Asha Bhandary

In this article, I respond to symposium articles by Clark Wolf, Elizabeth Edenberg, and Helga Varden. With shared sympathies for anti-oppression liberalism and social contract theory, they urge me to develop the theory of liberal dependency care (LDC) in new directions — respectively, as a form of subject-centered justice, with a political liberal justification, and with a Kantian foundation for ‘private right.’ I respond by explicating the inclusivity that is built into the arrow of care map and the variety of contract theory I advance. Furthermore, I insist that anti-oppression liberalism need not formulate its claims in political liberal terms.

Inequalities in expectations to receive care permeate social structures, reinforcing racialized and gendered hierarchies. Harming the people who are overburdened and disadvantaged as caregivers, these inequalities also shape the subjectivities and corporeal habits of the class of people who expect to receive care from others. With three examples, I illustrate a series of justificatory asymmetries across gender and racial lines that illustrate (a) asymmetries in deference and attendance to the needs of others as well as (b) assertions of the rightful occupation of space. These justificatory asymmetries are cogent reasons to evaluate the justice of caregiving arrangements in a way that tracks data about who cares for whom, which can be understood by the concept of the arrow of care map. I suggest, therefore, that the arrow of care map is a necessary component of any critical care theory. In addition, employing a method called living counterfactually, I show that when women of color assert full claimant status, we are reversing arrows of care, which then elicits resistance and violence from varied actors in the real world. These considerations together contribute to further defense of the theory of liberal dependency care’s constructivism, which combines hypothetical acceptability with autonomy skills in the real world. Each level, in turn, relies on the transparency of care practices in the real world as enabled by the arrow of care map.

This author's reply addresses critiques by Daniel Engster, Kelly Gawel, and Andrea Westlund about my 2020 book, Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture. I begin with a statement of my commitment to liberalism. In section two, I defend the value of a distinction between conceptions of persons in the real world and in contract theory to track inequalities in care when indexed to legitimate needs. I argue, as well, that my variety of contract theory supplies the normative content needed to reject the subordination of women of color. Acknowledging the enduring danger of expressive subordination, I emphasize my theory's compatibility with the full social inclusion of people with disabilities. Section three then defends liberal dependency care's compatibility with radical critique and transformative change by emphasizing the abstract nature of its core theoretical module. Finally, in section four, I reaffirm conceptual distinctions between autonomy skills, care skills, and a sense of justice by explicating their theoretical roles. In that section, I also embrace Westlund's insight that theorists of justice need to have skills enabling responsiveness to other perspectives. To this new requirement for actual theorists of justice, I further add that we must attain capacities to engage critically with our society's norms. Thus, the final section of this article supplements the justificatory module of liberal dependency care, building from the necessary conditions specified as two-level contract theory toward an account of necessary and sufficient conditions for this liberalism's justificatory module.

This summary of Freedom to Care begins with the core claims and conceptualizations upon which the theory of liberal dependency care rests. It then summarizes the book's chapters. The first five chapters (Part I) delineate its theoretical foundations, which include the two-level contract theory approach to distributive justice for caregiving arrangements. In Part II of the book, chapters six through nine, I formulate liberal proposals for justice-enhancing social change before identifying cross-cultural metrics of justice for the internal evaluation of caregiving arrangements.

The negative health effects of stress are well documented in medical and psychological research, but these effects are underexplored in political philosophy. This essay evaluates these effects in relation to the explanatory and normative value of the concept that I call “being at home.” The phenomenological description of the state of being at home is the sense of feeling at safe and at ease in your context, and therefore being able to relax. Although it characterizes a particular state of being for an individual person, its conditions are relational. I show how the normative value of being at home can guide nonideal action- guiding recommendations to respond to racism in light of the claim that one of the negative effects of racism is a steady stream of disruptions to a person’s sense of ease in the world. Racism and microaggressions create stress, which then causes further negative health effects to the minority body. Consequently, the physical harms perpetrated by racist and sexist societies on the members of oppressed identities can be as great as the effects of actions standardly understood as violence. Demonstrating that a nonideal theoretical approach to bioethics is well suited to evaluating the philosophical ramifications of the bodily damage incurred by microaggressions, I recommend selective and episodic separatism from the perpetrators of microaggressions as a health-protective response to the realities of an unjust world.

Caring for Liberalism brings together chapters that explore how liberal political theory, in its many guises, might be modified or transformed to take the fact of dependency on board. In addressing the place of care in liberalism, this collection advances the idea that care ethics can help respond to legitimate criticisms from feminists who argue that liberalism ignores issues of race, class, and ethnicity. The chapters do not simply add care to existing liberal political frameworks; rather, they explore how integrating dependency might leave core components of the traditional liberal philosophical apparatus intact, while transforming other aspects of it. Additionally, the contributors address the design of social and political institutions through which care is given and received, with special attention paid to non-Western care practices. This book will appeal to scholars working on liberalism in philosophy, political science, law, and public policy, and is a must-read for feminist political philosophers.