P.P. in relation to the German

⁴⁰⁴ Jacobs received letters from different European ICWPP organizations calling on her to publish radical responses to the German letters, to call for meetings just to prove that many countries would not allow peace meetings to take place, and to perform other publicity stunts throughout 1916. Jacobs choose not to do any of these, which led the activists to forward these letters to Addams, hoping she would force Jacobs's hand. Letters from Rosika Schwimmer and Crystal Eastman to Jane Addams, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁰⁵ During 1916 Senator Robert La Follette from Wisconsin published a pamphlet that called for peace organizations in the United States to unite under one umbrella. He outlined what he saw as the main issues for America's peace movement, which centered around keeping America out of the war. While he pushed for policy changes that conservative groups did not call for, such as removing all protections for anyone who wished to travel on belligerent ships and stopping American companies from lending money to any warring powers, all ideas for ending war permanently were based on building a strong international government after the war ended, not on ending it. La Follette wanted the APS to lead the way in organizing this single peace organization. The chair of the APS wrote to Andrews asking if her Central Organization for a Durable Peace would be willing to help with this as he believed her organization to be one that most groups could rally around. Andrews seemingly did not reply, and La Follette's idea was never realized. It is important to note that the APS was a male-led organization, and Andrews may have known that most women involved in the peace movement would not be willing to give up their authority to an organization that not only excluded them but refused to act at all during the first years of the war. For more on the APS refusing to act, see chapter 1. For La Follette's argument and the letter to Andrews, see Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from the American Peace Society to Fannie Fern Andrews, September 1916, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Peace Offer, we differed merely in the matter of judgment.”⁴⁰⁶ If Addams believed that her actions could have shortened the war by even one day, I believe she would have acted. Her belief in peace was so profound that the decision to do nothing must have been agonizing for her. To then have to defend herself over and over again to other European ICWPP members must have only added to the agony. The tone of Addams’s letter to Jacobs—overtly professional where previously she had been cordial—demonstrates how hurt she was that a dear friend would question her commitment to peace.

Addams, Balch, and Andrews all remained hopeful that peace would be declared soon, despite the Entente’s hostile response to Germany and Germany’s ultimate reply. Andrews wrote in January 1917 to Rebecca Shelly, the secretary for the Neutral Conference Committee: “I rejoice with you that negotiations have been begun.”⁴⁰⁷ A few days later, Balch wrote as vice president of the Neutral Conference Committee to Andrews’s organization, the ASPL, calling on the group to continue to publicly support Wilson. Balch wanted all peace organizations to send out petitions so that Wilson would have supported “at this critical hour when he is trying to restore peace to the world.”⁴⁰⁸

Addams for her part began planning, along with the executive committee of the ICWPP, an end-of-the-war conference, to be held alongside the official peace conference, in order to influence the official peace agreement. The ICWPP’s founders believed that any peace treaty that ended the war would need to contain language for disarmament, women’s suffrage, and other

⁴⁰⁶ Letter from Jane Addams to Dr. Aletta Jacobs, January 24, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁰⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Rebecca Shelley, January 3, 1917, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁴⁰⁸ There is no evidence in the Andrews archives that Andrews did as Balch asked. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, January 10, 1917, A-95, box 220, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

progressive peace ideas that would help maintain peace far into the future.⁴⁰⁹ Addams wrote to members of the ICWPP, her personal friends, and fellow peace workers, calling for help funding the end-of-the-war conference. Her letter referenced the growing call for peace and the coming of the end of the war. In Addams's letter, the hope of January 1917 can truly be seen.⁴¹⁰

While they were not expecting an immediate end to the war, the women of the ICWPP were putting plans into motion as if the end of the war was close. The ICWPP would not have begun such plans if they did not believe the war would end soon—Addams was far too much of a pragmatist to make plans that might not go through. If they had simply been planning an eventual conference, they could have begun anytime after April 1915. Yet the ICWPP leadership waited until January 1917, after the publication of the peace notes, to call for preparations to begin.⁴¹¹ I argue that this demonstrates a hope for peace that had not existed before.

Then, on January 22, 1917, President Wilson gave his famous “Peace without Victory” speech before the Senate. Many of Wilson’s arguments echoed the ideas of the progressive peace movement — fueling Addams’s and others’ hopes. Wilson declared, “In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power.”⁴¹² The idea of a League of Nations had first been introduced by the ICWPP in April 1915. Wilson also argued that America was the perfect nation to help in the peace process:

In is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have

⁴⁰⁹ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, The Hague, International Women’s Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20 ,folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁴¹⁰ Letter from Jane Addams to ICWPP members, January 10, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴¹¹ Letter from Jane Addams to ICWPP members, January 10, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴¹² Woodrow Wilson, “Permanent Peace: Address to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917,” in *War Addresses of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Arthur Toy Leonard (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1918), 3–12.

sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government every since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it.⁴¹³

This argument almost perfectly reflected the American exceptionalism argument that peace advocates like Andrews made in previous years, and that Addams made in her statements at the ICWPP founding meeting in 1915. Female peace advocates, like Wilson in this speech, argued that America's history made it the best country to help achieve permanent peace, and because of that fact, America had a duty to the rest of the world to act. This argument was also part of the American progressive internationalist argument that Americans could help the world move forward, and if they did, and the world improved, then America would be better for it.

It is in Wilson's January 1917 speech that we see his indebtedness to the women's peace movement. His final argument—the idea of a “peace without victory”⁴¹⁴—became the centerpiece of his speech, but he did not invent it. The ICWPP, the WPP, the ASPL, the Neutral Conference Committee, the Central Committee for a Durable Peace, etc., all had argued for years that the only way the war could successfully end was through a negotiated peace. These organizations, and their members, feared a dictated victors' peace because they believed that it would only cause further conflict and future wars. Wilson's articulate nature, and the extremely public platform of the presidency, allowed this idea to become his: “First of all, that it must be a peace without victory... Only a peace between equals can last.”⁴¹⁵

Wilson's indebtedness to the women's peace movement, however, was not acknowledged by the President or the world. Leaders from both belligerent and neutral countries wrote to

⁴¹³ Wilson, “Permanent Peace,” 3–12.

⁴¹⁴ Wilson, “Permanent Peace,” 3–12.

⁴¹⁵ Wilson, “Permanent Peace,” 3–12.

congratulate Wilson, but no one mentioned the fact that the women's peace movement had been championing this idea since January 1915, when the Hague Congress had resolved that only a negotiated peace could lead to a lasting peace because any sort of victors dictated peace would not be permanent.⁴¹⁶ Even progressive activists did not address the fact that Wilson took credit for their ideas; peace advocates were simply happy to have the leader of the world's most powerful neutral country finally putting forward their arguments.⁴¹⁷

Progressive peace advocates rejoiced. The day after the speech, Addams wrote separately to both Balch and Lochner. To Balch she wrote, "Isn't it wonderful the way our cause is moving lately?"⁴¹⁸ Balch telegraphed Wilson on behalf of the Neutral Conference Committee: "Mr. President in address to senate we hail in this initiation of new international opening to us of uniting with all peoples in creation of new world order."⁴¹⁹ Even the AUAM, whose members had generally not supported Wilson in his reelection of 1916, sent a message of praise.⁴²⁰

Despite all of this praise, Wilson never personally responded. This lack of acknowledgment is worth noting because, not long before, Wilson had personally responded to Addams, however perfunctorily, whenever she wrote him. Now he had his secretary draft a form letter to be sent to all those who wrote in support of his speech. While this may have simply been

⁴¹⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Preamble and Resolutions Adopted*, Principles of Permanent Peace, The Hague, International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, International Congress of Women, Membership, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁴¹⁷ For more on Wilson's indebtedness to the women's and other peace movements and progressive activists, see Knock, *To End All Wars*, 150–52.

⁴¹⁸ Letter from Jane Addams to Emily Green Balch, January 23, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10; Letter from Jane Addams to Louis Lochner, January 23, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴¹⁹ Quoted as in the original. Telegrams allowed for a very limited message and therefore grammar and punctuation were often missing. Telegram from Emily Green Balch to Woodrow Wilson, January 23, 1917, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 6.

⁴²⁰ Letter from AUAM to Woodrow Wilson, January 24, 1917, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Reel 1, The New York Public Library.

a matter of convenience, it is significant that Addams would not receive another personal message from Wilson throughout the rest of the war.⁴²¹

The events of December 1916 and January 1917 allowed Andrews, Balch, and Addams to believe that peace was close. This hope led all three factions of the women's peace movement to look past their differences and begin to plan for the end of the war through the unifying ICWPP. Yet within that same organization the divisions among the factions were only growing. The same hope of January 1917 that allowed for radicals, conservatives, and moderates to continue overlooking the differences in their goals, strategies, and methods would prevent them from attempting to overcome these differences and unite behind one plan. These underlying divisions would help destroy the women's peace movement.

Hope Obliterated

Even as peace advocates celebrated the hopeful signs in January 1917, the Imperial German government was making plans to undermine the possibility of peace. On January 31, 1917, Germany informed President Wilson that they would begin unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917. This decision broke a May 1916 agreement in which Germany had pledged to limit its submarine attacks. Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917—sending peace advocates scrambling to prevent the United States from entering the Great War.⁴²²

⁴²¹ See below for analysis of why Wilson stopped communicating with the peace advocates. This lack of communication fits with what historian Thomas Knock claims to be one of the greatest mistakes of Wilson's administration: after American joined the war, Wilson failed to keep the support of the progressive activists that helped get him reelected in 1916. What we see here is the beginning of Wilson losing his focus on keeping his supporters motivated and behind him. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 158–60.

⁴²² During the initial years of the war, the German government allowed, with very few restrictions, its submarines, called U-boats, to sink any ship in order to combat the British blockade. This policy led to diplomatic crises between Germany and the United States, when ships carrying American passengers were sunk. After the sinking of many foreign ships and the death of more than a hundred Americans, a German U-boat sank the French passenger ship the *Sussex* on March 24, 1916. Though only two American passengers were wounded, the sinking of the *Sussex* caused another diplomatic crisis and the American government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. To prevent this, the

The Imperial German government was making plans to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. In January the German Imperial government had decided that unrestricted submarine warfare had to be resumed in order for Germany to win. While these discussions had been going on in Berlin for some time, on January 9, 1917 the Kaiser sent an Imperial Order, which declared that unrestricted submarine warfare would resume.⁴²³

The United States knew nothing during January of 1917 about the German Imperial government's debates. Wilson's January 22 address to the Senate was viewed in America as a great step forward in beginning peace negotiations.⁴²⁴ Peace activists and Wilson alike seemed to believe that peace was near. However, the hope for peace was shattered January 31, 1917, when Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff presented his government's plan to resume unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917.⁴²⁵ Two days later, his faith in Germany shattered, President Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany and ordered Bernstorff out of the country. With this major step toward war, peace activists faced a crisis of untold proportions.

They reacted quickly. On the same day, Addams telegraphed both Balch and Wilson with ideas about how to fix the situation. Addams's telegrams reflected her confidence in neutral negotiations and internationalism. Addams wrote to Balch, "Would it be possible for the Neutral Conference Committee to urge Washington to treat the present situation by calling a congress of

German Imperial government agreed to the Sussex Pledge on May 4, 1916, which created strict rules about warning ships, and what ships the German U-boats could sink. This pledge kept diplomatic relations between the two countries intact and prevented America from entering the war at that time. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 191-219.

⁴²³ For more information about the decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare and the historical debate on why the German government made its decision, see Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 238-49.

⁴²⁴ Abroad, Wilson's speech was not as well received. For more information, see Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 242-49.

⁴²⁵ It should be noted that Bernstorff worked to prevent this from happening and argued for Germany's government to work with Wilson to see if peace could actually occur before deciding to break the Sussex Pledge. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 250-51.

neutral nations to make a mutual protest in the name of international sea rights.”⁴²⁶ Right after, she also telegraphed Wilson:

Many of us hope that you may find it possible to meet the present international situation in League with other neutral nations in Europe and South American whose interests are similarly involved. Such an alliance might prove to be the beginning of a League of Nations standing for International Rights and could at least offer a method of approach less likely to involve any one nation in war.⁴²⁷

Addams still hoped that neutral nations could help America find a solution without resorting to war.

Balch’s radical Neutral Conference Committee, meanwhile, was already working to prevent American entry into the war. In February 1917 the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation reorganized as the Emergency Peace Federation (EPF).⁴²⁸ Addams quickly gave her support to the new organization and moved to join it. Addams and Balch telegraphed each other with the hope that the EPF would take the lead in attempting to prevent America’s entry into the war. Addams telegraphed Balch on February 3: “Would it be possible ... to urge Washington to treat the present situation by calling a congress of neutral nations to make a mutual protest in the name of international sea rights.”⁴²⁹ Addams wrote to Balch again on February 5: “I hope the Neutral Conference Committee is pushing a league of neutrals, the beginning of a conference to

⁴²⁶ Telegram from Jane Addams to Emily Greene Balch, February 3, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴²⁷ For the sake of clarity, I have capitalized proper nouns as Addams would have if she had written a letter. Telegrams were written in all capital letters without punctuation usually. Because of a lack of space many writers chose shortened sentences which made the telegrams grammatically incorrect. The words are exactly the same as the original. Telegram from Jane Addams to Woodrow Wilson, February 3, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴²⁸ The Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation had to reorganize after February 1917 because the organization lost its funding. Henry Ford, who had kept funding the group even after it lost his personal support and attention in 1916, pulled his financial support and informed the public that all his factories would be given over to support the war effort. Lochner and Balch were able to re-form the Neutral Conference Committee into the EPF. Letter from David Starr Jordan to Jane Addams, February 9, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴²⁹ Telegram from Jane Addams to Emily Greene Balch, February 3, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

consider their mutual rights. It would, at least, be a larger method of approach than the old way to taking alarm over possible infringements of rights.”⁴³⁰

The national EPF quickly organized branches in New York City and Washington, D.C., and planned a mass meeting for D.C. Addams also offered to organize a Chicago branch herself.⁴³¹ The national D.C. meeting produced a statement of intent: the committee would monitor Congress, and the speeches made within, and keep peace organizations informed, while, in turn, the peace organizations, including the WPP, AUAM, and the APS, would publish the information and recruit new members. The EPF also attempted to convince congressmen to introduce a bill that called for a referendum on war in all cases but direct invasion.⁴³² The EPF also hoped to get President Wilson to meet with a delegation of its members.⁴³³

While the EPF worked in D.C. to convince Wilson and Congress to call for a neutral conference to discuss international sea rights, Addams focused on the role of the WPP and ICWPP in trying to keep the country at peace. Addams wrote to WPP members to update them on the activities of the executive board, stressing the national response to the present crisis, though she underscored international solidarity. In her first letter she described her personal telegrams to Wilson as well as the national ICWPP’s telegrams to branches in Amsterdam and Germany. The telegram to Germany read, “Many American women join with the members of our International Committee in sending messages of good-will to our German sisters and share

⁴³⁰ The Neutral Conference Committee was still reorganizing as Addams wrote. Telegram from Jane Addams to Emily Greene Balch, February 5, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³¹ Telegram Margaret Lane to Jane Addams, February 7, 1917; telegram from Jane Addams to Harriet P. Thomas, February 8, 1917; and telegram from Jane Addams to Emily Greene Balch, February 9, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³² Letter from Jane Addams to WPP members, on behalf of the Emergency Peace Federation, February 9, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³³ Telegram from Emily Greene Balch to Jane Addams, February 10, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

our hopes that war may yet be averted.”⁴³⁴ Addams also included a telegram that she planned to send to President Wilson after members of the WPP signed off. It stressed that the WPP hoped Wilson would lead the nation through this crisis and follow the new tenets of internationalism “rather than with the antiquated and what proved to be futile method followed by our nation in 1812.”⁴³⁵ The WPP’s telegram to Wilson, like Addams’s personal ones, also called for a referendum to prove that Americans did not want war. The letter ended with an affirmation of cosmopolitan patriotism: “I am sure that we all have the earnest desire to stand by the President of the United States in such a crisis, but surely the highest patriotism does not exclude conscientious discussion of public measures.”⁴³⁶

Addams had taken a conservative approach to the peace letters in December 1916, but the crisis of February 1917 made her reconsider her tactics. Now she put her support behind Balch and the radical EPF. Working together, Balch’s EPF and Addams’s ICWPP tried desperately to show Wilson that the people did not want war. Yet their efforts produced little response. Addams shift in tactics demonstrates her willingness to do what was necessary to end the war and keep the United States out of it. This shift, however, also had long lasting consequences. Because Addams began working with the radical EPF her moderate organizations, the ICWPP and WPP, became associated in the public’s mind with the radical peace movement. After the United States entered the war and pacifists became equal to traitors in many American’s minds the radicals and moderates would suffer the same fate.

⁴³⁴ Letter from Jane Addams to WPP members, February 7, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³⁵ Letter from Jane Addams to WPP members, February 7, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³⁶ Letter from Jane Addams to WPP members, February 7, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

Until 1917, Wilson had almost always responded to Addams with thanks for her praise and support, and sometimes thanks for her advice. While she was ill, Wilson even sent her get-well wishes with a bouquet of roses.⁴³⁷ But his letter of December 28, 1916, thanking Addams for her praise of his reply to the belligerent powers, was his last.⁴³⁸ Throughout the rest of 1917, Addams received no communication from Wilson.

Why did Wilson stop communicating with Addams in 1917? One possibility is that she was no longer necessary to his political campaign. In earlier years, and particularly in 1916, Addams—a high-ranking official in many progressive and women’s organizations—was needed to ensure that Wilson would receive the vote of women and progressives. Some female peace advocates had turned on him because he allowed material support to the Entente Powers, and the close race between him and Republican nominee Hughes meant he could not afford an influential woman like Addams to support his opponent. Most historians agree that before January 31, 1917, Wilson really was trying to work for peace in Europe. Adams’s support had been crucial to his 1916 win. Many scholars describe the agonizing decision over whether or not to enter war.⁴³⁹ Considering their argument, one could contend that Wilson stopped writing Addams because he knew that she would only tell him not to go to war. Wilson’s cabinet was increasingly jingoistic; historians found that some advisers, particularly his Secretary of State, actively undermined him throughout these months. Communicating with Addams, when he knew her argument, might have simply prolonged the agony for Wilson.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁷ “Roses for Miss Addams: President Sends Flowers and Cheering Note to Sufferer,” *New York Times*, April 13, 1916, 13, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

⁴³⁸ Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Jane Addams, December 28, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴³⁹ Works such as Thomas Knock, *To End All Wars*, and Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, all describe this.

⁴⁴⁰ Wilson’s secretary, Joseph Tumulty, his Secretary of State, and his primary advisor, Colonel House, probably also played a role in Wilson’s lack of communication. All three men were gatekeepers for Wilson, with Tumulty having the largest role. These three men were all Anglophiles and wanted America to join the Entente in the war against Germany. They would certainly have advised Wilson against responding to Addams; likewise Tumulty

With Wilson not responding and the country moving ever closer to war, Addams, Balch, and other peace advocates turned to their legislators. Addams wrote to her congressmen urging them to vote against war with Germany, and to call for a referendum vote on whether the country should go to war. Addams and others firmly believed that a referendum would prove to Congress and the President that a majority of Americans did not want war. Unfortunately, Addams's senators did not see things as she did. Senator James Hamilton Lewis wrote, "I do not agree with you as to the methods and have a different viewpoint as to our military necessities."⁴⁴¹ Senator Lawrence Sherman was not as dismissive of Addams, but still did not agree:

It is the opinion of the writer that a referendum vote on peace or war is impracticable. Before a campaign could be properly conducted the crisis will have passed... The principle announced in the German government's note is so utterly impossible to be tolerated by an independent nation, that before I would note to humiliate and dishonor our own country I would prefer war even with its attendant horrors.⁴⁴²

While Addams's senators, unlike Wilson, took the time to respond to her letters calling for peace, they would be of no help in the fight to stop America entering the war.

While working to alleviate the crisis, caused by Germany's decision and Wilson's response, peace advocates faced a brand new crisis. The Zimmermann telegram—sent to Wilson

could have denied peace advocates meetings with Wilson, as he controlled the president's schedule. Historians have reported that Tumulty was the reason that certain progressives got meetings earlier in the war, and he could have just as easily prevented these from happening to ensure his boss made up his mind. Historians have argued that Tumulty was politically savvy and allowed peace advocates to see Wilson, not because he agreed with them, but because he believed Wilson needed their support early in his presidency and during his reelection. Wilson had bad experiences in 1914 meeting with suffrage and foreign peace advocates and was loath to meet more, hence Tumulty's need to intervene. Patterson, *The Search for Negotiated Peace*, 38. It should also be noted that no matter the reason, Wilson stopped communicating with Addams, and this fact played a large role in his administration's failure. As Thomas Knock argues, Wilson's failure to maintain the support of progressive activists during America's belligerency in World War I cost him their support in the 1918 midterm elections. This resulted in the Republicans taking control of the Senate. With Republican adversaries in charge of ratifying treaties, Wilson's peace notions, and hopes of a League of Nations, as he saw it, would never come to be. Addams turned on Wilson by the end of the war and worked to prevent the Senate ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. While his failure after the war was not an inevitable outcome, Wilson's decision not to respond to Addams and other progressives starting in 1917 certainly helped pave the way. Knock, *To End All Wars*, Preface.

⁴⁴¹ Letter from Senator James Hamilton Lewis to Jane Addams, February 13, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁴² Letter from Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman to Jane Addams, February 13, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

by British intelligence on February 24, then published in *The New York Times* and other papers on March 1, 1917—sealed America's entry into World War I.

The Zimmermann Telegram, also called the Zimmermann Note, had been sent on January 17 from German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann and intended for German Ambassador Johann von Bernstorff. Along with Germany's decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, it included instructions for Bernstorff to propose an alliance with Mexico: if Mexico were to immediately attack the United States, then Germany would help Mexico take back the territories lost in the Mexican-American War, after the war in Europe was finished. The telegram had been intercepted by British intelligence and, after ensuring that it would not put further intelligence gathering at risk, sent to President Wilson. Wilson then chose to leak it to the American press. On March 3, 1917, Zimmermann himself admitted the note's authenticity, which created even more public outrage toward Germany.⁴⁴³

As mentioned earlier, Addams had recently reached out to the German National Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, with a telegram of good wishes—and this telegram was printed in *The New York Times* on the same day that the Zimmermann telegram was reported. Although the telegram had been sent the day before, it seemed that Addams was sending good wishes to the Germans on the very same day that the telegram was disclosed.⁴⁴⁴ As the country's hatred of Germany increased, peace advocates were increasingly accused of being

⁴⁴³ Historians argue that the Zimmermann Telegram, and Zimmermann's own admission of its legitimacy, hurt any chances of American remaining neutral in the ongoing conflict. For Wilson the telegram was just further proof that German officials could not be trusted; and for the American people that Wilson listened to, it was proof that Germany was a threat. By the time Zimmermann explained the reasoning behind his note many were firm in their belief that the note was real, and Germany was a threat. The Imperial German government did not help matters when, after Zimmermann explained his intentions, they backed his actions. More than likely there were those in the German government who dissented, but from the American public's point of view, the entirety of the German government was behind this action. For more on the Zimmermann Note and its effect on America, see Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 268; and Pope and Wheal, *Dictionary of the First World War*, s.v. "Zimmerman note," 521.

⁴⁴⁴ Telegram from Jane Addams to the German National Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, April 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

funded by the German government—and Addams’s telegram did not help dispel these untrue beliefs. Where before Addams’s and other peace advocates connections with Europe had been to their benefit, now it was detrimental to them.

Not to be deterred, both Addams and Balch strove to convince Wilson and Congress not to go to war. The EPF attempted to convene an unofficial commission of inquiry that would devise ways to avert war.⁴⁴⁵ Wald and Addams, meanwhile, wrote to Wilson on behalf of the AUAM. Their intention was for the President to call for munitions to be shipped only on belligerent vessels, and for Americans to stop traveling on belligerent ships, in hopes that the German government might negotiate their unrestricted submarine warfare policy.⁴⁴⁶ Wald and Addams also reminded Wilson that he had been willing to listen to them before:

From time to time, you have given us the extreme satisfaction of believing that you gave serious consideration to what we had to say. As we have had the privilege of presenting to you our conception of a so-caled [*sic*] neutrality, we should like, at this time, to bring to you, for consideration, one interpretation of that policy.⁴⁴⁷

Unfortunately, Wilson did not send even a perfunctory response.

Instead, on April 2, 1917, Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany and the other Central Powers. Because of procedural delays, and attempts by pro-peace senators to prevent the vote, war was not declared until April 6, 1917.⁴⁴⁸ It would be over a year before

⁴⁴⁵ The unofficial commission of inquiry perhaps could have worked if they had had more time. With events moving at a rapid pace, and Wilson’s entire cabinet supporting war, the commission did not have time even to convene before Wilson called for war. “Plan for the Formation of an Unofficial Commission of Inquiry by the Emergency Peace Federation,” Enclosed in letter from Louis Lochner to Jane Addams, March 10, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁴⁶ While historians today understand more about the Imperial German government’s decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, and know that it is unlikely that the above promises by Wilson would have persuaded them to stop, Addams and other peace activists operated with limited information. Historians note that as women they had access to officials during the war in a way than male activists did not; however, as women they received less information.

⁴⁴⁷ Letter from the AUAM to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Reel 1, The New York Public Library.

⁴⁴⁸ Senators such as Robert M. La Follette from Wisconsin used filibusters to prevent the vote from happening. La Follette and other senators had used this same tactic earlier in 1917 to prevent a vote on arming merchant ships, which they believed would lead to war. This angered Wilson and his Democratic supporters in the Senate, and by a

American troops arrived in force in the trenches of Europe, but for peace advocates the fight for American neutrality was over. A new fight, however, had just begun.

Moderate and radical peace activists, working together, faced a growing hyperpatriotism within the press and the vocal public. While many individuals across the United States did not support entering the war, those the government listened to did. The moderate and radical women also faced abandonment by the conservative faction: the women's peace movement was becoming divided precisely when it needed unity the most. Addams and others did their best to keep the movement unified but simply could not do so while divided.

The Collapse of the Women's Peace Movement

Just as the women's peace movement was facing desertion by one of its major factions, it suffered yet another blow as the major American suffrage organizations officially declared their support of America's entry into World War I. Although the WPP had remained intact despite the different goals and strategies of its internal factions, with the first 1917 crisis, state branches declared their independence from the national mission. From February through the end of April 1917, dissension in the ranks of the women's peace movement's leaders caused a rapid decline in membership and support for peace advocates.

The conservative Massachusetts branch of the WPP began its separation from the national organization as early as February 1917. The leaders of the branch, Andrews and Rose Dabney Forbes, did not support Addams's decision to try to persuade Wilson during the crisis. Forbes telegraphed Addams on February 12: "Feel greatly troubled lest emergency committee work is only embarrassing White House. We know no one in whole country more truly aiming

procedural vote they worked to pass a rule that limited filibuster time. Previously, filibusters could not be overruled, but now with a two-thirds vote in the Senate a filibuster could be limited. This new rule prevented La Follette from stopping the war vote on April 6, 1917. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War*, 272–76.

for Peace than our national leader in Washington.”⁴⁴⁹ Addams attempted to explain the WPP’s actions but Forbes and Andrews were not swayed.⁴⁵⁰ Just three days later, Forbes again wrote to Addams:

some of us feel strongly that individuals should act in this crisis not as representing their organization where there is not unanimity of opinion as to what measures are calculated to advance our Cause at this time. Mrs. Andrews and I both understand from important sources that a national Referendum will hinder and not help the President in his efforts for Peace and Justice, and we are very much opposed to the Woman’s peace Party urging this measure at this crisis.⁴⁵¹

Addams continued to try to persuade Wilson and members of Congress to hold a national referendum over the issue of war, but did so with the understanding that members of her own organization were not behind her.⁴⁵²

Andrews, who is notably absent from any of the above attempts to keep America out of the war, made the crucial decision to support Wilson and the war in 1917 and transfer all her efforts to upholding conservative internationalists’ goals. Once war was declared, she left the peace movement entirely. Her branch of the WPP changed its name to the Woman’s Patriotic Party of Massachusetts; Andrews also changed the name of her personal organization from the American School Peace League to the American School Patriotic League.⁴⁵³ These small name changes aside, Andrews also declared her support for Wilson and the war in the spring of 1917, in the pamphlet *A Call to Patriotic Service*.

Like her first peace publication in 1914, *The War: What Should Be Said About It in the Schools?*, her 1917 pamphlet also focused on educators. However, it discussed how students

⁴⁴⁹ Telegram from Rose Dabney Forbes to Jane Addams, February 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁵⁰ Letter from Jane Addams to Rose Dabney Forbes and Fannie Fern Andrews, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁵¹ Underlining and capitalization from original; letter from Rose Dabney Forbes to Jane Addams, February 15, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁵² Kazin, *War against War*, 26–29 and 94–106.

⁴⁵³ Zeiger, “The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory,” 150–79.

should be led to understand their patriotic duty to America, rather than their duty to the world.⁴⁵⁴

In this pamphlet we see Andrews switch to fully support conservative internationalism. From 1915 onward Andrews had gradually supported more organizations that leaned toward conservative internationalism—and had even founded one herself.⁴⁵⁵ Yet Andrews had not publically supported America entering the war, which almost all conservative internationalists did.⁴⁵⁶ With the publication of *A Call to Patriotic Service* and the decision to separate both the Massachusetts Branch of the WPP and her own American School Peace League from even the word *peace*, Andrews converted entirely to conservative internationalism—and left her friends behind.

Andrews accepted that the declaration of war changed everything, and pushed educators to accept this as well:

Whatever may be our view of the processes which have brought the world to this point, we have now to face the fact that the action of the nations is focused on this gigantic conflict and that our own country is now involved in it. We recognize that our Government has been loath to join the struggle and has entered into it only after long and searching deliberation. The will of the majority of Congress has declared war and it is the duty of all Americans to accept this mandate. The voice of law commands loyal and earnest service, and American patriotism will respond to the call. Service is the privilege of each and every citizen, and the measure of service is always the nation's need.⁴⁵⁷

Here Andrews abandoned the idea of cosmopolitan patriotism and adopted a more traditional “tribal” form of patriotism. This new definition, unlike that of her friends—which allowed for, even encouraged, debate and dissent—demanded loyalty to the decisions of the government. So, while the American government was neutral, Andrews believed it was acceptable to question the

⁴⁵⁴ Fannie Fern Andrews, *A Call to Patriotic Service* (Boston: American School Peace League, 1917), 1.

⁴⁵⁵ Please see chapter 4 for more information on the Central Organization for a Durable Peace and on Andrews's national and international activities after the 1915 Women's Congress at The Hague.

⁴⁵⁶ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 48.

⁴⁵⁷ Andrews, *A Call to Patriotic Service*, 1.

war and fight for peace; but once America entered the war, patriotism called for conformity, not questions.⁴⁵⁸

Though she now called for acceptance of American entry into the war, Andrews kept working for “preparation for peace,” though an international governing body that would come into creation after the war. Joining with other conservative internationalists, such as the all-male LEP, she argued that without an international government, war would simply begin again:

It becomes the patriotic duty of American citizens to study and to encourage the study of those plans [Wilson’s plans that he stated in his call for war] put forward to achieve a definite concern of the Powers and a just war settlement. Let us keep this before our minds, for even though we achieve military success, we shall not be victorious unless our preparations for peace, backed by the voice of the people, come into full fruition at the close of the war.⁴⁵⁹

This statement clearly reveals Andrews’s internationalism—and her firm belief that America’s victory in the war would lead to the international government that would in turn lead to world peace.⁴⁶⁰

Andrews’s decision to leave the peace movement after the declaration of war is illustrative of the decisions of many conservative peace activists after April 1917. Most activists chose to fight for other progressive causes they had been associated with before the war, for example suffrage or education reform. Those who remained active in the peace movement did so because of their firm belief that only with a peace settlement would permanent peace succeed. These women did not see any form of permanent success in a military victory, with or without

⁴⁵⁸ For definitions of cosmopolitan patriotism and tribal patriotism, see Hanson, *The Promise of Patriotism*, xiii–xxii.

⁴⁵⁹ Andrews, *A Call to Patriotic Service*, 2.

⁴⁶⁰ This argument can also be seen in Woodrow Wilson’s arguments about why America needed to enter the war. He argued that America would have a better opportunity to fight for international organization and peace by having a “seat at the table” rather than by simply “peering through the door.” Conservative internationalists like Taft had been arguing this for most of the war: they believed that America was the best country to help establish an international government but would not be listened to if it did not participate in defeating German militarism. Again Wilson was borrowing his arguments from established peace organizations and making them appear to be his own. Knock, *To End All Wars*, Preface.

the United States. Humanitarian activists like Addams and Balch also could not justify the human suffering that war caused, no matter what victory achieved. These women would continue to fight for peace, but would do so without the support of many of their former friends.

In February 1917 the women's peace movement lost another crucial ally when the NAWSA, led by Catt, voted to support the president in all his endeavors, including war. Just before this decision was made, Addams wrote to her friend Catt personally, to persuade her not to pull American suffragists away from the peace movement:

to express ... the hope that the Council meeting called by the President of the N.A.W.S.A. ... will take no action concerning service to our government anticipatory of war since many women suffragists hope such a calamity may be averted, and feel that this is a time when patriotism may be effectively shown by refraining from any action tending to increase the war spirit.⁴⁶¹

Despite Addams's personal plea to her friend, the NAWSA voted to stop agitating for peace and to support the American government in any decision it made concerning war.

This reversal by suffragists—from supporting the peace movement to supporting the war—was similar to events in Great Britain in 1914, when it declared war. Suffragists and suffragettes both stopped supporting any peace movements or activists and instead began speaking for the government. The British suffragists in 1914 and the American suffragists in 1917 both decided that women's suffrage was more important than peace—recognizing the political opportunity that war provided in their fight for suffrage. While some individual suffrage supporters, like Addams, chose to fight for peace first and suffrage second, most followed their organizations' lead and supported war.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ Letter from Jane Addams to Carrie Chapman Catt, February 22, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁶² For more on British women, suffrage, and the war, see Hochschild, *To End All Wars*, 79–134; for more on Carrie Chapman Catt and American suffragists and the war, see Kazin, *War against War*, 41–50.

The break between the suffrage organizations and the women's peace organizations would have been quite the blow to Addams, Balch, and other female peace activists. Letters from WPP members demonstrate their refusal to accept that Catt and the NAWSA would abandon them. Catt had requested that her name be removed from WPP stationery, and members wrote to Addams to protest; fights even broke out within WPP branches over this issue.⁴⁶³ The fact that the simple removal of Catt's name from the letterhead caused such controversy demonstrates the emotional commitment that some women had in keeping the suffrage leader as part of their movement.

Losing the support of the NAWSA also had practical repercussions for peace organizations. Suffrage organizations were generally well run, politically connected, and well financed. On the whole, peace groups too were well run, but generally individuals, not organizations, were well connected politically, and peace groups were not well funded. Many women involved in peace work had begun as suffrage activists. This meant that when the NAWSA pulled away from peace work, individual members had to choose which organizations they would support. While some chose peace over suffrage, most followed the NAWSA and left peace organizations behind.

However, one group of suffrage advocates took the opposite route. Alice Paul, a suffrage worker and leader of the Congressional Union, had in January organized a picket line, outside the White House, demanding women's suffrage. Her fellow picketers—whose signs compared Wilson to the Kaiser—faced arrest, prosecution, and defamation by the public and press. Paul

⁴⁶³ Multiple letters were written to Addams about the arguments and verbal altercations that broke out in meetings when Catt was voted out of WPP branches. New York, led by radical Crystal Eastman, removed her first, but other states followed suit. Catt requested that her name be removed, as she did not consider herself part of the organization any longer. Members, however, protested the formal vote removing her from their honorary leadership positions assigned to her in 1915; many women did not think it appropriate to remove her. Letters from Harriet P. Thomas, Crystal Eastman, and other unnamed WPP members to Jane Addams, March 24–27, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

and her fellow protesters continued even after America entered the war—and faced the same criticism as the suffragettes had in England before 1914. The NAWSA and other mainstream suffragists condemned the struggle and worked to ensure that no one confused the picketers with the suffragists.⁴⁶⁴

The Question of Conscription and Conscientious Objectors

With war declared and the women's peace movement falling apart, remaining peace activists faced serious choices and new fights. While many left the peace fight and supported the government's decision, others worked maintain freedom of choice: namely men's choice to fight and women's own choice to publicly dissent against the government. Two bills, one to prevent espionage and another to implement a draft, became the focus of peace activists after April 6, 1917.

The fights over conscientious objection and conscription also contributed to divisions among peace workers after April 6, 1917. Some wanted to continue to push for an early peace settlement and keep American interests separate from the Entente's. Others wanted to concentrate on free speech in America, and work on ensuring an internationally negotiated peace so that another war would never occur. A third, much smaller, group decided that the men who faced conscription were the ones who needed the most help. As moderates and radicals worked

⁴⁶⁴ I could not find in Addams's or Balch's papers any written material discussing Paul and her picket line. Neither Balch nor Addams was involved with the Congressional Union; it could also be that Addams and Balch saw their own work to keep America out of the war as much more important than this group. This instance also demonstrates that, like the peace movement, the women's suffrage movement had its own factions. With suffrage, the moderates joined the conservatives in supporting the war, leaving the radicals on their own. This is unlike the women's peace movement, where the moderates and radicals were left by the conservatives. McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent*, 296.

together, the differences in beliefs, especially concerning conscription, divided the remaining peace advocates even more.⁴⁶⁵

The dissension among peace advocates concerning conscription centered on the idea of censorship, and the choice to break laws to make a point. Arguing for free speech was one thing to many advocates, but attempting to prevent conscription could be construed as actively working against the government, which was illegal under the recently passed Espionage Act. Most moderate peace activists did not wish to antagonize the government unnecessarily—and did not want to be arrested. Yet while the bill was still being debated, both moderate and radical activists published pamphlets against conscription and attempted to persuade President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker.

From April 6 to May 18, 1917 Addams, Balch, and others worked to prevent the passage of the Selective Service Act through two avenues. First they worked on preventing the bill from passing at all. Using pamphlets and speeches in an attempt to win over Congress and the American public, many advocates argued that conscription was not compatible with American democracy. Second, activists tried to get amendments put into the Selective Service Act that would protect conscientious objectors if the bill became law. While the law had provisions for objectors with religious beliefs against war, there were no provisions for those with a conscientious objection to war. The bill also did not protect Americans who felt any contribution to the war effort counted as participating. This absolutist objection was an important distinction as those who received exemptions were expected to perform some war related task.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁵ This can be seen in the breakdown of organizations such as the AUAM over the issue of conscription and the resignation of female moderate leaders such as Wald and Addams when the organization voted to allow legal aid for conscientious objectors. Kazin, *War against War*, 191–204

⁴⁶⁶ Kazin, *War against War*, 191–204.

Addams personally tried to convince Secretary of War Baker and Congress to, at the very least, transfer objector tribunals to civilian courts to ensure the fairness of the hearings. Addams and Wald wrote to Secretary Baker: “these changes mean to us a step toward the preservation of that liberty of conscience which is absolutely vital to democracy.”⁴⁶⁷ Their attached memorandum laid out the arguments for exemptions. They called for objectors to be judged based on their own personal beliefs, not on the organizations or religious sects they belonged to.⁴⁶⁸

To convince Baker of the importance of these amendments, the two women used the example of England, which had implemented a draft in January 1916. The British government had then imprisoned, under very harsh conditions, many men who were absolutist pacifists, who accepted no service that would benefit the military. English officials had sent some of these objectors to the front lines with no weapons but were forced to bring them back after a public outcry. The public’s outrage was so great it threatened civil order, and the British government turned over its absolutist objectors to civilian officials and prisons instead of military ones.⁴⁶⁹ Addams and Wald contended that the English conscription law was more liberal than the one currently in Congress, and that America would have much more difficulty implementing conscription.⁴⁷⁰ Addams and Wald may have believed that for the wars supporters, who generally discussed America supporting England against Germany, the comparison to England

⁴⁶⁷ Letter from Jane Addams and Lillian Wald to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, April 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁶⁸ Attached memorandum in the letter from Jane Addams and Lillian Wald to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, April 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁶⁹ Thomas Kennedy, *The Hound of Conscience: A History of the No-Conscription Fellowship, 1914–1919* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1981).

⁴⁷⁰ Attached memorandum in the letter from Jane Addams and Lillian Wald to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, April 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

would have more of an affect. Most members of Wilson's cabinet were Anglophiles so using England to persuade Baker also demonstrates Addams and Wald's political savvy.

Finally, Addams and Wald argued that it was more important to protect those who truly believed in peace than to persecute those attempting to get out of their "civil duty" to the country:

Better that some slackers escape under cloak of conscience than that the state coerce men's consciences in a war for freedom. So great will be social pressure and so little incline to mercy will be the average tribunal that it is not likely that slackers will share the exemption granted to men brave enough to follow conscience in times like these.⁴⁷¹

The two women used Wilson and Congress's own arguments for war in their attempt to get amendments added to the Selective Service Bill. "A war for freedom," in their view, could not be won by men who were forced to fight. They emphasized this with a concluding note: "We desire respectfully to submit in offering this memorandum we do not imply support of the general principle of selective draft, which we are obliged to oppose as in itself dangerous to democracy."⁴⁷²

Secretary Baker wrote to Addams that he appreciated their ideas. But in late April, as the bill approached a vote, activist Roger Baldwin wrote to Addams that Baker was not supporting their amendments.⁴⁷³ Addams wrote again to Baker and asked him to consider the previously

⁴⁷¹ Attached memorandum in the letter from Jane Addams and Lillian Wald to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, April 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷² Attached memorandum in the letter from Jane Addams and Lillian Wald to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, April 12, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷³ Baldwin was a member of the AUAM at its inception in 1915 and is known as the father of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). For more on Baldwin and the ALCU's creation, see Laura Weinrib, *The Taming of Free Speech: America's Civil Liberties Compromise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1–52. Telegram from Roger Baldwin to Jane Addams, April 27, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

suggested exemptions.⁴⁷⁴ Baker responded a few days later that the exemptions were not likely to be passed at all.⁴⁷⁵

Addams had not pinned all her hopes on the Secretary of War, however. She also worked to convince Congress to either not pass the Selective Service bill, or to include exemptions. She did this through hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs and in personal appeals to Illinois's congressmen.⁴⁷⁶ In Congress she stressed the discord between the draft and American moral values. She cited letters she received from around the country which argued "that conscription is a form of coercion which is absolutely averse and absolutely contradictory to everything that America has ever stood for."⁴⁷⁷ She continued stressing the public's lack of support for the draft.⁴⁷⁸ Because the members of Congress she was addressing faced reelection in little over a year, Addams may have thought that convincing them the public mandated their refusal of the draft, Congress would acquiesce. Unfortunately for Addams, Congress believed the public was not behind her. The Americans who wrote to Addams may have given her the

⁴⁷⁴ Telegram from Jane Addams to Secretary of War Newton Baker, April 27, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷⁵ Letter from Newton Baker to Jane Addams, April 29, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷⁶ The telegrams to her congressmen urged them to vote for exemptions and contained the same argument about the England conscription law as in the memorandum to Secretary of War Baker. Telegram from Jane Addams to Senator George E. Chamberlain and Congressmen Stanley H. Dent, May 7, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷⁷ Jane Addams presenting on Volunteer and Conscription Systems to the Sixty-Fifth Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, First Session on the Bill Authorizing the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States, Washington Government Printing Office, April 14, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁷⁸ Jane Addams presenting on Volunteer and Conscription Systems to the Sixty-Fifth Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, First Session on the Bill Authorizing the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States, Washington Government Printing Office, April 14, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

impression that the general public did not support the draft, but Congress either did not care or did not believe her.⁴⁷⁹

Addams was not alone in her fight against conscription. The AUAM published the April 1917 pamphlet *Concerning Conscription: The Experience of England, Canada, Australia and the United States with Volunteer and Conscript Armies*, using international and historical examples of the problems caused by the draft. The AUAM's arguments were that the draft failed in America during the Civil War, that it caused unnecessary strife in England during the current war, and that democracies like Australia and Canada refused to implement a contemporary draft because of the issues with it.⁴⁸⁰ The AUAM contended that the volunteer system worked well in countries like Canada and Australia, ensuring good soldiers for the war effort and preventing unnecessary civil strife.

The authors of the pamphlet posed questions such as “Will the Conscript Make as Good a Soldier as the Volunteer?” or “Is the Draft Constitutional”—but did not supply any of their own opinions. Instead, the organization turned to significant political and historical figures to answer for them.⁴⁸¹ This writing style is similar to the AUAM's pamphlets published a year earlier during the fight against preparedness. Using another's arguments to support their own ideas

⁴⁷⁹ As discussed in the introduction, the perception of what “the public” wanted depended on which section of the public you were listening to. Congress was surrounded by people who, in 1917, generally supported England, or were being contacted by their donors and other business owners who had the time and money to contact Congressmen. Business owners generally supported England because of the amount of American money invested into the British war effort. Addams's public consisted of pacifists and other peace supporters who took the time to write her. Neither group truly understood what the average American wanted. Most Americans had little time to write letters to peace activists and politicians, which limited the contemporary knowledge, as well as the historic knowledge, of what “the public” wanted in 1917.

⁴⁸⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Concerning Conscription: The Experience of England, Canada, Australia and the United States with Volunteer and Conscript Armies*, AUAM, April 1917, A-95, box 34, folder 403. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁴⁸¹ These figures included an army major and general, former governors, and many reporters. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Concerning Conscription: The Experience of England, Canada, Australia and the United States with Volunteer and Conscript Armies*, AUAM, April 1917, A-95, box 34, folder 403. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

allowed the AUAM to borrow the legitimacy of the quoted people and organizations—a tactic that became more and more important during the fight against conscription as the AUAM became villainized by many in the American media.

Addams, Balch, AUAM members, and others also tried to convince President Wilson to aid in the fight for conscientious exemptions. On April 13, 1917, Wald and Addams appealed to Wilson's religious nature to persuade him to help conscientious objectors. They also reminded him that he needed supporters and should attempt to unify the nation rather than divide it through a conscription bill that forced men to serve.

Mr. President, when Moses prayed for the people, there were some among them whose names are not even recorded who held up his hands. You need us nameless men and women who have been so proud and so happy to believe in you, to push from behind where you were leading on before. You need us, Mr. President, as much as we need you.⁴⁸²

In citing Moses, Wald and Addams were asking for a leader, and not just any leader, but a leader chosen by God. Neither Addams nor Wald was overtly religious, but they did understand his religious nature and his seeming desire to be a great leader, and hoped he would be swayed to their point of view. Historians have pointed to the fact that Wilson's abandonment of the progressive advocates he formerly worked with would lead to challenges later in his political career. Here we see Addams and Wald attempting, in an argument devised specifically for Wilson, to remind him of this.

Despite Addams's and Wald's efforts, Congress passed the Selective Service Act on April 28, 1917, and Wilson signed it into law May 18, 1917. It required men ages 21 through 30 to register for the draft. It also attempted to fix some of the problems that had occurred with the Civil War draft: it forbade substitutes, so that men could not longer hire others to serve in their

⁴⁸² Letter from Lillian Wald and Jane Addams to Woodrow Wilson, April 13, 1917, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Reel 1, The New York Public Library.

place. In 1918, the bill was amended to include men 18 through 45 and prevented any more volunteers from registering. Even with all the press that appeared against the draft before its implementation in 1917, a majority of Americans complied with the order. Out of 2.8 million men conscripted, only around 300,000 attempted to dodge the draft.⁴⁸³

With the passage of the Selective Service Act, anti-conscription advocates faced a serious choice. They could continue agitating against the draft and help potential objectors navigate the complicated process, or they could abandon the cause and put their efforts into another fight such as that against censorship. Agitating against the draft after its passage was soon became precarious work because of the Espionage Act, which passed only a month after conscription and made it illegal to hinder the government's war effort in any way. Protesting conscription or trying to keep men from registering was considered a hindrance, and therefore a crime.⁴⁸⁴

A faction that chose to continue their fight against conscription and to help conscientious objectors was led by progressive advocate and AUAM member Baldwin. He created a committee within the AUAM called the National Civil Liberties Bureau whose sole purpose was to help conscientious objectors.⁴⁸⁵ This radical faction, however, was disliked by many moderate founding members of the AUAM; as conscription became a hotly debated issue throughout the United States, Addams and Wald chose to leave the AUAM.

Addams disappeared from AUAM meeting logs and publications before Wald, but never formally disconnected from the group. Wald left the AUAM completely in August 1917, after trying to sever the National Civil Liberties Bureau from the main committee. When she was

⁴⁸³ Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*, 50–118.

⁴⁸⁴ Kazin, *War against War*, 191–204

⁴⁸⁵ This committee would eventually be forced out of the AUAM in late 1918 and would become the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which still exists today. The ACLU is the only remnant of the AUAM that survived the end of the war. Baldwin himself would face imprisonment for refusing to register for the draft and would use his tribunal hearing and trial as a propaganda tool. Weinrib, *The Taming of Free Speech*, 1–52.

unsuccessful, she submitted her resignation. As the president of the AUAM since its founding at her settlement house in NYC in 1915, Wald regretted resigning, and wrote to Addams:

The American Union overruled me about the separation of the Civil Liberties Bureau from the Committee.... I am very, very sorry for I think that we have a definite place in the position that some of us feel what we ought to hold; namely, the holding on of the civil rights and opposition to militarism, but not opposition to the government, not embarrassment to the government.⁴⁸⁶

Wald believed that the AUAM should fight rising militarism and censorship in the United States, not agitate against conscription, which was already law. Leaving the AUAM was difficult for both women, but Addams, unlike Wald, was president of other organizations, which allowed her to channel her peace efforts into other work. Wald continued corresponding with members of the AUAM, but she concentrated more on her settlement house work as the war progressed.

Fight for Freedom of Speech

In the fall of 1917, peace workers were becoming more and more scarce. Some activists had left the movement early in 1917, before war was declared, and even more left after April 6, 1917. Many former peace workers lived on the East Coast, which was more pro-Entente than the rest of the United States. Midwest states, however, also supported Wilson in his call for America to enter the war. German Americans in the Midwest supported American entry more than many Americans believed. Studies on Germany's attempts to utilize German Americans on behalf of the Imperial government demonstrate that many German Americans did not support the German government in the war and that the Imperial German government did not capitalize on its propaganda or American supporters well.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁶ Letter from Lillian Wald to Jane Addams, August 14, 1917, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Reel 1, The New York Public Library.

⁴⁸⁷ Fulwider, *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I*, 91–174.

Despite a seeming majority of Americans supporting U.S. entry into the war, Wilson's administration, including the Justice Department, worried about subversive citizens in their midst. As many historical studies have shown, German Americans, despite their support, faced the most scrutiny by the Justice Department.⁴⁸⁸ Women too faced federal scrutiny, especially as draft legislation was being drawn up: the administration worried that women, because of their maternal protective nature, would hold men back from registering for the draft out of fear for their safety. While none of this was based on facts, the Wilson administration worked with Congress to combat dissenting information, using the public's fear of German spies to pass legislation against dissent.⁴⁸⁹

Addams and Balch were both part of the fight against the censorship of free speech allowed under the espionage bill that was before Congress. Although Addams was moderate and Balch radical, they both believed that dissent was a part of a free society; as cosmopolitan patriots, they believed that dissent created a better country. They did not see themselves as disloyal simply because they disagreed with the war; in fact, they saw themselves, and all those who publicly spoke against the war, as true patriots because they were trying to help the country they loved become better. Unfortunately for them, many did not see their protests that way.

The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on espionage and interference with neutrality April 9–12, 1917. The primary purpose of these hearings was to

⁴⁸⁸ While investigations were officially done by the Justice Department, the federal government used citizens to investigate each other and accepted evidence of disloyalty based on little more than hearsay. The public also acted on their own using vigilante "justice" to ensure the loyalty of their neighbors and community members. This resulted in the persecution of anyone seen as "un-American" by their neighbors and the lynching of many people. Very little was done to prevent the vigilantes from performing these horrible crimes, and Congress passed additional legislation against dissenters as their solution to vigilante justice. Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*, 1-10.

⁴⁸⁹ The fear of spies was prevalent in almost all warring countries. While there is very little evidence of direct spying by the Central Powers in the United States, there certainly were German agents attempting to spread German propaganda and promote good will toward Germany during America's neutral period. Fulwider, *German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I*, 91-174.

debate the bill on espionage. Both Balch and Addams spoke before the committee, arguing that the bill would hurt American democracy because it limited free speech and dissent; and both were careful to not speak against the war itself, as they did not want to antagonize the congressmen while attempting to persuade them on a different topic.

Balch was there as a known activist and professor, not as a founding member of the EPF. As one of the first speakers before the committee, she made her points very quickly:

I wish to see my country go through this war with the utmost credit to herself and not have any of the war hysteria of which there has been some in other countries. I want to see a war, which is intended as a war for democracy, carried through without any damage to democracy, and a war against Prussianism carried through without any Prussianizing here; and, of course, you want the same thing.... I want to see every possible protection give to the thing which makes America dearest to us, and that is her freedom and her justice.⁴⁹⁰

While Balch maintained that the espionage bill would cause the United States to adopt its enemy's tactics of controlling free speech, Addams used a different tactic. She addressed the committee as the leader of the WPP, emphasizing that she still believed that the international conflict would be solved by an international solution, not a military one. Though she did not speak directly against America entering the war, she proceeded to question the committee members on the different topics that the WPP generally spoke about and how the organization's membership believed that the espionage bill would prevent these conversations and publications. She stressed her belief that only through debates—through dissenting opinions—could America's national and international conflicts be solved:

Of course, we [members of the WPP] are all anxious that this war, now that it has been declared, should be waged as a republic only can wage war, and that it should have in it those elements of moral sanction, the actual participation of a man's mind and spirit as well as his bodily presence in the ranks, which will cause the hastening of complete peace, and that can only come through the fullest discussion.... There are a number of

⁴⁹⁰ Emily Green Balch, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, *Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary*, 61st Cong., 1st sess., H. R. 291, serial 53, part 2, April 9 and 12, 1917.

men and women all over the country who are quite as alarmed over the moral damage done by a war waged as this one seems to start to be, with all possible imitation of Old World methods.⁴⁹¹

Addams's remarks again reveal her cosmopolitan patriotism, as she believed that it would take people of differing opinions for the nation to end the war. She hoped that Congress would prevent "old world methods," meaning censorship and a restriction of free speech, from permeating into America. Addams recalled the arguments about America's role in the European conflict that were popular when the war first broke out, when Americans believed that their "new world" was much better off than Europe's "old" one and that by remaining neutral they kept the moral high ground.

Neither Addams nor Balch received a good reception from Congress.⁴⁹² Intent on stopping the bill from becoming law, they wrote to President Wilson on April 16, 1917, appealing to his sense of righteousness and seemingly progressive nature:

We are deeply concerned lest America, having declared a state of war, should sacrifice certain safeguards fundamental to the life of her democracy. Several bills are now before congress ... purposely made comprehensive, so as to include a wide range of possible offenders, may easily lend itself to the suppression of free speech, free assemblage, popular discussion and criticism.⁴⁹³

They contended that Wilson, of all people, would understand and wish to uphold the freedoms that America had always guaranteed to its people: "We believe that you would deem it essential, perhaps more at this time than at any other, that the truth should not be withheld, or concealed

⁴⁹¹ Jane Addams, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, *Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary*, 61st Cong., 1st sess., H. R. 291, serial 53, part 2, April 9 and 12, 1917.

⁴⁹² Congressmen's questioning revealed that they did not agree with the two women; they frequently posed questions that were unrelated to the women's arguments. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, *Espionage and Interference with Neutrality: Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary*, 61st Cong., 1st sess., H. R. 291, serial 53, part 2, April 9 and 12, 1917.

⁴⁹³ Letter from Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch to Woodrow Wilson, April 16, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

from the American people whose interests after all are the most vital consideration.”⁴⁹⁴ Addams and Balch particularly wanted Wilson to declare his support for free speech and freedom of assembly, as peace organizations were facing discrimination around the country.⁴⁹⁵

What we ask of you, Mr. President, whose utterances at this time must command the earnest attention of the country, is to make an impressive statement that will reach, not only the officials of the federal government scattered throughout the union, but the officials of the several states and of the cities, towns and villages of the country, reminding them of the peculiar obligation devolving upon all Americans in this war to uphold in every way our constitutional rights and liberties. This will give assurance that in attempting to administer war-time laws, the spirit of democracy will not be broken. Such a statement sent throughout the country would reinforce your declaration that this is a war for democracy and liberty.⁴⁹⁶

Despite this impassioned plea, and despite their previous congenial communications with the President, Wilson never responded. Nor did he make any such statement upholding civil liberties. Indeed, historians report that Wilson’s record on civil rights throughout the war was abysmal: he frequently overlooked violations by his own people, and refused help to his former supporters.⁴⁹⁷

The women did not win their fight. The Espionage Act of 1917 was passed in June to quell dissent in the United States. However, the act, did not completely silence dissent: activists continued their fight against other violations of personal freedoms.⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁴ Letter from Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch to Woodrow Wilson, April 16, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁹⁵ In the letter, Addams and Balch mention governors and mayors preventing groups from meeting in their cities, police breaking up meetings or allowing mobs to, and an overall sense that peace groups were not welcome to express their opinion. Letter from Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch to Woodrow Wilson, April 16, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁹⁶ Letter from Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch to Woodrow Wilson, April 16, 1917, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10.

⁴⁹⁷ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 158–60.

⁴⁹⁸ For more on how the espionage act worked, see William H. Thomas Jr., *Unsafe for Democracy: World War I and the U.S. Justice Department’s Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 50–119.

The Price of Dissent

The Wilson administration also worked to ensure the American people supported him and the war. Using propaganda, and again with the support of the Justice Department, Wilson did not lack resources in enforcing support of the war. Americans suspected of supporting America's enemies, and those suspected of being "slackers," i.e., draft dodgers, were heavily persecuted by both the Justice Department and the American public.⁴⁹⁹ The price of dissent fell heavily on those who attempted to help conscientious objectors and/or those who continued to fight for peace. Because the Espionage Act made it illegal to aid in hindering the war effort, helping conscientious objectors skirt their "duty to the country" could be prosecuted. Those who chose to help these men also faced persecution.⁵⁰⁰ Dissenters on the other hand, as cosmopolitan patriots, believed their dissent strengthened the country. As the war continued, these conflicting ideas about patriotism and the obligations of citizenship resulted in heated public discussions, and even violence.

Though Addams and Balch as moderate and radical peace activists supported different goals during America's neutral period, after America entered the war they found themselves lumped together by both the federal government and members of the vocal public, who treated all dissenters as traitors. The war created a new definition of citizen, based not on the cosmopolitan form but rather on the tribal one. The importance of sacrifice became prevalent in the United States, and the public and press turned on those who were not sacrificing for the common good.⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*, 1-10.

⁵⁰⁰ William Preston, *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933*, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), 1-87.

⁵⁰¹ Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 1-20.

The development of this new idea of citizenship was not created by the public, but through careful use of propaganda in all forms by the newly created Committee for Public Information (CPI). Also known as the Creel Committee, the CPI was established by executive order on April 13, 1917, under the direction of George Creel. Creel worked to reach as many Americans as he could with a message of support and sacrifice. Spreading patriotic messages and urging people to give what they had to the war effort, Creel and the CPI were instrumental in spreading the new idea of citizenship based on sacrifice. The CPI issued as much propaganda in as many forms as it could during its 26-month tenure. One pamphlet, found in the Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, was almost 20 pages long and included notes for speaking in movie theaters, notes for attending parties, even sample sermons for priests.⁵⁰² Peace activists did not have the funding to refute such a storm of propaganda and were left to do whatever they could to spread their message.

On June 11, 1917, Addams addressed the First Congregational Church in Evanston, Illinois, on “Pacifism and Patriotism in the Time of War”—a speech that was basically a declaration of her belief in cosmopolitan patriotism. She argued that pacifists lost the protection of legitimacy that they had before the war: now, the war created a wave of tribal patriotism that did not tolerate any dissent. During war, she contended, pacifists must abandon their concerns about legitimacy and fight against the wave of war enthusiasm that undermined their patriotism.⁵⁰³ Addams argued that Addams maintained that the American people needed to recognize that discussion did not equal treason, and that citizens could be patriotic and still not

⁵⁰² Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; *Bulletin* 29, April 6, 1918, A-95, box 93. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁵⁰³ Jane Addams, “Pacifism and Patriotism in the Time of War” (speech at First Congregational Church, Evanston, Illinois, June 11, 1917), in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

support the war. For Addams this was a critical declaration of her beliefs. While she had spoken publicly about her want of peace and her belief that those speaking out against war in belligerent nations were brave, this was the first, and almost the last, time that she publicly spoke on this topic while America was at war.

Addams got a taste of the public backlash immediately. An old friend, Judge Orrin N. Carter of the Illinois State Supreme Court, rose and publicly berated her speech: “I think anything that may tend to cast doubt on the justice on our cause in the present war is very unfortunate. No pacifist measures, in my opinion, should be taken until the war is over.”⁵⁰⁴ This public “break,” a word that the judge used, was the first indication of the reaction that Addams would receive.

While a few people wrote privately to Addams to offer their support, only critics’ remarks were published. This was more than likely because of newspaper self-censorship, rather than a lack of people writing to their papers. Newspapers chose which letters to the editor to publish and which articles to write. Addams had many friends who were not afraid to publicly support her, but because of the papers’ control, it is not known if those letters exist. Still, three articles were important enough, to Addams or to her archivist, to be kept among her personal papers.

All three (one from *The Herald*, the other two unlabeled) criticized the August 11 speech and wanted readers to doubt Addams’s patriotism. They acknowledged Addams as a former social worker who once believed in America and supported the American people: “As an early

⁵⁰⁴ Orrin N. Carter in “Jane Addams Told Pacifism Is Unwise,” June 11, 1917, unlabeled newspaper article, found in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

and conspicuous mover in social settlement work and other forms of uplift, she gained more than national reputation as a leader among women.”⁵⁰⁵ Yet her speech received this criticism:

Miss Addams challenged the justice and righteousness of the war into which the United States has entered, after the most solemn consideration of its duty to the cause of humanity. No American has the right to such a challenge now. If it is not treason it is dangerously near it. If such utterances are not calculated to give aid and comfort to the enemy, what is their effect?⁵⁰⁶

With these criticisms, Addams had been transformed from a leader among women to woman “dangerously near” treason. With a single speech, she had become a target for almost all of the American press.

Addams was not, by any means, the only person targeted by newspapers, the federal government, or the public—yet this episode affected her. She moved out of the public eye and instead worked behind the scenes on peace; she also worked with the United States Food Administration under future president Herbert Hoover.⁵⁰⁷

The Justice Department helped keep the country in line as well with targeted intelligence gathering, the allowing of vigilante violence without prosecution, and the enforcement of the Espionage Act and, later, the Sedition Act. While those who attempted to speak out against conscription and other government programs were the main focus of the federal government’s ire, all dissenters were monitored and prosecuted if they got out of line. For Balch and Addams, staying out of the limelight ensured that they did not face federal prosecution, even if they did face public ridicule and private discrimination. As the face of the peace movement, Addams

⁵⁰⁵ “Miss Addams Resurges,” June 1917, unlabeled newspaper article, found in in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

⁵⁰⁶ “They Should Disavow It,” June 1917, unlabeled newspaper article, found in in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:46.

⁵⁰⁷ Addams’s post-1917 actions will be briefly highlighted in the conclusion to this dissertation.

faced much more public ridicule than Balch, but Balch encountered private consequences after the war ended in 1918.⁵⁰⁸

Peace Work during War

After the June 1917 episode, Addams turned to her organizations the WPP and the ICWPP to work on a peace settlement to prevent future wars. The two groups kept up their work on what the eventual peace should look like, and continued to prepare for the end of the war. Balch and Andrews helped Addams with this despite Andrews's differing ideas on peace work during the war. Though Andrews did not want to try and end the war any earlier than the American government thought it should, she believed that a constructive, progressive peace would help prevent any future wars. Through letters, the three women worked together to write a platform for peace that would be discussed at the end-of-the-war meeting of the ICWPP. What is interesting was that while Addams was the ultimate judge, Balch and Andrews both tried to get their points of view into the final document. The edits and back-and-forth corrections reveal disagreements between the women's philosophies.

The final platform for peace identified for discussion at the end-of-the-war conference. This platform was broken into three sections: national problems, international problems, and what a third Hague Conference should provide for. As this was written for an international audience, the national problems section was meant to apply to all nations, not just the United States. The women called for: all foreign policy to be controlled by the democratic process, only allowing civilian authorities to vote on matters of peace at peace conferences, women not to be excluded from any democratic processes, no transfer of territory without plebiscite, a concert of

⁵⁰⁸ Actions by the public, Justice Department, Wilson administration, and Congress to dispel and prosecute dissent have been well documented in Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*, 1–10.

nations open to all, international protection for “unorganized regions” such as colonies, a permanent court of arbitration and world court of justice, and a reconstruction of international law based on a declaration of the idea of rights and duties of nations.⁵⁰⁹ All of the above ideas were part of the ideology of the ICWPP and the American WPP since their inception. What was not here was how the war should end, or what kind of end the war should have. This was one of the reasons that Andrews helped with this document. She supported a diplomatic end to the war in order to create permanent peace, but did not support pressuring the American government to make peace quickly without the full approval of the Entente Powers.

One distinction that needs to be noted is the separation of colonies from the plebiscite part of the program. While the women called for territory to not be transferred without plebiscite, they did not apply this to what they referred to as “unorganized regions such as the African dependencies.”⁵¹⁰ What separated territories that deserved plebiscites and those that did not was race. Most progressive peace advocates were not supporters of equal rights for all races. Addams and Balch had both worked with African American activists before and during the war, and Balch would advocate for Haitian independence after 1919; but none of them ever attempted to help the African colonies under European rule.⁵¹¹ While it is possible that most women simply did not know or agree on what to do with the colonies, Addams and others chose not to attempt to help them. I believe that progressives did not see the colonial peoples as full human beings who deserved to be helped. The idea that colonial oversight could help a country’s people

⁵⁰⁹ This list is only part of the program. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Tentative Program for Discussion of the I.C.W.P.P. at the Congress after the War, presented by the American Section of the ICWPP, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁵¹⁰ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; Tentative Program for Discussion of the I.C.W.P.P. at the Congress after the War, presented by the American Section of the ICWPP, A-95, box 20, folder 272. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁵¹¹ Haiti was taken over by the United States military during 1915, and a military government was put in place in 1916. The American government argued that this was necessary to protect the Haitian people from invasion. Steihm, *Champions for Peace*, 41–60.

progress was deeply rooted in society, and most progressives believed it. While there were exceptions in beliefs and in action, overall the progressives did not attempt to aid the colonies in their struggles for independence.⁵¹²

With the preliminary program published, Balch and Andrews frequently corresponded in July 1917 to edit the document. While they agreed on many of the same things, including ensuring that military men would not have any say in any part of the peace process, they disagreed on crucial elements. Balch sent suggestions to Andrews, and Andrews summed those up and sent them to Addams. What Andrews added to and subtracted from Balch's suggestions indicates the differences that remained between these women at this point in their peace work.

Balch, for example, urged that an article on disarmament be added to the program:

I feel strongly that we should urge disarmament. I even believe this will be more practical and in any case we do not want to run any risk of asking less than we might get. Let us ask for what we want and be glad of whatever we can get. But the world after the war will not be the old world but a strangely new one. Revolutionary Russia we may hope will be having her say, and in every country there will be new classes influential. Let us not be among old fogies trying to reform the war system and make it tolerable. Let us believe in the Permanent Peace which we announce in our title.⁵¹³

Clearly, Balch wanted disarmament to be discussed at the congress; however, when Andrews sent a letter to Addams entitled "Discussion of Miss Balch's Suggestions," she wrote something quite different:

Disarmament is too much to expect from the peace settlement conference. It looks very probably that a league of nations in some form or another, as proposed under (2), will be set up after the war, and it must be noted that disarmament is not a part of this plan. A reduction of rival armies and navies is possible. The Third Peace Conference might possibly provide for disarmaments.⁵¹⁴

⁵¹² McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent*, 201–15.

⁵¹³ At this point Russia was under the control of the liberal provisional government. The Bolshevik Revolution that started the Russian civil war and pulled the Russian army out of World War I would not occur until November 1917. Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; letter from Emily Greene Balch to Fannie Fern Andrews, July 31, 1917, A-95, box 30, folder 364. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁵¹⁴ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Jane Addams, August, 1917, A-95, box 30, folder 364. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

In a second letter to Addams, titled “Further Discussion of Miss Balch’s Suggestions,” Andrews again wrote, “It is inconceivable to expect that disarmament would come at this time, even though a League of nations were organized.”⁵¹⁵

Andrews chose to substitute her beliefs without even addressing Balch’s ideas. Balch believed that at the very least they should ask for disarmament, while Andrews believed that disarmament would not happen and there was no point even bringing it up and antagonizing the belligerent nations in their effort to create peace. Always more conservative in her peace work, Andrews was in effect supporting Wilson’s war effort; Balch was still fighting against it. After sending Balch a copy of the letter she had written to Addams, Andrews wrote to Balch, “I am sorry not to agree with you but of course you expect me to explain myself frankly. You and I want the same thing, but we have a different approach.”⁵¹⁶

The creation process of the peace platform allows for several conclusions. First, that despite differences of opinion on the war, and on America’s role in it, female activists still managed to work together. Though differences of opinion can be seen in the document and its edits, the fact that Andrews chose to work with Balch and Addams even in late 1917 indicates that there was still some common ground between them. Most historians argue that once the war broke out, all pacifist groups broke up and were forced to either quit their work or face the consequences. While that is true for most groups, here we see an outlier: Addams, Balch, and Andrews continued to work together to help the world find permanent peace after the war.

A second conclusion that can be drawn from this is that serious differences existed between the three women’s beliefs. Andrews and Balch are representative of the two extremes

⁵¹⁵ Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, 1896–1941; letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Jane Addams, August, 1917, A-95, box 30, folder 364. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

⁵¹⁶ Letter from Fannie Fern Andrews to Emily Greene Balch, August 16, 1917, in the Emily Greene Balch Papers (DG 006), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 6.

among progressive activists after American entered the war. Andrews represents the conservative progressives, who flipped their loyalty after the war was declared and began to work for organizations that supported the war. Generally, these activists focused on other progressive causes, such as education and suffrage, and believed that supporting the war and the Wilson administration would allow them to further their cause.⁵¹⁷ Balch, on the other hand, represents the radical peace workers. Supporting unofficial neutral mediation and controversial proposals such as total disarmament, Balch willingly put herself into the public sphere as a pacifist. Choosing peace work over all other causes, Balch was comfortable with the scrutiny of the media and the vocal public, and refused to back down simply because the government did not approve of what she said.

The final conclusion that can be drawn here is about Addams's role in peace work after her much maligned speech of June 1917, when she left the public eye. Her changed role can be seen in the above letters, as Addams was not in them. She helped create the original draft of the peace platform, but she allowed Andrews and Balch to edit the document. The changes were submitted to her, and she approved them, but this was done in private, and not publicized. Unlike previous documents that the ICWPP created, the peace platform was never published. It was created as a private document to be seen only by members of the ICWPP who attended the women's peace conference after the war. Addams's decision to keep her peace work private is an indication of how much the public ridicule of June 1917 affected her.

⁵¹⁷ This is particularly true for suffrage and civil rights activists in 1917. While much more has been written about the suffrage movement, African American activists struggled with the same choices as their white counterparts. The belief that having one's cause tainted by the pacifists' unpopularity would permanently doom one's cause was pervasive, and was reinforced by the government. This forced activists to choose to support either peace or the other causes they had once worked for. In this way the government got activists to censor themselves, without any actual pressure. For those who kept up peace work, however, the government was more than willing to provide the pressure.

With factions growing within the different peace groups, the abandonment of Wilson, and the growing public ire with any kind of peace activism, Addams, Balch and others left the public sphere and worked on peace in private. Some activists, like Roger Baldwin and Alice Paul, chose not to follow these leaders, but for the majority of peace activists, public work was finished. Peace activists would now work in private to help develop plans that they hoped would allow the countries leaders to create a peace settlement that would end all war.

CONCLUSION: THE UNIMAGINABLE HAS OCCURRED

“From the moment the war broke out, she [Jane Addams] had launched a propaganda campaign, with the aim of uniting America and the other neutral countries to end the war, and had succeeded in forming a great organization of women to support this program. So it was that she energetically opposed the entry of the United States into the war. She held fast to the ideals of peace even during the difficult hours when other considerations and interests obscured it from her compatriots and drove them in to the conflict. Throughout the whole war she toiled for a peace that would not engender a new war, becoming, as she did so, the spokesman for the pacifist women of the world. Sometimes her views were at odds with public opinion both at home and abroad. But she never gave in, and in the end she regained the place of honor she had had before in the hearts of her people.”

– Presentation speech by Halvdan Koht, member of the Nobel Committee, on December 10, 1931

“And then came the First World War, putting an end to her [Emily Greene Balch’s] university career, for she was dismissed from her post in 1918 because of her pacifist activities. But the war also brought a fresh challenge, giving her life a new goal. Like so many others, she saw the war as a futile interruption to the construction of a better world. ... She has taught us that the reality we seek must be earned by hard and unrelenting toil in the world in which we live, but she has taught us more: that exhaustion is unknown and defeat only gives fresh courage to the man whose soul is fired by the sacred flame.”

– Presentation speech by Gunnar Jahn, Chairman of the Nobel Committee, on December 10, 1946

The legacy of Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch’s peace work can be seen in the above quotes. Winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931 and 1946 respectively, Addams and Balch were both commended for their peace work during World War I.⁵¹⁸ Unlike her fellow peace workers, Fannie Fern Andrews is not remembered as an advocate for peace. Instead some remember her as an education advocate and founder of American civics education. Despite her support for World War I, and her invitation to serve as a delegate at Versailles in 1919, it is Andrews who has been forgotten by history. Though their efforts were controversial during the war, Addams and Balch maintained their support for peace, and later, as Americans became disillusioned with the Great War during the 1920s and 1930s, it was the legacies of Addams and Balch that endured.

⁵¹⁸ Balch was also commended for her work for conscientious objectors during World War II, and for her work in Haiti. Addams’s Hull House and social work, along with her peace work, was also commended.

As the war continued in 1918, and American men finally reached the trenches of Europe, the peace movement struggled on. Advocates were forced onto one of three paths: defy the American government and continue to work against wartime measures and for a hopeful end to the war; work for peace while also supporting some wartime measures; or give up on the peace movement and support the government completely. Addams, Balch, and Andrews, all took a different path: Addams attempted to be both an advocate for peace and a government supporter, Balch defied the government and worked only for peace; and Andrews supported the government to such an extent that at the end of the war she was invited to the Treaty of Versailles peace conference by President Wilson.

Addams chose to walk a tightrope between aiding the war effort on the home front and keeping up peace work. Although she never declared any support for the war, she turned to the United States Food Administration under Herbert Hoover to demonstrate her support for the American people and the soldiers. The program originally started as part of the relief effort that Hoover organized after for German-occupied Belgium; but when America entered the war, Hoover organized an effort for the everyday citizens to save food that would ostensibly be sent to American troops. While its actual effect has been debated, the program allowed women, children, and those who could not fight to feel connected to the sacrifices of the war effort.⁵¹⁹ Even though the program was construed as aiding the war effort, Addams's humanitarianism allowed her to undertake this work. Yet she faced heavy criticism throughout the war, and ultimately turned completely against Wilson and his administration. In 1919 she fought against

⁵¹⁹ For more on the idea of sacrifice and the different programs the American government put in place, see Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

the Treaty of Versailles and Wilson's League of Nations, seeing them as a continuance of old diplomacy that would lead to another war.⁵²⁰

Balch suffered even more for her peace work. Not as wealthy as Addams, Balch needed a job in order to survive. Her tenure at Wellesley College came to an abrupt end in 1918, however, when the board of trustees decided not to renew her contract. Citing her peace work and antigovernment position, they denied Balch her professorship, even after all of her time there. Like Addams, she worked against the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in 1919 and became a full-time worker for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), which formed out of the ICWPP at their meeting in Zurich in 1919. She continued to work within the women's peace movement throughout her life.⁵²¹

Andrews kept up her work for education reform throughout the rest of the war. In 1919 she attended the Treaty of Versailles peace conference as a member of the American committee. She was invited as an expert on education and put forth a resolution that would have created an international curriculum for all League of Nations members. The resolution never passed, and Andrews returned to the United States. She kept up her education work throughout the rest of her life and is considered the mother of modern-day civics education in the United States. Her support for the eugenics movement, however, and her belief that nonwhite peoples were actually a different species eventually severely tarnished her work and her reputation. Her peace work before America declared war in 1917 was never recognized—and more than likely she did not

⁵²⁰ Addams received public redemption during the 1920s and 1930s as the American people, and the world, became more and more critical of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles. She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1936, only a little before her death. Steihm, *Champions for Peace*, 21–40.

⁵²¹ Balch did not receive the same redemption as Addams, because of the growing red scare in the United States. A declared Socialist, Balch faced persecution because of her anti-capitalist beliefs. She worked outside the United States for some time as a member of the WILPF. Balch also worked in the 1920s and 1930s with oppressed peoples such as the Haitians. Having been taken over by the United States during the First World War, Haiti was in need of humanitarian aid. Only after the Second World War was Balch's peace work finally recognized; she won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946. She is still unfortunately less known than Addams, despite their similar work.

want it to be. Her passion was education through the lens of American-led internationalism. She firmly believed in America's superiority and wanted to spread it throughout the rest of the world through education.⁵²²

While no women faced conscription or imprisonment for refusing to fight, the Wilson administration did focus on women as a source of discontent and dissent during the war. The propaganda arm of the federal government, the CPI and Creel, produced films, songs, and publications that claimed that women could be detrimental to a man's patriotic health. Worried that women would stop their sons, brothers, husbands, etc., from entering armed service, the CPI and the Justice Department paid special attention to women's actions. Through investigations and propaganda, the Wilson administration worked to ensure women's loyalty. Other women also enforced this loyalty. The Hoover Food Program was supposed to help soldiers, but became a sign of loyalty for women: if a neighbor did not have a support sign for the program in her window, she could be suspected of, and reported for, dissent. Through public and official federal enforcement, American men and women were kept "loyal" to their country, at least in the public eye.⁵²³

The final question my dissertation seeks to answer is: What went wrong? In December 1916 and January 1917 activists felt that peace was so close they could begin planning for the war's end. But they were severely mistaken. Of course, some of their assumptions in January 1917 were assumptions made by the whole United States. The Imperial German government chose to allow conversations about peace to continue even as they made plans to resume

⁵²² Zeiger, "The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory," 150–79; and Threlkeld, "Education for *Pax Americana*," 515–41.

⁵²³ While there were hotspots of dissent against the war, such as the Midwest and especially Wisconsin, the majority of Americans supported the war, or at least the federal government. Many of the investigations, whether official or unofficial, came about because of hearsay rather than official evidence and were based heavily on stereotypes about race, ethnicity, gender, and religion. For more on the enforcement of patriotism in the United States during World War I, see Thomas, *Unsafe for Democracy*.

unrestricted submarine warfare. Most Americans did not know about the Zimmermann Telegram because it was held by British intelligence while they worked to expose it without revealing that they cracked the German's codes.

Some historians have argued that Wilson betrayed the peace workers in 1917.⁵²⁴ Although I agree that after war was declared Wilson abandoned the progressives who had supported his reelection, I do not think that Addams and Balch had placed all their faith in him. These two women were well educated and politically savvy, with a lot of political connections. They had faced repeated setbacks within the women's suffrage movement. While I believe they felt Wilson listened to them more than previous presidents had, I do not believe they trusted him. Addams was clearly strategizing when she wrote to Wald that perhaps, if Wilson believed peace negotiations would get him reelected, he would begin them.⁵²⁵ The fact that Addams even entertained this idea demonstrates how practical she was about Wilson's support of the peace movement. Nor did Addams and Balch put their faith only in Wilson; they reached out to congressmen, and especially to the American people. In the end, they turned against Wilson and fought against his policies, much to his chagrin.⁵²⁶

What I found is that the major problem in the women's peace movement was that the women who made up the movement were divided. From its inception, the Woman's Peace Party contained women who represented the conservative, moderate, and radical peace movements in the United States. The WPP allowed for all of these women to work together, as it was the first organization that allowed women into leadership roles. Later, the ICWPP provided all of these

⁵²⁴ Both Knock, *To End All Wars*, and Kazin, *War against War*, discuss how Wilson betrayed the peace movement and his own want of peace in exchange for the League of Nations and a "seat at the table."

⁵²⁵ Letter from Jane Addams to Lillian Wald, May 12, 1916, in the Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:09.

⁵²⁶ Thomas Knock discusses how Wilson's abandonment of the progressives like Addams cost him in 1919. Knock, *To End All Wars*, 158–60.

women an international venue. As the war progressed, however, even more new international organizations formed that gave women leadership roles. These new organizations gave women opportunities to work toward goals that better fit with their ideologies. Conservatives like Andrews could try to build a better peace without worrying how the current war would end, while radicals like Balch could focus on ending the war and fight against what they saw as the main reasons the war broke out in the first place: militarism and imperialism.

As these independent organizations grew, Addams tried desperately to maintain unity within the moderate ICWPP. Understanding that only a united organization that speaking for all peace advocates would stand a chance against the jingoistic and united pro-war advocates in the United States, she tried to find ways to maintain a middle ground. Her work succeeded in maintaining the moderate stance of the ICWPP until the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917. Then, the crisis surrounding imminent American entry into the war had the effect of dividing, rather than unifying. The strains of the women's peace movement broke away from each other, with conservatives supporting Wilson and the war, moderates trying to rally public support to prove that the people did not want war, and radicals trying desperately to end it. Though the moderates and radicals began working together in February 1917 this unification was too little too late, and occurred as a result of the severe backlash against all peace workers in the United States.

Though divided in early 1917, the women's peace movement made mistakes along the way. One of these was underestimating the war fervor that struck America in 1917. English peace workers had faced the same war fervor in 1914. Neither was prepared, or unified enough, to push against their government's propaganda, or against the prevailing hatred toward Germany. Addams represented only one part of the peace movement, and while she worked with as many

organizations as she could, there were many more. Even different branches within the same organizations wanted different things: within the WPP alone, Addams faced branches that did not support women's suffrage, or cared more about immigration policies than the war.⁵²⁷ While there were some attempts by organizations such as the American Peace Society to unify the entire peace movement behind male peace activists, nothing ever came of them. Disagreements on women's place in politics and public activism also caused rifts. Some women wanted women's-only movements, and some believed that men and women should work together in all things. These divisions could not stand up to the unified pro-war movement, especially once the American government rejected neutrality.

Even united, the women's peace movement in America faced several challenges that were difficult to overcome. Addams, Balch, and Andrews main goal for much of the war was to convince the public that, as Americans, they needed to support an American-led neutral conference that would end the war. Yet what the women wanted the public to support was a complicated concept, not easily summed up in a slogan, and they did not attempt to publicize their idea beyond high-level pamphlets and a few political cartoons. The New York branch of the WPP developed a "War against War" exhibit that appeared in New York and other cities, it was for a limited time, and was more concerned with the preparedness movement rather than with explaining and garnering support for the neutral conference.⁵²⁸

I contend that unconscious class bias hindered Addams and Balch, as they attempted to persuade a public that was generally less educated and less literate than the progressive activists

⁵²⁷ The Massachusetts branch put up the biggest fight against including suffrage in the WPP platform, and the California branch wrote to Addams in 1917 without mentioning the war at all. Instead, their branch was focused on the immigration of Japanese and Chinese workers. Jane Addams Collection (DG 001), Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm Reel 113:10–11.

⁵²⁸ The exhibit was also shown in Washington, D. C. While it reached a valuable population, it did not receive the national coverage received by other causes, i.e., preparedness and the war. Kazin, *War against War*, 82–83.

they usually communicated with. This is interesting, even puzzling, because both Addams and Balch worked with groups of people for whom English was likely not their primary language. At her settlement house, Addams frequently would have interacted with recent immigrants and uneducated workers. Balch, too, worked with immigrants during her sabbatical years before the war. However, both women either took their arguments to Congress and the President, or recruited fellow progressive activists to write news articles or periodical pieces that explained their point of view. Peace activists also faced a divided public, where pacifists heard one thing, while Congress and the President heard another. When she was still healthy, Addams gave public talks on both her time abroad and on the peace movement, but, based on reports, her diction was quite high, and her audience was filled with those similar to her in education and ideals.

Andrews was more overtly classist; some historians have shown that many teachers she worked with found her patronizing.⁵²⁹ As an education activist Andrews frequently worked with teachers—but not with their students. Andrews also worked with government education officials on the Board of Education, and was a member of the APS, which generally communicated with the public through their periodical *The Advocate*.

Other kinds of activists, particularly those who supported the preparedness program or America's involvement in the war after April 1917, used multiple kinds of media to communicate with the American public. Preparedness advocates sponsored countrywide preparedness parades, public speakers, written articles, cartoons, and even occasionally used films. Arthur Creel, the mastermind behind America's wartime propaganda campaign, also used the above media, with funding only from the federal government. These campaigns were

⁵²⁹ Zeiger, "The Schoolhouse vs. the Armory," 150–79.

successful: the American public ultimately supported both the preparedness program and the war. They did not support neutral mediation.⁵³⁰

I believe that two other limitations hindered the peace workers advocating for neutral mediation. The first was funding. Among the papers of Addams, Balch, and Andrews, one finds multiple letters asking for money. The ICWPP and the WPP were funded by member donations. When this money did not come in, the organizations did not have the funds to produce anything. Pamphlets and other written material were widely available and would have been cheaper to produce than colored pictures or films.

The second limitation, I contend, was the widespread public misconception of neutral mediation. Mediation at the time was understood to mean that two countries came together, usually with a neutral country hosting, and those two countries created or dictated peace.⁵³¹ Mediation as such did not call for a peace conference; it usually benefited the country that held the most valuable military position. The last major European conflict that ended in a multinational peace settlement would have been the Napoleonic Wars of the 1800s. These ended with a peace conference in Vienna in 1815, to which France was not invited.⁵³² In more recent years, neutral countries had helped negotiate peace during the Balkan Wars, but these wars, while pivotal, had been between small nations, not major European powers. With no clear example of a neutral peace conference to point to, Addams, Balch, and Andrews had to fight misconceptions about their idea before they could even begin to persuade people it was the best idea out there. The complicated nature of the neutral peace conference created confusion among the public and

⁵³⁰ Finnegan *The Spectre of a Dragon*, 91–138.

⁵³¹ They type of peace a country received depended on the size of the country, how territorially valuable the country was, and who their allies were overall.

⁵³² This is a simplification of events. There were two peace meetings and two peace treaties that ended the Napoleonic Wars. The first did involve France, but after Napoleon's escape from his island prison and his 100-day campaign, a second treaty was created, and France was not involved. Tim Chapman, *The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815: Origins, Processes, and Results* (New York: Routledge, 1998) 16–93.

politicians alike; many believed that the three women wanted peace immediately, which under the old way of negotiating would have benefited Germany for most of the war. Most people on the East Coast, where Andrews and Balch lived, and in Washington, D.C., did not support the Central Powers, which might have led them to not support the women's peace program.

The final challenge for the women's peace movement as a whole is the most obvious. The activists I have examined were women. They did not have the national right to vote, they were not established citizens of the United States, and they were still seen, for the most part, as mentally inferior to men. Although Addams as a resident of Illinois had the right to vote, neither Balch nor Andrews did. All three women worked for women's suffrage, though for all three it was a secondary cause: for Addams and Balch suffrage was secondary to peace work, and for Andrews it was secondary to education reform. Historians have noted that female activists in the United States, as well as internationally, were treated differently from male activists. One of the reasons that the ICWPP delegates were able to enter Belgium under German occupation was because they were female. The gender of the activists also allowed them meetings with high-level officials in belligerent nations—because they were not seen as officials themselves.

This access, though, was not as unlimited as it seemed. Historians contend that belligerent officials, and American politicians, gave the women very little information; in their view, simply meeting with and listening to them was enough. Meetings that President Wilson held with delegates from the WPP and then, only days later, with male delegates of the American Socialist Party demonstrate this. With the women, Wilson was merely polite, and he told them no relevant or significant information. But with the men, the President shared his plans as well as information about foreign policy.⁵³³ This difference in treatment gave male activists advantages

⁵³³ Knock, *To End All Wars*, 50–55.

over female ones. This could also explain why Addams and other female activists felt they had more power to persuade politicians than they actually did.

Peace Vindicated

Despite their failure to prevent American entry into World War I, and their persecution by the public during 1918 and 1919, peace advocates clearly impacted international policy decisions as they regained public support in the 1920s. The 1920s saw multiple international conferences concerning disarmament, which were prompted by the public's moral outrage as well as the desire to avoid any future wars.

In the 1920s, the United States hosted two naval conferences with the hope of preventing an arms race.⁵³⁴ In 1921–22, the United States hosted eight other nations, including representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and China, travelled to Washington, D.C., in order to discuss naval disarmament. A second conference was held in Washington, D.C., in 1927, attended by the United Kingdom and Japan. These two conferences were meant to help prevent naval arms races and maintain a balance in naval capabilities, especially between the United Kingdom and the United States. The attending nations agreed to limit their navies in accordance with an agreed-upon 5:5:3 ratio, as well as the territory needed to control. This gave the United Kingdom and the United States the largest naval forces, followed by Japan, Italy, and France.⁵³⁵ The 1927 conference was meant to further naval limitations, but the United Kingdom and the United States failed to reach an

⁵³⁴ These conferences were also called to address—and, hopefully, limit—Japan's growing influence in the Far East. The first conference saw the enshrining of America's Open Door Policy toward China in international agreements.

⁵³⁵ While other countries were at this conference, the naval agreements were signed only by these five countries in what is known as the Five-Power Treaty. Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business and Foreign Policy: 1920–1933* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 31–64.

agreement. In 1930, at the London Naval Conference, the two nations overcame their differences and successfully continued naval disarmament.⁵³⁶ These conferences demonstrate the belief in disarmament as a way to prevent war. Throughout World War I, peace advocates called for disarmament as the critical means for preventing any future wars. As can be seen from the naval conferences, the great powers agreed—it just took them longer.

The 1920s also saw the public's growing moral outrage against chemical weapons. The European public had more experience with the horrors associated with chemical warfare, but the United States public had not. America's military leaders originally intended to develop chemical weapons for use in future conflicts, and Western governments fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia did in fact use them against the Red Army. The newly renamed Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) took up the fight against chemical weapons and began a public awareness campaign in the United States and Europe. This campaign proved successful: in response to the public's moral outrage, the United States and other European nations met in Geneva in 1925 and agreed to ban the use of chemical weapons⁵³⁷—a clear victory for WILPF and for all advocates of disarmament.

The highlight of the anti-war shift of the 1920s was the Kellogg Briand pact of 1928. This agreement to outlaw war, signed on August 27, 1928, in Paris, was the world's attempt to

⁵³⁶ Arguments in 1927 centered around whether to limit navies by tonnage or by number of ships, and around the United Kingdom's wish to maintain a larger navy than the United States. The UK reasoned that, because of its colonial reach, it needed a larger navy. The United States, which was also in possession of colonies and territories, did not agree. In 1930, all five powers from the original 1921–22 conference met in London and agreed on updates to the 1922 Five Power Treaty. The United Kingdom was allotted more tonnage for its navy than anyone else, but the United States was allotted more heavy cruisers. All countries agreed on a five-year moratorium on building new capital ships. Ernest Andrade Jr., "The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922–1936," *Military Affairs* 48, no. 3 (July 1984): 113–20, doi:10.2307/1987484.

⁵³⁷ While the use of chemical weapons was banned, their manufacture and storage was not. For more on the use of chemical weapons from 1918 through 1925 and WILPF's fight for public support for banning them, see Allison Sobek, *How Did the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Campaign against Chemical Warfare, 1915–1930?* (Binghamton, NY: State University of New York at Binghamton, 2001).

prevent another Great War and establish world peace. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace played a major part in this campaign, as did French Minister of Foreign Affairs Aristide Briand and U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, for whom the pact is named. Originally, Briand intended the agreement to be between the United States and France; however, President Calvin Coolidge did not want to enter into a bilateral agreement with France, as he worried it could be used as an alliance which could draw the United States into a war. Kellogg suggested that Briand invite all nations to join in the pact and thus have an international agreement outlawing war. The language of the pact was well received by the international community, as it only banned wars of aggression. The pact also called upon nations to settle disputes through peaceful means instead of military conflict. The final pact was initially signed by 15 nations, and later by an additional 47. In the United States, the Senate ratified the agreement 85 to 1, and Kellogg would earn the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in 1929.⁵³⁸

The Kellogg-Briand Pact set the stage for the 1930s neutrality acts and the reluctance of the world to enter into another war. For peace advocates like Addams and Balch, it signaled that the world was finally coming to its senses. It took a decade for their ideas to finally reach the highest places of international power, but they did succeed. The Kellogg-Briand Pact not only outlawed war but also called upon signatories to negotiate their disagreements. This idea—of diplomacy being the way to avoid war—was the leading idea of every peace advocate during the First World War. The international support for such an agreement in 1928 proved that peace was wanted. Peace advocates had finally achieved what they set out to do. It is unfortunate that less

⁵³⁸ Senator John J. Blain from Wisconsin, who voted against the Kellogg-Briand pact, believed it upheld British imperialism, which he did not agree with. When the agreement was ratified, the Senate passed reservations to ensure that it did not limit the U.S.'s right to self-defense or force the U.S. to enter a conflict if it did not want to. For more on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and how the American public reacted to the treaty, see Stephen J. Kneeshaw, *In Pursuit of Peace: The American Reaction to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928–1929* (New York: Garland, 1991).

than a decade later this hard-won achievement would be one of the reasons for appeasement as Hitler and the Nazis abused the world's wish for peace.

My dissertation has shown that, despite its mistakes, the American peace movement of 1914 through 1917 should not be overlooked. The international connections and organizations created during this time lasted well beyond the war. WILPF still exists today and continues to fight for peace worldwide. The ideas of a connected America that cannot escape the issues of the rest of the world, and whose problems affect the rest of the world, is much more accepted today than ever before. Internationalism is a way of life for most people. While nationalistic movements are growing stronger in many countries, America is more connected, economically, and in reality politically, than ever before. Addams, Balch, and Andrews worked to help end World War I in a way that might have possibly prevented World War II. We will never know what might have occurred if a peace based on their combined ideals prevailed; yet many of the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles, which historians have pointed out over the years, were ones that these women warned of, well before it was written.

Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch are still remembered today because of their peace work during World War I. Addams earned the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931, and its presenter cited her peace work during the war, as well as her work against chemical weapons afterwards. Balch was awarded the same prize in 1946 and again her peace work during World War I was cited along with her postwar work in Haiti, as well as her work to help conscientious objectors during World War II.⁵³⁹ Addams is remembered today as a leader of the women's movement as well as of the peace movement. In Chicago she has parks and memorials named after her, and her

⁵³⁹ After the First World War, Balch travelled to Haiti to help the nation rid itself of American soldiers occupying the country. Haiti was occupied as a strategic military location in July 28, 1915; the American military did not leave until August 1, 1934. Balch lived in the country for many years and, with the help of WILPF, fought to force America to leave the nation and return political control to its people.

settlement house Hull House still stands. And although Balch is not as well remembered as Addams, she has still left her mark. To this day her alma mater Bryn Mawr College has all first-year students participate in Emily Balch Seminars. These seminars challenge students to think, from a variety of perspectives, about complex issues in the world, in honor of Balch and her uniquely global perspective. Though Fannie Fern Andrews, Emily Green Balch and Jane Addams may not have succeeded in preventing America's entry into World War I, but their determination and devotion to peace and international communities has left a lasting impact on the world, which is upheld still in their names.

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Anne Porterfield Rankin Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Crystal Eastman Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library.

Emily Greene Balch Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

Jane Addams Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Lillian Wald Papers, Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library.

Louis Lochner Papers, UW-Madison Archives, Wisconsin Historical Society Library Madison Wisconsin, Microfilm.

Rosika Schwimmer Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Woman's Peace Party Records, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

Newspapers and Periodicals

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The Chicago Evening Post Found in the Jane Addams Papers Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Microfilm.

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APPENDIX

Editorial Cartoon 1 — No Title

Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922); Aug 2, 1914; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune
pg. 1

THE CHRISTIAN NATIONS.



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
Image A.1.

Editorial Cartoon 1 – No Title

Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922); Aug 4, 1914; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune
pg. 1

THE SPORT OF KINGS.


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Image A.2.

Image A.3.






Image A.4.